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2003  WI  105
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                               01-2690-CR
COMPLETE TITLE:
State  of  Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Patty  E.  Jorgensen,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
Reported  at:                                                           256  Wis.  2d  1047,  650  N.W.2d  322
(Ct.  App.  2002-Unpublished)
OPINION FILED:                                                          July  11,  2003
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                          February  18,  2003
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                  Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                 Dane
JUDGE:                                                                  Steven  D.  Ebert
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:                                                              ABRAHAMSON,  C.J.,  dissents  (opinion  filed).
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For   the   defendant-appellant-petitioner   there   were   briefs
and  oral  argument  by  Charles  Bennett  Vetzner,  assistant  state
public  defender.
For   the   plaintiff-respondent   the   cause   was   argued   by
Christopher  G.  Wren,  assistant  attorney  general,  with  whom  on
the  brief  was  James  E.  Doyle,  attorney  general.




2003  WI  105
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
editing  and  modification.    The  final
version   will   appear   in   the   bound
volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
(L.C.  No.                                                                     99  CT  1250)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                                           :                     IN  SUPREME  COURT
State  of  Wisconsin,
                                                                                                     FILED
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.                                                                                                   JUL  11,  2003
Patty  E.  Jorgensen,                                                          Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Affirmed.
¶1    JON  P.  WILCOX,  J.      This  is  a  review  of  an  unpublished
court  of  appeals  decision,  State  v.  Jorgensen,  No.                      01-2690-CR,
unpublished  slip  op.  (Wis.  Ct.  App.  June  27,  2002),1  in  which  the
court  of  appeals  affirmed  a  judgment  of  conviction  and  order
denying   a   postconviction   motion   entered   by   the   Dane   County
Circuit  Court,  Steven  D.  Ebert,  Judge.     The  defendant,  Patty
Jorgensen,  contends  that  the  court  of  appeals  erred  in  affirming
1  Pursuant   to   Wis.  Stat.  §  752.31(2)(f)                                (1999-2000),   this
case  was  decided  by  one  judge  at  the  court  of  appeals,  rather
than  a  three  judge  panel.
All  subsequent  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are  to
the  1999-2000  version  unless  otherwise  indicated.




No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
her  conviction  for  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  intoxicated,
fourth  offense,  and  the  denial  of  her  postconviction  motion.
She  now  seeks  relief  from  this  court  on  the  ground  that  the
sentencing  guidelines  established  by  the  Fifth  Judicial  District
for  certain  "operating  while  intoxicated"  offenses  under  the
authority   of   Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a),   are   unconstitutional.
Jorgensen  claims  the  circuit  court  violated  her  rights  to  due
process  and  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by  relying  upon  the
local  guidelines  authorized  by  §  346.65(2m)(a).    She  asserts  the
guidelines  operate  to  increase  disparity  in  sentencing  based
only   on   the   geographic   location   of   the   offense.                  Jorgensen
further  claims  that  the  guidelines  relied  upon  by  the  court
exceed    the    authority    granted    by    the    legislature    in
§  346.65(2m)(a)   and   that   the   guidelines,   on   their   face,   are
inapplicable  to  her.
¶2    We  hold  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  established  by
the                                                                            Fifth                                                  Judicial   District                        are          authorized    by
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a).     We  further  conclude  that  under  the
plain   language   of                                                          §  346.65(2m)(a),   the   sentencing   guidelines
apply                                                                          only                                                   to         Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b),   not
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a),  under  which  Jorgensen  was  sentenced.
However,   because   circuit   courts   have   a   great   amount   of
sentencing  discretion,  we  find  that  reference  to  the  sentencing
guidelines  in  a                                                              §  346.63(1)(a)  case  does  not  constitute  error.
That  being  the  case,  a  defendant  such  as  Jorgensen  sentenced
under  §  346.63(1)(a)  may  potentially  be  sentenced  by  a  court
referring                                                                      to                                                     the        sentencing                      guidelines   established
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                                                                              No.                                                                   01-2690-CR
for  §  346.63(1)(b).                                                         Therefore,   we   must   address   Jorgensen's
argument  that  these  guidelines  are  unconstitutional.     We  agree
with   the   court   of   appeals'   conclusion   that   the   sentencing
guidelines  are  constitutional  and,  accordingly,  we  affirm.
I.    BACKGROUND
¶3    For  purposes  of  this  appeal,  the  following  facts  are
not  in  dispute.    In  the  early  morning  hours  of  May  21,  1999,  a
witness  found  Jorgensen  in  her  vehicle  in  a  ditch  near  his  home
and  summoned  police.    Responding  officers  found  Jorgensen  asleep
in  the  driver's  seat  of  her  vehicle.     Jorgensen  failed  field
sobriety  tests  administered  by  the  police,  and  she  was  arrested
for  operating  a  vehicle  while  intoxicated.     Subsequent  blood
testing  showed  that  Jorgensen's  blood  alcohol  content  was  .276.
¶4    Jorgensen                                                               was                                                                   charged      with   violating
                                                                              Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a)   and   Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b).2                                   She
utilized  her  right  to  a  jury  trial.    She  stipulated  to  many  of
2  Wisconsin  Stat.  §  346.63(1)  provides,  in  pertinent  part:
No  person  may  drive  or  operate  a  motor  vehicle
while:
(a)   Under   the   influence   of   an   intoxicant,   a
controlled  substance,  a  controlled  substance  analog  or
any   combination   of   an   intoxicant,   a   controlled
substance  and  a  controlled  substance  analog,  under  the
influence  of  any  other  drug  to  a  degree  which  renders
him  or  her  incapable  of  safely  driving,  or  under  the
combined  influence  of  an  intoxicant  and  any  other  drug
to  a  degree  which  renders  him  or  her  incapable  of
safely  driving;  or
(b)    The    person    has    a    prohibited    alcohol
concentration.
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No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
the  facts  and  the  only  issue  remaining  for  jury  determination
was   whether   or   not   Jorgensen   was   the   person   operating   the
vehicle.     At  trial,  Jorgensen  claimed  that  another  person  was
driving.
