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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further  editing.  If
published, the official version will appear in the
bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 15, 1999
A  party  may  file  with  the  Supreme  Court  a
                                                                                        Marilyn L. Graves                                                     petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
                                                                                        Clerk, Court of Appeals                                               Court of Appeals.   See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
                                                                                        of Wisconsin                                                          STATS.
No.                                                                                     99-1002-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                      IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                        DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JOSEPH SCARO,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL  from a judgment and  an order  of  the circuit court for
Waukesha County:   JOESPH E. WIMMER, Judge.   Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                      NETTESHEIM,  J.       Joseph  Scaro  appeals  from  a  judgment  of
conviction  for  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  intoxicated  pursuant  to
§ 346.63(1)(a), STATS.   Scaro pled guilty to the charge after the trial court denied
his motion to suppress based upon his claim of an illegal stop of his motor vehicle
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).   On appeal, Scaro challenges the
trial court’s suppression ruling.




No. 99-1002-CR
FACTS
¶2                                                                                                  The facts are not in dispute.   On August 18, 1997, at approximately
1:15 a.m., Officer Daniel Streit of the Village of Mukwonago Police Department
was patrolling in the area of Bay View Road and Highway ES.   In this area, Bay
View Road ends in a cul-de-sac where business structures are located.    Streit
testified that this area of the village experiences “a lot of burglaries….   It’s not a
high crime area, but that is the area that gets hit more frequently than any other
area in the village as far as nighttime business burglaries.”
¶3                                                                                                  While on patrol, Streit observed a pickup truck leaving one of the
business parking lots on the cul-de-sac and traveling southbound on Highway ES.
Streit considered this suspicious because all the businesses were closed at that
hour of the morning.   Streit followed the vehicle and observed it weaving within
its own lane of traffic.   However, the vehicle did not touch either the center line or
the  fog  line.    Streit  then  activated  his  emergency lights  and,  later,  his  siren.
Eventually, the vehicle pulled over.   Streit established that Scaro was the driver.
Further investigation resulted in Scaro’s arrest for OWI.
¶4                                                                                                  Scaro challenged the validity of Streit’s stop of his vehicle.    He
argued  that  Streit  did  not  have  a  legitimate  reasonable  suspicion  of  criminal
activity  within  the  meaning  of  Terry  and                                                      §                                                                      968.24,  STATS.,  the  statutory
codification of Terry.   The trial court rejected Scaro’s argument.   The court held
that  Streit’s  observation  of  Scaro’s  vehicle  leaving  the  business  parking  lot
justified the stop.1
1 The trial court also ruled that the erratic driving, coupled with Streit’s prior observation
of the vehicle leaving the parking lot, created a reasonable suspicion that the operator might be
intoxicated.   The court additionally stated that if the stop had been based solely on Scaro’s
driving conduct, the stop would not have been valid.
2




No. 99-1002-CR
¶5                                                                                         Following this ruling, Scaro pled guilty to the OWI charge.2   Scaro
appeals  pursuant  to  §  971.31(10),  STATS.,  challenging  the  trial  court’s  ruling
denying his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
¶6                                                                                         The court of appeals will uphold the factual findings of a trial court
unless they are clearly erroneous.   See State v. Young, 212 Wis.2d 417, 424, 569
N.W.2d                                                                                     84,                                                                      88               (Ct.  App.   1997).   However,  whether  the  facts  satisfy  a
constitutional requirement is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
See id.   Here, the relevant facts are not in dispute.   Therefore, the question before
us is whether those facts satisfied the constitutional standards set out in Terry and
related case law.
¶7                                                                                         An investigative stop of a vehicle is appropriate when an officer
possesses  specific  and  articulable  facts  which  would  warrant  a  reasonable
suspicion that the occupants have committed or may commit a crime.   See Terry,
392 U.S. at 21; State v. Guzy, 139 Wis.2d 663, 675, 407 N.W.2d 548, 554 (1987).
“Reasonable suspicion” is a test of common sense.   See State v. Anderson, 155
Wis.2d 77, 83, 454 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1990).   This test envisions that we balance
the need to search or seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
¶8                                                                                         Scaro  contends  that  Streit  was  operating  on  the                   “inchoate  and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch” which Terry condemns.   See id. at 27.   He
argues that his conduct was  “innocent and commonplace” and, if this conduct
2  A  companion  charge  of  operating  a  motor  vehicle  with  a  prohibited  alcohol
concentration pursuant to § 346.63(1)(b), STATS., was dismissed.
3




