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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                        This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 7, 2005
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Cornelia G. Clark                                                                                                                                          petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                                  Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                           and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                           Cir. Ct. No.   2003CM9064
Appeal No.                                                                             2004AP3105-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                         IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                           DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
LARRY D. HICKS,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL  from  a  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  for  Milwaukee
County:   MARSHALL B. MURRAY, Judge.   Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                     WEDEMEYER,  P.J.1    Larry  D.  Hicks  appeals  from  a  judgment
entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of disorderly conduct, contrary
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2003-04).




No.   2004AP3105-CR
to WIS. STAT. § 947.01 (2003-04).2  He claims the trial court erroneously exercised
its discretion in allowing the State’s witnesses to testify that Hicks had been
arrested for domestic-violence-related conduct within seventy-two hours of the
disorderly conduct incident.   Because the trial court did not erroneously exercise
its discretion in admitting the limited evidence, which related to the context of this
case, this court affirms.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                         On November 9, 2003, Hicks pried open a living room window to
the home located at 3534 N. 24th Place, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which he owned
with his estranged wife, Maelethie.    Maelethie and Hicks were separated and
Hicks did not have keys to the home.   Hicks entered the home while Maelethie and
their son, Larry, were at church.   When Larry returned to the home to retrieve a
cellular  phone,  he  observed  Hicks attempting to barricade  the  front door  and
windows to prevent Larry and Maelethie from entering the residence.
¶3                                                                                         Larry telephoned police and went to church to advise his mother as
to what was happening.   When Larry and Maelethie returned to the home, Hicks
was inside and had blocked all points of entry.   The police arrived and convinced
Hicks to open the door and let them in.   After conducting an investigation, the
police arrested Hicks for disorderly conduct.   Hicks pled not guilty.   Prior to trial,
he filed a motion seeking to prohibit the State from introducing other bad acts
evidence.   Specifically, he did not want the jury to hear about an incident which
had occurred two days prior to November 9th.   On November 7th, Hicks had been
2  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No.   2004AP3105-CR
arrested for domestic violence because he was in the home tying the door shut and
attempting to ignite the house.   The case was “no-processed”3 and Hicks was not
convicted.   Everyone believed that a seventy-two hour no-contact order was issued
in conjunction with that arrest, which is standard procedure.   For some unknown
reason, however, the order could not be located.
¶4                                                                                        The trial court ruled that it would not permit the State to introduce
evidence  of  the  November                                                               7th  domestic  violence  incident.    It  did  indicate,
however, that the victims could refer to the earlier incident to explain why they
feared for their safety on November  9th.    During the testimony of the police
officer, defense counsel asked about the seventy-two hour no-contact order.   The
State then requested an in-chambers conference to discuss additional questions
pertaining to this.   In essence, the State argued, for the sake of completeness, that
it should be permitted to inform the jury that Hicks was arrested, which is why
everyone believed that there was a no-contact order.   The trial court ruled that in
asking the question, defense counsel opened the door for clarification and that it
would permit the State to introduce the fact that Hicks was arrested and that is
why the police believed the seventy-two hour no-contact order existed.   The trial
court ruled, however, that other details relating to the November 7th event would
not be admitted.    The police officer then explained to the jury that they had
investigated whether a seventy-two hour no-contact order was in place because
Maelethie insisted that the no-contact order existed.   She had been told that a no-
contact  order  would  be  issued  due  to  the  arrest  of  Hicks  two  days  earlier.
However, an investigation revealed that no no-contact order was issued, that no
3                                                                                         “No-processed” means the district attorney did not issue charges.
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No.   2004AP3105-CR
one could explain why it had not been issued, and that it should have been issued
because of the arrest.
¶5                                                                                       At  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  the  jury  found  Hicks  guilty  of
disorderly conduct.   He was sentenced to sixty days in the House of Correction.
Hicks now appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶6                                                                                       Hicks  contends  that  the  trial  court  erroneously  exercised  its
discretion in allowing the victims to testify that they feared Hicks because of prior
behavior, allowing into evidence the fact that he was arrested two days prior to
November 9th, and permitting the discussion regarding the seventy-two hour no-
contact order.    This court’s review  of  evidentiary admissions is  limited.    An
appellate court will not overturn a trial court’s decision on an evidentiary ruling as
long as the trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of
law, and demonstrated a rational process in reaching a reasonable conclusion.
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 780-81, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).   In applying
this deferential standard, this court cannot conclude that there was an erroneous
exercise of discretion.
¶7                                                                                       Admissibility of other acts evidence is governed by statute:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith.   This subsection does
not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan,  knowledge,  identify,  or  absence  of  mistake  or
accident.
WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2).   Thus, other acts evidence must first be offered for an
acceptable purpose.   Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.   It also must be relevant.   Id.
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No.   2004AP3105-CR
Finally, the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by unfair
prejudice.   Id. at 773.
¶8                                                                                         Our  supreme  court  recently  held  that  an  acceptable  purpose  for
admitting other acts evidence includes “establishing context.”   State v. Hunt, 2003
WI 81, ¶58, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771.   “Other-acts evidence is permissible
to show the context of the crime and to provide a complete explanation of the
case.”   Id.   Like in Hunt, the evidence proffered here was offered to establish
context.   Hicks was arrested two days before the November 9th incident.   Both the
victims and the police believed that, as a result of the arrest, there was a no-contact
order prohibiting Hicks from coming to the home.   The police indicated that when
they were first called to the home on November  9th, it was to investigate the
violation of a restraining order.   Hicks told police he had a legal right to be in the
home.    Maelethie  insisted  that  a  no-contact  order  existed.    She  believed this
because that is what she was told by someone in the district attorney’s office just
two days before Hicks came and locked her out of her home.   Much of the police
investigation in the November 9th incident revolved around determining whether
or not the no-contact order existed.
¶9                                                                                         Thus, the trial court in this case did not error in allowing the limited
testimony about the prior arrest and the no-contact order.   It was offered for the
acceptable purpose of establishing the context of the November 9th event.   For
these same reasons, its admission was relevant.   The last question then is whether
its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice.   In this regard, the trial
court  was  very  careful  about  admitting  very  limited  amounts  of  information
relative to the events of November 7th.   The trial court did not allow introduction
of  any  of  the  specific  details  about  what  happened  on  that  date.    The  only
information admitted was the fact that Hicks was arrested, that the victims feared
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No.   2004AP3105-CR
for their safety on November 9th, and general discussion about the seventy-two
hour no-contact order.   This information was not unfairly prejudicial to Hicks.
The very brief testimony established the context which was necessary for the jury
to understand the events and did unfairly prejudice Hicks.
¶10    Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that there was a proper
basis to admit the limited testimony and it can be inferred from the record that the
trial court assessed the proper factors, applied the correct law, and reached a
reasonable determination.    This court cannot find that there was an erroneous
exercise of discretion.   Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
                                                                                       This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                                                                              (b)4.
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