¶5    A  jury  found  Jorgensen  guilty  of  operating  a  vehicle
while  under  the  influence  of  an  intoxicant  (OWI)  in  violation  of
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a)  and  of  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while
having   a   prohibited   blood   alcohol   concentration                     (PAC)   in
violation  of  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b),  either  of  which  would
constitute  her  fourth  "operating  under  the  influence"  offense.
¶6    Section                                                                 346.63(1)                                                                (c)    of    the    Wisconsin    Statutes
provides  that  although  a  defendant  may  be  charged  and  prosecuted
for  both  OWI  and  PAC,  violations  of                                                                                                              §§  346.63(1)(a)  and                         (b),
                                                                              respectively,  a  defendant  may  not  be  "convicted"  and  sentenced
                                                                              for  both  OWI  and  PAC  if  the  charges  arise  out  of  the  same
incident   or   occurrence.                                                                                                                            Rather,   "[i]f   the   person   is   found
guilty  of  both  pars.                                                       (a)  and                                                                 (b)  for  acts  arising  out  of  the
same  incident  or  occurrence,  there  shall  be  a  single  conviction
for   purposes   of   sentencing   and   for   purposes   of   counting
convictions                                                                   under                                                                    ss.                                           343.30(1q)   and           343.305."
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(c).     Jorgensen's  judgment  of  conviction
was  entered  on  the  OWI  count,  §  346.63(1)(a).
¶7    The   sentencing   guidelines   at   issue,   the   "Fifth
Judicial  District  OWI  Sentencing  Guidelines,"  were  established
by  the  Chief  Judge  of  the  Fifth  Judicial  District  under  the
authority                                                                     granted                                                                  by                                            the          legislature   in
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No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a).3     For  a  fourth  offense  such  as  the
one  here,  the  guidelines  are  provided  in  a  table  format  and
include   factors   to   consider   and   corresponding   sentencing
recommendations.                                                              The   horizontal   headings   on   the   table   are:
"BAC  Levels,"  "Minimum  Driving  No  Accident,"  and  "Aggravated
Driving  Accident  or  Injury  Bad  Driving  Record."     The  specific
guideline  relevant  to  sentencing  in  this  case  provided  that  for
a  fourth  offense,  a  defendant  with  a  blood  alcohol  content  level
of  .20  or  above  faces  periods  of  incarceration  with  ranges  of  60
to  150  days  and  90  days  to  one  year,  depending  upon  the  court's
determination   of   the   specific   circumstances   surrounding   the
offense.
                                                                              ¶8    At    sentencing    on    September                                                                                                 7,                     2000,    both    the
                                                                                                                                      prosecutor  and  defense  counsel  made  arguments  based  on  these
                                                                              3  Wisconsin  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)  provides:
                                                                              In   imposing   a   sentence   under   sub.                                                                                                                      (2)   for   a
violation   of   s.                                                                                                                   346.63(1)                                                              (b)   or   (5)   or   a   local
ordinance   in   conformity   therewith,   the   court   shall
review  the  record  and  consider  the  aggravating  and
mitigating  factors  in  the  matter.    If  the  level  of  the
person's  blood  alcohol  level  is  known,  the  court  shall
consider  that  level  as  a  factor  in  sentencing.     The
chief  judge  of  each  judicial  administrative  district
shall   adopt   guidelines,   under   the   chief   judge's
authority  to  adopt  local  rules  under  SCR                                70.34,  for
the    consideration    of    aggravating    and    mitigating
factors.
(Emphasis  added.)     We  note  that  the  defendant  argues  that  the
guidelines  established  by  the  Fifth  Judicial  District  exceed  the
authority  granted  by  this  statute.
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No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
sentencing  guidelines.    Explicitly  noting  guideline  factors,  the
State   requested   an   eight-   to   nine-month   sentence.                 Defense
counsel  did  not  dispute  application  of  the  guidelines  at  the
time.                                                                         Rather,    Jorgensen's    counsel    noted    the    guideline
provisions   and   argued   that   a   three-month   sentence   was   more
appropriate   under   the   circumstances.                                    After   hearing   these
arguments,   the   circuit   court,   explicitly   referencing   the
sentencing  guidelines,  sentenced  Jorgensen  to  seven  months  in
jail.
¶9    Jorgensen  filed  a  motion  for  postconviction  relief  on
several   grounds,   including   the   issue   now   before   this   court,
whether   the   circuit   court   erroneously   relied   upon   local
sentencing  guidelines  because                                               §  346.65(2m)(a),  the  authorizing
statute,   is   unconstitutional.                                             The   circuit   court   denied   the
motion.
¶10   Jorgensen    appealed    from    both    the    judgment    of
conviction  and  the  order  denying  her  motion  for  postconviction
relief.    She  again  claimed  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  relied
upon  by  the  circuit  court  were  unconstitutional.4    The  court  of
appeals  affirmed  the  circuit  court,  holding  that  the  circuit
court   did   not   violate   Jorgensen's   due   process   and   equal
protection  rights  by  using  the  local  sentencing  guidelines.    On
October                                                                       21,                                                              2002,  this  court  accepted  Jorgensen's  petition  for
review.
4  Jorgensen  also  appealed  the  circuit  court's  ruling  on  the
issue  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel,  but  that  issue  has
not  been  raised  as  part  of  this  appeal  and  is,  therefore,  not
addressed.
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No.                                                                             01-2690-CR
II.    STANDARD  OF  REVIEW
¶11   The  question  before  this  court  is  whether  the  circuit
court   erred   in   using   the   Fifth   Judicial   District   sentencing
guidelines  to  sentence  Jorgensen.    We  review  the  circuit  court's
exercise    of    discretion    in    sentencing    Jorgensen.                  More
specifically,  we  look  at  the  legal  bases  for  the  circuit  court's
sentencing  determination.
¶12   Sentencing  falls  within  the  discretionary  authority  of
the  circuit  court.    McCleary  v.  State,  49  Wis.  2d  263,  277,  182
N.W.2d  512                                                                     (1971);  State  v.  Eckola,   2001  WI  App                     295,                                   ¶4,   249
Wis.  2d  276,  638  N.W.2d  903.    This  court  has  held  that  it  "will
not   interfere   with   the   circuit   court's   sentencing   decision
unless  the  circuit  court  erroneously  exercised  its  discretion."