No. 99-1002-CR
provides a basis for a Terry stop, “a substantial portion of the public would be
subject each day to an invasion of their privacy.”   United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d
973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993).
¶9                                                                                         We  disagree.    Here,  prior  burglaries  had  occurred  in  the  area.
Although Streit did not describe the area as “high crime,” he did represent that the
area experienced more nighttime burglaries than any other area in the village.
Streit observed Scaro’s vehicle exiting a business parking lot during the early
morning hours when all the businesses in the area were closed.    Under those
circumstances, we hold that Streit’s suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot
was reasonable.
¶10    We  acknowledge  that  “conduct  that  large  numbers  of  innocent
citizens engage in every day for wholly innocent purposes, even in residential
neighborhoods where drug trafficking occurs,” cannot form the basis for a Terry
stop.    See Young,  212 Wis.2d at  429-30,  569 N.W.2d at  91.    In Young, the
conduct occurred on a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood in the light of
day and consisted of two persons merely contacting each other.   See id. at 424, 569
N.W.2d at 88.   Here, however, the conduct occurred under the cover of night in an
area of closed businesses that had experienced burglaries in the past.
¶11    In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
a Terry stop was invalid where the officer had testified that the alley in question
“looked  suspicious”  but  was  unable  to  point  to  any  facts  supporting  that
conclusion.   See id. at 52.   Here, Streit was able to point to the burglary history of
the area.   The Brown Court also noted that there was nothing to indicate that it
would be unusual for people to be in the alley during the afternoon hours.   See id.
4




No. 99-1002-CR
Here, the area in question was a private business parking lot and the time of day
was the early morning hours when all businesses were closed.
¶12    While Scaro’s act of driving from the parking lot ultimately proved
to be innocent, the fact remains that it was unusual and suspicious conduct given
the time of day, the area in question and the history of criminal activity associated
with the businesses in the area.   Unlike the conduct in Young and Brown, this was
not conduct that much of the public would engage in on a regular basis.   The law
requires that the inference of unlawful conduct be reasonable.   See Young, 212
Wis.2d at 430, 569 N.W.2d at 91.   We hold that this test is satisfied under the facts
of this case.
¶13    Scaro  points  to  cases  from  other  jurisdictions  in  support  of  his
argument.3   While these cases are of interest, we echo the words of the court in
Young:                                                                                          “Because the determination of reasonable suspicion is fact sensitive and
the possible factors vary, we do not look to other cases with the expectation that
one will be factually identical and resolve the issue in this case.”   Id. at 432, 569
N.W.2d at 91-92.
CONCLUSION
¶14    We hold that the events observed by Streit created a reasonable
suspicion that the operator of the vehicle might be engaged in criminal activity.
We uphold the trial court’s similar ruling.   We affirm the judgment of conviction.4
3 Scaro cites to State v. Robertsdahl, 512 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1994); State v. Haviland,
532 N.W.2d  767  (Iowa  1995); State v. Sarhegyi,  492 N.W.2d  284  (N.D.  1992); Illinois v.
Deppert, 403 N.E.2d 1279 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); and Michigan v. Freeman, 320 N.W.2d 878
(Mich. 1982).
4 In light of our holding, we need not address the other grounds urged by the State in
support of the trial court’s ruling.
5




No. 99-1002-CR
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published.  See RULE 809.23(1)(b)4, STATS.
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