State   v.   Lechner,                                                           217   Wis.  2d  392,          418-19,                           576   N.W.2d  912
(1998);  see  also  Eckola,  249  Wis.  2d  276,  ¶4.    The  circuit  court
erroneously   exercises   its   discretion   if   the   exercise   of
discretion  is  based  on  an  error  of  law.    State  v.  Davis,  2001  WI
136,                                                                            ¶28,                          248  Wis.  2d  986,               637  N.W.2d  62;  State  v.  Hutnik,   39
Wis.  2d  754,  763,  159  N.W.2d  733  (1968).
¶13   In     reviewing     the     circuit     court's     sentencing
determination   in   this   case,   we   must   also   interpret   the
provisions   of                                                                 §  346.65(2m)(a).             Statutory   interpretation   is
reviewed  de  novo.    Burg  v.  Cincinnati  Cas.  Ins.  Co.,  2002  WI  76,
¶15,                                                                            254   Wis.  2d  36,           645   N.W.2d  880.                The   first   step   in
statutory  interpretation  is  to  look  at  language  of  the  statute.
Id.,  ¶16.
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No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
¶14   If  we  find  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  established
by   the   Fifth   Judicial   District   do   not   exceed   the   authority
granted  by  the  legislature  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a),  the
analysis  must  focus  on  the  constitutionality  of  that  statute.
The  constitutionality  of  a  statute  is  a  question  of  law  which
this  court  reviews  de  novo.    State  v.  McManus,  152  Wis.  2d  113,
129,  447  N.W.2d  654  (1989);  Employers  Health  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tesmer,
161  Wis.  2d  733,  737,  469  N.W.2d  203  (Ct.  App.  1991).    Statutes
are   presumed   constitutional,   and   the   party   bringing   the
constitutional  challenge  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  statute
                                                                                                               unconstitutional   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.                                                         McManus,                              152
Wis.  2d  at                                                                   129                                                                                   (internal  citation  omitted);  Stanhope  v.  Brown
County,                                                                        90  Wis.  2d  823,              837,                                                  280  N.W.2d  711                                                                            (1979);  State  v.
Hanson,                                                                        182  Wis.  2d  481,             485,                                                  513  N.W.2d  700                                      (Ct.  App.                            1994);
Employers  Health,                                                                                             161  Wis.  2d  at                                                                                           737.     If  there  is  no  suspect
classification   or   fundamental   right   involved,   "'it   is   the
court's  obligation  to  locate  or  to  construct,  if  possible,  a
rationale  that  might  have  influenced  the  legislature  and  that
reasonably  upholds  the  legislative  determination.'"  Tomczak  v.
Bailey,                                                                        218  Wis.  2d  245,             264,                                                  578  N.W.2d  166                                      (1998)                                (internal
                                                                               citation  omitted);  McManus,                                                         152  Wis.  2d  at                                     129                                   ("'If  the  court
can  conceive  any  facts  on  which  the  legislation  could  reasonably
be   based,   it   must   hold   the   legislation   constitutional.'")
(quoting  State  ex  rel.  Strykowski  v.  Wilkie,                             81  Wis.  2d  491,
506,                                                                           261   N.W.2d  434               (1978));   see   also   Employers   Health,           161
Wis.  2d  at  737-38  ("'If  there  is  any  reasonable  basis  upon  which
the  legislation  may  constitutionally  rest,  the  court  must  assume
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No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
that  the  legislature  had  [that]  fact  in  mind  [when  it  passed  the
act].'")  (internal  citation  omitted)  (brackets  in  original).
III.    ANALYSIS
¶15   This   case   centers   around   the   constitutionality   of
sentencing   guidelines   promulgated   under   the   authority   of
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a).                                                Jorgensen    argues    that    these
guidelines  violate  her  state  and  federal  constitutional  rights
to  due  process  and  equal  protection  of  the  law  because  they
increase  sentencing  disparity  on  the  basis  of  the  geographic
location  of  the  alleged  offense.      Jorgensen  also  raises  two
related   preliminary   issues.                                               She   argues   that   the   guidelines
established  by  the  Fifth  Judicial  District  exceed  the  authority
granted    through    Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)    and    that    the
guidelines,  on  their  face,  are  not  applicable  to  her  case.     We
address  these  issues  first.                                                Because  we  conclude  that  the
guidelines  were  authorized  under  §  346.65(2m)(a),  that  reference
to  the  guidelines  was  not  error,  and  that  there  is  a  rational
basis   for   the   guidelines,   we   affirm   the   court   of   appeals'
decision.     Finally,  Jorgensen  asserts  that  even  if  we  find  the
sentencing   guidelines   constitutional,   we   should   utilize   our
supervisory   powers   to   abrogate   use   of   the   guidelines.           We
decline  to  do  so.
A.    Statutory  Authority
¶16   Jorgensen    argues    that    the    sentencing    guidelines
established  by  the  Fifth  Judicial  District  exceed  the  authority
granted  by  the  legislature  in  §  346.65(2m)(a).    She  argues  that
the   legislature   did   not   mandate   creation   of   guidelines   with
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No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
recommendations  of  specific  sentences  or  sentencing  ranges.    She
points   to   the   language   of                                             §  346.65(2m)(a),   which   states,   in
pertinent    part:                                                            "The    chief    judge    of    each    judicial
administrative   district   shall   adopt   guidelines  .  .  .  for   the
consideration  of  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors."    Jorgensen
suggests  that  the  legislature  did  not  intend  for  the  districts
to  go  beyond  creating  a  list  of  appropriate  aggravating  and
mitigating  factors  for  consideration.
¶17   The                                                                     State,                                             on              the                             other   hand,   suggests
that  §  346.65(2m)(a)  merely  sets  a  minimum  upon  which  the  chief
judges  of  various  judicial  districts  have  expounded  by  adding  a
link   to   an   appropriate   sentence.                                      We   agree   with   this
perspective.    We  see  nothing  in  the  language  that  prohibits  the
districts  from  linking  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors
with   an   appropriate   sentence   within   the   broader   range   of
sentences    allowed    under  §  346.65.                                     Section                                            346.65(2m)(a)
mandates  that  chief  judges  set  up  guidelines  based  on  their
authority   under   SCR                                                       70.34                                              (2000).         This   rule   provides   that
"[e]ach  chief  judge  may  adopt  additional  local  rules  not  in
conflict  with  the  uniform  judicial  administrative  rules."     SCR
70.34.    The  legislature  authorized  and  required  chief  judges  to
set    up    guidelines    for    consideration    of    aggravating    and
mitigating  factors.    As  far  as  we  can  discern,  there  is  nothing
to  prevent  the  chief  judges  from  taking  an  extra  step  to  link
these  factors  with  appropriate  sentence  ranges.
¶18   This  court  has  found  that  "when  the  legislature  has
granted  the  sentencing  court  the  authority  to  impose  sentences
10




No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
within  a  certain  range,  the  legislature  has  given  the  court
discretion  to  determine  where  in  that  range  a  sentence  should
fall."    State  v.  Setagord,  211  Wis.  2d  397,  418,  565  N.W.2d  506
(1997)                                                                        (citation  omitted).     That  is  essentially  what  the  chief
judges  have  done  here.    They  have  created  guidelines  that  match
up   appropriate   sentences   within   the   statutory   ranges   to
aggravating   and   mitigating   factors.                                     We   do   not   find   this
inappropriate.
B.    Applicability  of  the  Guidelines
¶19   The  parties'  briefs  to  this  court  raise  the  issue  that
Jorgensen   was   sentenced   under   Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a),   not
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b).     It  appears  that  this  issue  was  not
raised  before  either  the  circuit  court  or  the  court  of  appeals.
Instead,  the  record  indicates  that  all  parties  appeared  to  rely
upon  the  applicability  of  the  guidelines  until  the  appeal  to
this  court.      Jorgensen  now  attempts  to  use  the  argument  to
emphasize  her  point  that  application  of  these  guidelines  to  her
was  inappropriate.    Arguably,  she  has  waived  any  complaint  about
the  application  of  the  wrong  statute  to  her  case.    Nonetheless,
we  find  it  appropriate  to  discuss  the  issue  because  the  State
agrees  that  Jorgensen  was  sentenced  under  the  wrong  section  of
the  statute  and  asserts  that  the  error  deprives  Jorgensen  of
standing  to  argue  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  guidelines.
¶20   The  State  asserts  that  Jorgensen  lacks  standing  to
raise  a  constitutional  challenge  to  the  sentencing  guidelines
because  the  guidelines  are  inapplicable  to  the  section  under
which  she  was  sentenced.    The  State  acknowledges  that  the  judge
11




No.                                                                             01-2690-CR
relied  upon  the  guidelines,  but  suggests  that  only  a  person
sentenced                                                                       under           the                   relevant                            section          mentioned   in
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)——Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b)——has
standing  to  make  a  constitutional  challenge.     The  State  argues
that  Jorgensen  could,  at  best,  claim  that  the  court's  reliance
upon  the  guidelines  was  an  erroneous  exercise  of  discretion.
¶21   We  do  not  agree  with  the  State's  argument  on  standing.
In  Mast  v.  Olsen,  89  Wis.  2d  12,  16,  278  N.W.2d  205  (1979),  this
court  held:     "A  party  has  standing  to  challenge  a  statute  if
that  statute  causes  that  party  injury  in  fact  and  the  party  has
a  personal  stake  in  the  outcome  of  the  action."    We  find  that  if
the  circuit  court  relied  upon  the  local  sentencing  guidelines,
then  Jorgensen  has  arguably  been  injured  and  assuredly  has  a
personal    stake    in    whether    or    not    the    guidelines    are
constitutional.
¶22   One  of  the  reasons  for  the  rule  of  standing  is  that
courts                                                                          "should         not                   adjudicate                          constitutional   rights
unnecessarily."    State  v.  Fisher,  211  Wis.  2d  665,  668  n.2,  565
N.W.2d  565  (Ct.  App.  1997)  (quoting  Mast,  89  Wis.  2d  at  16).    In
Schwittay  v.  Sheboygan  Falls  Mutual  Insurance  Co.,                        2001  WI  App
140,                                                                            ¶16  n.3,       246  Wis.  2d  385,   630  N.W.2d  772,  the  court  of
appeals  found  that  requiring  standing  also  "assures  that                 [the
court   does]   not   decide   a   constitutional   issue   unless   it   is
essential  to  the  determination  of  the  case  before  [it]."    Here,
the  State  has  conceded  that  it  was  not  necessarily  inappropriate
for  the  circuit  court  to  refer  to  the  sentencing  guidelines.
Circuit  courts  are  allowed  wide  discretion  in  sentencing.     See
12




                                                                                                                                                                                    No.                   01-2690-CR
State  v.  McQuay,                                                               154  Wis.  2d  116,                                   129,                                         452  N.W.2d  377      (1990);
Anderson  v.  State,                                                             76  Wis.  2d  361,                                    363,                                         251  N.W.2d  768      (1977);
Eckola,                                                                          249  Wis.  2d  276,                                   ¶4.     This  court  has  found  that  the
circuit  courts  are  in  the  best  position  to  consider  the  factors
relevant  to  sentencing.     See  Setagord,                                     211  Wis.  2d  at                                     418.     We
agree  with  the  State  that  a  circuit  court's  reference  to  the
sentencing  guidelines  is  not  necessarily  inappropriate,  but  we
cannot   agree   that   Jorgensen   is   deprived   of   standing   on   the
constitutional    issue    because    she    was    sentenced    under
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a).
¶23   Essentially,  the  issue  of  whether  the  circuit  court
erroneously   exercised   its   discretion   in   this   case   may   be
determined   by   two   considerations:                                          (1)   whether   the   judge
actually   relied   upon   the   local   guidelines   in   sentencing
Jorgensen;  and                                                                  (2)  if  the  judge  relied  upon  the  guidelines,
whether  it  was  error  for  the  judge  to  do  so.
¶24   The   parties   do   not   dispute   the   circuit   court's
reliance  upon  the  sentencing  guidelines.5     We  find  the  record
5  Jorgensen  argues,  as  she  must,  that  the  circuit  court
relied  upon  the  guidelines.     If  the  circuit  court  did  not  rely
upon  the  guidelines  for  sentencing,  Jorgensen  would  clearly  lack
standing  to  make  a  constitutional  claim,  because  there  would  be
no  injury.    See  Mast  v.  Olsen,  89  Wis.  2d  12,  16,  278  N.W.2d  205
(1979);  Schwittay  v.  Sheboygan  Falls  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,                     2001  WI
App                                                                              140,                                                  ¶16  n.3,                                    246  Wis.  2d  385,   630  N.W.2d  722.     The  State
argues  that  Jorgensen  does  not  have  standing,  but  on  the  basis
that   the   circuit   court   sentenced   Jorgensen   under   the   wrong
statute,  not  on  the  basis  that  the  circuit  court  did  not  rely  on
the  guidelines.
13




No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
indicates  that  the  circuit  court  did,  in  fact,  rely,  at  least  to
some   extent,   upon   the   Fifth   Judicial   District   guidelines   in
sentencing   Jorgensen.                                                        As   noted,   both   parties   made   their
sentencing  arguments  based  on  the  guidelines.    The  circuit  court
then   followed   suit,   noting   at   the   outset   of   its   sentencing
determination  that  "everybody  apparently  has  the  guidelines  in
front  of  them,  so  we  all  know  what  the  Fifth  Judicial  District
does   consider   as   being   an   appropriate   range   of   sentencing
penalties  for  this  type  of  an  offense."    The  court  then  went  on
to  note  that  Jorgensen's  blood  alcohol  level  meant  that  the
relevant  section  was  the  highest  level  in  the  guideline  table.
As   noted   by   the   circuit   court   in   its   postconviction   order,
however,  it  did  consider  other  relevant  factors  in  addition  to
the  range  of  penalties  set  out  by  the  guidelines,  including
blood  alcohol  level,  prior  convictions  for  operating  under  the
influence,  and  the  fact  that  there  was  an  accident.    The  circuit
court  indicated  that  its  sentence  was  based  upon  the  appropriate
factors  laid  out  by  this  court  in  McCleary:    the  gravity  of  the
offense,  the  character  of  the  offender,  and  protection  of  the
                                                                               public.     See  McCleary,                    49  Wis.  2d  at             276;  State  v.  Harris,   119
Wis.  2d  612,                                                                 623,                                          350   N.W.2d  633   (1984)   (noting  the  McCleary
"primary"  factors  and  listing  other  additional  factors).
Apparently,  the  parties  disputed  reliance  at  the  court  of
appeals   level,   and   the   court   of   appeals   did   not   make   a
determination  regarding  whether  the  circuit  court  relied  upon
the  guidelines.     Rather,  the  court  of  appeals  stated  that  it
would  assume  the  circuit  court  relied  upon  the  guidelines  in
order  to  reach  the  constitutional  issue.
14




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      No.                    01-2690-CR
                                                                                                                                              ¶25   Our  second  consideration  is  whether  reliance  upon  the
                                                                                                                                              guidelines  was  inappropriate  under  the  relevant  statutes.     We
                                                                                                                                              have  established  that  the  circuit  court  relied,  at  least  to  some
                                                                               degree,   upon   the   provisions   of   the   guidelines.                                                                                                                    Section
                                                                                                                                              346.65(2m)(a)  of  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  authorized  the  creation
                                                                                                                                              of  sentencing  guidelines  for  certain  offenses.     That  section
provides,  in  its  entirety:
                                                                                                                                              In   imposing   a   sentence   under   sub.                                             (2)   for   a
                                                                               violation   of   s.                                            346.63(1)                                                                    (b)   or   (5)   or   a   local
ordinance   in   conformity   therewith,   the   court   shall
review  the  record  and  consider  the  aggravating  and
mitigating  factors  in  the  matter.    If  the  level  of  the
person's  blood  alcohol  level  is  known,  the  court  shall
consider  that  level  as  a  factor  in  sentencing.     The
chief  judge  of  each  judicial  administrative  district
shall   adopt   guidelines,   under   the   chief   judge's
authority  to  adopt  local  rules  under  SCR                                 70.34,  for
the    consideration    of    aggravating    and    mitigating
factors.
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)  (emphasis  added).    The  plain  language
of  the  statute  makes  clear  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  are
only  applicable  to  convictions  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b)
or  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(5).
¶26   The  record  here  shows  that  Jorgensen  was  not  sentenced
under  either                                                                  §  346.63(1)(b)  or  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.64(5).     She  was
sentenced  under  §  346.63(1)(a).    Neither  party  has  disputed  that
issue   and,   in   fact,   both   relied   upon   it   in   making   their
arguments  to  this  court.    It  is  true  that  Jorgensen  was  charged
with    and    found    guilty    by    a    jury    of    violating    both
§§  346.63(1)(a)  and                                                          (1)(b).     Nevertheless,  under  the  provisions
of  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(c),  Jorgensen  could  only  be  convicted
15




No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
and  sentenced  under  one  of  these  subsections.    The  circuit  court
sentenced  her  under  §  346.63(1)(a).
¶27   Since  the  legislature  specified  that  guidelines  were
to  be  established  for  use  in  sentencing  under                           §  346.63(1)(b),
not                                                                            §  346.63(1)(a),   circuit   courts   should   not   apply   the
guidelines  by  rote  to                                                       (1)(a)  convictions.6     We  agree  that  in
exercising  its  broad  discretion  in  the  area  of  sentencing,  a
court  may  refer  to  the  sentencing  guidelines  for  PAC  offenses  in
sentencing  a  defendant  convicted  of  OWI.     These  violations  are
similar  and  one  cannot  argue  that  the  factors  relevant  to  one
offense  are  not  a  relevant  consideration  in  sentencing  for  the
other.    As  this  court  has  noted:    "Wisconsin  has  a  strong  public
policy  that  the  sentencing  court  be  provided  with  all  relevant
information."                                                                  State   v.   Guzman,                                                        166   Wis.  2d  577,                                                592,                             480
N.W.2d  446                                                                    (1992).     Although  this  policy  typically  comes  up  in
the  context  of  information  about  the  defendant,  we  believe  it
applies  with  equal  force  to  relevant  law.    Thus,  it  is  not  error
for   a   circuit   court   to   refer   to   the   guidelines   authorized
under  §  346.65(2m)(a)                                                        when                                                                        sentencing                                                          a                                defendant
under  §  346.63(1)(a).                                                                                                                                    However,   because   the   legislature   has
                                                                               specifically   delineated   the   offense   to   which   the   guidelines
                                                                                                                                                           6  In  addition,  we  note  that  these  are  discretionary,  not
                                                                               mandatory,  guidelines.     State  v.  Smart,                                                                                                   2002  WI  App                    240,        ¶15,
257   Wis.  2d  713,                                                                                                                                       652   N.W.2d  429                                                   ("The   guidelines   are   not
mandatory,  and  a  court  may  disregard  them  if  it  so  chooses.").
Thus,                                                                          even                                                                        if                                                                  sentencing                       a           defendant   under
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(b),   a   circuit   court   may   decide   to
disregard  the  sentencing  guidelines.
16




No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
apply,  it  is  inappropriate  for  a  circuit  court  to  simply  apply
the   guidelines   as   the   sole   basis   for   its   sentence   in
a  §  346.63(1)(a)  case.7
C.    Equal  Protection  and  Due  Process
¶28   We  have  found  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  do  not
exceed                                                                        the                                   authority                                                              granted       by       the          legislature
in  §  346.65(2m)(a)  and  that  a  circuit  court  may  refer  to  the
guidelines                                                                    as                                    a                                                                      relevant      factor   in           sentencing
under  §  346.63(1)(a).    These  findings  leave  us  with  the  issue  of
whether  §  346.65(2m)(a)                                                     itself                                violates                                                               Jorgensen's
constitutional  rights  to  due  process  and  equal  protection  of  the
7  We  note  that  this  circuit  court's  error  may  not  be  unique.
In  the  appendix  to  her  brief  to  this  court,  Jorgensen  included
copies  of  the  related  sentencing  guidelines  from  Eighth,  Fourth,
and   Fifth   Judicial   Districts.                                           All   of   these   guidelines   are
entitled  "OWI  Sentencing  Guidelines."     This  is  somewhat  of  a
misnomer                                                                      that                                  we                                                                     suggest       should   be           clarified.
Wisconsin  Stat.  §  346.63  deals  with  many  "operating  under  the
influence"  offenses.     Violations  of  subsection                          (1)(a)  of  that
statute  are  often  referred  to  as  "OWI"  offenses.     Subsection
(1)(b),  as  clarified  in  this  case,  refers  to  violations  for
operating   a   vehicle   while   having   a   prohibited   blood   alcohol
concentration,  sometimes  known  as  "PAC"  violations.    Titling  the
guidelines   "OWI   Sentencing   Guidelines"   suggests   that   the
guidelines  refer  to  all  the  offenses  under  §  346.63  and  none  of
the   guidelines   appear   to   include   an   explanation   that   the
                                                                                                                    guidelines   only   apply   to   Wis.  Stat.  §§  346.63(1)(b)   and   (5).
                                                                                                                    Courts  could  even  interpret  the  guidelines  to  apply  only  to
offenses                                                                      under                                 Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a)——so-called                                OWI
offenses.                                                                                                           This   opinion   is   intended   to   clarify   that   these
interpretations  are  incorrect.     The  guidelines  only  apply  to
sentencing   for   convictions   under                                        §§  346.63(1)(b)   and                (5),
although  we  acknowledge  that  a  court  may  refer  to  the  guidelines
as                                                                            a                                     relevant                                                               factor        in       sentencing   under
Wis.  Stat.  §  346.63(1)(a).
17




No.                                                                           01-2690-CR
laws  under  both  the  state  and  federal  constitutions.8     "This
court  has  held  the  due  process  and  equal  protection  clauses  of
the  Wisconsin  Constitution  are  the  substantial  equivalents  of
their  respective  clauses  in  the  federal  constitution."    McManus,
152  Wis.  2d  at                                                             130;  see  also  Joseph  E.G.  v.  State,   2001  WI  App
29,  ¶5  n.4,  240  Wis.  2d  481,  623  N.W.2d  137  (2000).
¶29   Jorgensen    argues    that    the    sentencing    guidelines
violate  her  constitutional  rights  because  the  various  judicial
districts  have  different  guidelines  and  thus,  defendants  may
receive   different   sentences   based   on   where   the   crime   was
committed.     Jorgensen  asserts  that  the  location  of  an  offense
within   a   particular   district   is   not   a   legitimate   sentencing
factor.    Jorgensen  asserts  that  the  guidelines  are  not  entitled
to   a   presumption   of   constitutionality   because  §  346.65(2m)(a)
did  not  authorize  the  type  of  guidelines  promulgated  by  the
Fifth  Judicial  District.     In  contrast,  the  State  argues  that
because  there  is  a  rational  basis  for  the  sentencing  guidelines—
8  Article  XIV,  Section  1,  of  the  United  States  Constitution
provides,  in  pertinent  part:
No   State   shall  .  .  .  deprive   any   person   of   life,
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;  nor
deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal
protection  of  the  laws.
Article   I,   Section                                                        1   of   the   Wisconsin   Constitution
provides,  in  pertinent  part:
All  people  are  born  equally  free  and  independent,  and
have  certain  inherent  rights;  among  these  are  life,
liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  .  .  .
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No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
that  being  a  reduction  in  sentencing  disparity  within  judicial
districts——the  guidelines  are  constitutional.
¶30   We  agree  with  the  analysis  employed  by  the  court  of
appeals  in  this  case  and  in  the  case  of  State  v.  Smart,  2002  WI
App                                                                            240,                                                             257  Wis.  2d  713,   652  N.W.2d  429,  a  nearly  identical
case.     In  both  cases,  the  constitutionality  of  the  guidelines
was  upheld.
¶31   Jorgensen  does  not  argue  that  there  is  any  suspect
class  or  fundamental  right  involved  here  and  appears  to  agree,
as  she  did  at  the  court  of  appeals,  that  a  rational  basis  test
is  appropriate.    See  Jorgensen,  No.  01-2690-CR,  unpublished  slip
op.  at                                                                        ¶30.     The  United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  Chapman  v.
United  States,                                                                500  U.S.                                                        453,                  464-65                                    (1991),  supports  such  an
                                                                               interpretation   of   the   claims   here.                                                                                       Chapman   held   that         a
fundamental  right  is  not  involved  in  this  context  and  that            a
rational  basis  test  is  appropriate:
They                                                                           [the   defendants]   argue   preliminarily   that   the
right  to  be  free  from  deprivations  of  liberty  as  a
result   of   arbitrary   sentences   is   fundamental,   and
therefore   the   statutory   provision   at   issue   may   be
upheld   only   if   the   Government   has   a   compelling
interest  in  the  classification  in  question.     But  we
have  never  subjected  the  criminal  process  to  this  sort
of  truncated  analysis,  and  we  decline  to  do  so  now.
Every  person  has  a  fundamental  right  to  liberty  in  the
sense  that  the  Government  may  not  punish  him  unless
and   until   it   proves   his   guilt   beyond   a   reasonable
doubt  at  a  criminal  trial  conducted  in  accordance  with
the  relevant  constitutional  guarantees.     But  a  person
who  has  been  so  convicted  is  eligible  for,  and  the
court  may  impose,  whatever  punishment  is  authorized  by
statute  for  his  offense,  so  long  as  that  penalty  is
not  cruel  and  unusual,  and  so  long  as  the  penalty  is
not   based   on   an   arbitrary   distinction   that   would
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No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
violate  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.
In  this  context,                                                             .  .  .  an  argument  based  on  equal
protection  essentially  duplicates  an  argument  based  on
due  process.
Chapman,                                                                       500  U.S.  at                             464-65                    (emphasis  in  original)   (internal
citations  omitted).      This  view  was  adopted  by  the  court  of
appeals  in  Smart,  257  Wis.  2d  713,  ¶5.
¶32   As   indicated   by   Chapman,   the   analyses   of   the   due
process  claims  and  equal  protection  claims  are  largely  the  same.
Chapman,  500  U.S.  at  464-65.    The  court  of  appeals  has  laid  out
the  test  for  both.     In  Joseph  E.G.,                                    240  Wis.  2d  481,                       ¶8,  the
court  of  appeals  held:
When  considering  an  equal  protection  challenge  that
does    not    involve    a    suspect    or    quasi-suspect
classification,  "the  fundamental  determination  to  be
made  .  .  .  is     whether     there     is     an     arbitrary
discrimination  in  the  statute  .  .  .  ,  and  thus  whether
there  is  a  rational  basis  which  justifies  a  difference
in  rights  afforded."
(internal  citations  omitted);  see  also  McManus,                           152  Wis.  2d  at
130-31.      So  long  as  a  statute  creating  a  classification  is
"rationally  related  to  a  valid  legislative  objective,"  it  does
not  violate  the  constitutional  right  to  equal  protection.    Id.
¶33   Similarly,   the   court   of   appeals   has   held   that
substantive  due  process  serves  to  "protect[]  people  from  state
conduct   that   'shocks   the   conscience  .  .  .  or   interferes   with
rights  implicit  in  the  concept  of  ordered  liberty.'"    Smart,  257
Wis.  2d  713,                                                                 ¶11                                       (quoting  Joseph  E.G.,   240  Wis.  2d  481,        ¶13).
The   court   there   found   that   unless   a   fundamental   right   is
implicated,  "a  statute  will  generally  survive  a  substantial  due
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No.                                                                          01-2690-CR
process  challenge  if  it  is  rationally  related  to  a  legitimate
government  interest."    Id.  (citing  McManus,  152  Wis.  2d  at  131).
¶34   We  disagree  with  Jorgensen's  argument  that  the  statute
is  not  entitled  to  a  presumption  of  constitutionality.    We  have
already  found  that  the  sentencing  guidelines  do  not  exceed  the
authority  granted  in  §  346.65(2m)(a).     Thus,  the  issue  becomes
the  constitutionality  of  the  statute  itself.    It  has  been  well-
settled  that  statutes  are  presumed  constitutional  and  a  party
challenging  the  constitutionality  of  a  statute  must  prove  the
                                                                                                                                                                                statute   unconstitutional   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.                                                                                                         See
                                                                             Stanhope,                                       90   Wis.  2d  at                                  837                                                                                                                           ("We   begin   with   the   principle
                                                                                                                                                                                repeatedly  stated  by  this  court  and  the  United  States  Supreme
Court                                                                        that                                            all                                                legislative                                                              acts                                                 are                                     presumed
                                                                             constitutional  .  .  .                                                                                                                                                     .");   see   also   Milwaukee   Brewers   Baseball
                                                                             Club   v.   DHSS,                                                                                  130   Wis.  2d  79,                                                      98-99,                                               387   N.W.2d  254                       (1986).
Consequently,  we  will  apply  a  presumption  of  constitutionality
in   our   examination   of   Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)   and   the
guidelines  promulgated  thereunder.
¶35   Jorgensen  asserts,  as  did  the  defendant  in  Smart,  that
this  court's  decision  in  Nankin  v.  Village  of  Shorewood,  2001  WI
92,                                                                          245   Wis.  2d  86,                             630   N.W.2d  141,   and   the   United   States
                                                                             Supreme  Court  decision  in  Bush  v.  Gore,   531  U.S.                                          98                                                                       (2000),
support  her  argument  that  the  guidelines  are  unconstitutional.
Like  the  court  of  appeals  in  both  this  case  and  Smart,  we
disagree.
¶36   In  the  Nankin  case,  this  court  held  unconstitutional  a
tax  statute  that  applied  differently  to  residents  in  counties
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No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
with  larger  populations.    Nankin,  245  Wis.  2d  86,  ¶46.    As  noted
by  the  court  of  appeals  in  Smart,                                        257   Wis.  2d  713,                                                  ¶9,  the
Nankin  case  is  distinguishable.     Unlike  the  statute  in  Nankin,
which  merely  created  a  disparity  based  on  population  where  none
existed  before,  the  statute  here  is  remedial  and  serves  the
purpose  of  reducing  disparity.    See  Smart,  257  Wis.  2d  713,  ¶9.
¶37   The  United  States  Supreme  Court  decision  in  Bush  is
also  distinguishable,  as  noted  by  the  court  of  appeals  in  Smart,
257  Wis.  2d  713,                                                            ¶10.     In  Bush,                                                    531  U.S.  at                                  110,  the  United
States  Supreme  Court  prevented  a  recount  of  presidential  ballots
on  the  basis  that  different  standards  would  be  used  across  the
state.     Further,  as  the  Smart  court  pointed  out,  the  Supreme
Court  arguably  applied  a  higher  level  of  scrutiny  since  "the
right  to  vote  for  president  of  the  United  States,  once  conferred
by  a  state,  is  a  fundamental  right."     Smart,                          257  Wis.  2d  713,
¶10.
¶38   Jorgensen    argues    that    the    guidelines    increase
disparity,   but   as   noted   by   the   court   of   appeals,   she   has
provided  no  evidence  of  such  an  effect.     Instead,  she  asserts
that  the  court  of  appeals  in  Smart  concedes  the  point,  with  its
acknowledgement  that  the  statute  "creates  different  classes  of
                                                                               people"   that   might   be   subject   to   different   standards.   See
Smart,                                                                         257  Wis.  2d  713,                                                   ¶6.     We  disagree  with  this  assertion.
In  fact,  as  this  court  has  recognized:     "Equal  protection  does
not   deny   a   state   the   power   to   treat   persons   within   its
jurisdiction   differently;   rather   the   state   retains   broad
discretion    to    create    classifications    so    long    as    the
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                                                                               No.                           01-2690-CR
classifications   have   a   reasonable   basis."                              McManus,                      152
Wis.  2d  at  131.
¶39   We   agree   that   having   different   guidelines   in   the
various  judicial  districts  may  lead  to  some  disparity.     It  is
not   a   perfect   solution   to   the   sentencing   disparity   problem.
However,  under  a  rational  basis  test,  it  need  not  be  a  perfect
solution.     It  must  only  be  a  step  in  the  right  direction.     As
noted  by  the  court  of  appeals  in  Smart,  257  Wis.  2d  713,  ¶7:
Smart   argues   the   guideline   scheme   does   not   bear   a
rational   relationship   to   the   objective   of   reducing
disparity  and  actually  increases  it  by  allowing  each
judicial   district   to   develop   their   own   standards.
While  we  agree  the  statute  may  not  be  the  best  way  to
reduce  drunk  driving  sentencing  disparity,  a  rational
basis  inquiry  does  not  require  perfection.     Our  only
question    is    whether    the    statute    bears    some
relationship  to  advancing  that  goal.     It  does.     By
mandating  the  creation  of  guidelines  within  judicial
districts,  the  statute  attempts  to  reduce  sentencing
disparity   within   those   districts.                                        While   statewide
guidelines  would  perhaps  be  more  equitable,  there  is
no  requirement  the  legislature  choose  the  wisest  or
most  effective  means  of  reducing  disparity.
In   addition,   this   court   has   held:                                    "The   fact   a   statutory
classification  results  in  some  inequity  .  .  .  does  not  provide
sufficient  grounds  for  invalidating  a  legislative  enactment."
McManus,  152  Wis.  2d  at  131.
¶40   Jorgensen  does  not  challenge  sentencing  guidelines  as
a  whole.     As  this  court  acknowledged  in  State  v.  Speer,             176
Wis.  2d  1101,  1124,  501  N.W.2d  429  (1993),  sentencing  guidelines
that  allow  "the  exercise  of  judicial  discretion  while  reducing
variance  by  providing  guideline  sentences  for  similar  offenders
who  commit  similar  offenses,"  are  valid.                                  (Citation  omitted.)
23




No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
We   disagree   with   Jorgensen   that   the   sentencing   guidelines
established   under   Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)   do   not   fit   that
mold.     We  agree  with  the  court  of  appeals'  statement  in  Smart
that    statewide    guidelines    might    be    better,    but    that
acknowledgement  is  not  the  equivalent  of  a  determination  that
district-by-district  guidelines  increase  disparity.     Smart,              257
Wis.  2d  713,  ¶7.    Rather,  we  are  persuaded,  as  was  the  court  of
appeals   in   both   Smart   and   this   case,   that   the   district-by-
district  sentencing  guidelines  at  issue  here  in  fact  operate  to
reduce  disparity  within  the  judicial  administrative  districts.
See   Smart,                                                                   257   Wis.  2d  713,                                          ¶9.   Such   guidelines   do   not
completely  eliminate  the  evil  of  sentencing  disparity,  but  as
the  court  of  appeals  in  this  case  pointed  out,  "[T]he  proper
comparison  is  between  having  no  guidelines  and  having  district-
by-district  guidelines."    Jorgensen,  No.  01-2690-CR,  unpublished
slip  op.  at                                                                  ¶29.     That  comparison  makes  clear  that  having  some
guidelines  within  districts  are  better  than  none  at  all.    As  the
State  points  out  in  its  brief,  Jorgensen  here  appears  to  argue
for  the  position  that  district-by-district  guidelines  violate
equal   protection   and   due   process,   but   a   system   without
guidelines  does  not.                                                         (Resp't  Br.  at                                              12)   Such  a  position  is
illogical  and  we  reject  it.      Instead,  we  accept  that  these
guidelines    fulfill    the    rational    basis    test    by    reducing
sentencing  disparity  within  judicial  districts.
¶41   Accordingly,    we    affirm    the    court    of    appeals'
determination   that   the   Fifth   District   Sentencing   guidelines
authorized  by  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.65(2m)(a)  are  constitutional.
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No.                                                                            01-2690-CR
D.    Supervisory  Powers
¶42   In  a  final  argument,  Jorgensen  suggests  that  even  if
this  court  finds  the  guidelines  constitutional——which  we  do——
this  court  should  still  invalidate  the  guidelines  exercising  its
supervisory   powers   over   the   state   courts.                

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