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COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION
Case Nos.:                                 96-1211 & 96-1393
Complete Title
of Case:
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF RICHARD BROWN:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
RICHARD BROWN,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF DONALD WILLIAMS:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
DONALD WILLIAMS,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Opinion Filed:                             December 23, 1997
Submitted on Briefs:                       November 4, 1997
Oral Argument:                             ---
JUDGES:                                    Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Curley, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:




Appellant
ATTORNEYS:                                                                  On behalf of the respondent-appellant Richard Brown, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of James J. Winiarski, of Milwaukee.  On behalf
of the defendant-appellant Donald Williams, the cause was submitted on
the briefs of Richard D. Martin, assistant state public defender.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS:                                                                  On behalf of the petitioner-respondent/plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
                                                                            submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Sally L.
Wellman, assistant attorney general.
On behalf of Director of State Courts J. Denis Moran, an amicus brief was
submitted by Brady C. Williamson and Jeffrey J. Kassel of La Follette &
Sinykin, of Madison.




COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
NOTICE
DATED AND FILED
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in the
bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 23, 1997
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Marilyn L. Graves                                    petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
Clerk, Court of Appeals                              Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
of Wisconsin                                         STATS.
Nos.  96-1211 & 96-1393
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                   IN COURT OF APPEALS
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF RICHARD BROWN:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
RICHARD BROWN,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF DONALD WILLIAMS:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
DONALD WILLIAMS,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
DIANE S. SYKES, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Curley, JJ.
CURLEY, J.      Richard Brown and Donald Williams appeal from
trial court orders holding that there is no right to judicial substitution in Chapter
980 civil commitment proceedings.1    Brown and Williams argue that, under a
proper interpretation of Chapter 980 and § 801.01(2), STATS., the right to judicial
substitution  afforded  by                                                              § 801.58,  STATS.,  does  apply  to  Chapter   980  civil
commitment proceedings.  Alternatively, Brown and Williams argue that without a
right to judicial substitution, Chapter  980 violates constitutional guarantees of
equal protection.   We conclude that Chapter 980, containing the civil commitment
procedure for sexually violent persons, is subject to the provisions of Chapters 801
to  847.    The only exception to the general rule embodied in  § 801.01(2) that
“Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and practice … in all civil actions and
special proceedings” is “where [a] different procedure is prescribed by statute or
rule.”    There is no language in Chapter  980 prescribing a different procedure.
Thus, the right to judicial substitution embodied in § 801.58 applies to Chapter
980  proceedings.    Because  this  holding  is  dispositive,  we  need  not  address
Brown’s  and  Williams’s  equal  protection  claims.    Therefore,  we  reverse  and
remand to the trial court with directions to honor Brown’s request for judicial
substitution.
1  Brown’s and Williams’s cases were consolidated on appeal because in both cases the
issues presented and the trial court’s rationale are identical.
2




                                                                                        Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
I. BACKGROUND.
On March 3, 1995, the State filed a petition against Brown, pursuant
to the civil commitment provisions of Chapter 980, STATS., alleging that he was a
sexually violent person.   The case was originally assigned to Milwaukee Circuit
Court  Judge  Hansher,  who  found  probable  cause  that  Brown  was  a  sexually
violent  person,  but  dismissed  the  case  after  finding  Chapter                    980  to  be
unconstitutional.   The State appealed, however, and the appeal was stayed to await
the outcome of several other cases challenging the constitutionality of Chapter
980.   Eventually, in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997), and its companion case, State v. Post, 197
Wis.2d 279,  541 N.W.2d  115 (1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court declared Chapter 980 to be constitutional.   Following
these  decisions,  this  Court summarily reversed the  trial  court’s  judgment and
remanded the case back to the circuit court.   On remand, Judge Diane Sykes was
administratively assigned the case.    Upon learning that Judge Sykes had been
assigned the case, Brown filed a request for judicial substitution, citing §            971.20,
STATS., the right of judicial substitution found in the criminal procedure code.
The trial court declined to accept the request for substitution, but noted that Brown
had timely filed his request under both the criminal substitution statute, § 971.20,
and the civil substitution statue, § 801.58, STATS.   The trial court denied Brown’s
request, reasoning  that, because  Chapter  980 is silent with respect to judicial
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
substitution, “no right of substitution is available in Chapter 980 cases.”   Brown
now appeals.2
The State also filed a petition against Williams, and, on November 1,
1994, the trial court found probable cause that Williams was a sexually violent
person within the meaning of Chapter 980, STATS.   Williams’s case, like Brown’s,
was delayed by appellate proceedings until March 7, 1996, at which time it was
remitted to the circuit court.   On April 15, 1996, Williams’s attorney learned that
Judge Sykes had been assigned to Williams’s case, and on April  22 he filed a
substitution request.   The trial court denied Williams’s request “for the reasons
which are included in [the] written decision” in Brown’s case and entered an order
to that effect.   Williams also now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS.
The first issue presented is whether the right to judicial substitution
embodied in  § 801.58, STATS., applies to civil commitment proceedings under
Chapter 980, STATS.   To resolve this issue, we must interpret Chapter 980 and
§ 801.01(2),  STATS.    Statutory  construction  involves  a  question  of  law  and
therefore our review is de novo.   See State v. Martinez, 210 Wis.2d 397, 413, 563
N.W.2d 922, 929 (Ct. App. 1997).
The trial court’s holding that no right to judicial substitution exists in
Chapter 980 proceedings is based on its reading of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
opinion in State ex rel. Serocki v. Clark County Cir. Ct., 163 Wis.2d 152, 471
2  The State has filed a brief conceding that the trial court erred in finding that the right to
judicial substitution found in § 801.58, STATS., does not apply to Chapter 980 civil commitment
proceedings.   An amicus curiae brief, however, has been filed by the Director of State Courts,
J. Denis Moran, supporting the trial court’s position.   Therefore, our decision will primarily
respond to the arguments raised by the amicus curiae.
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
N.W.2d 49 (1991).  The trial court specifically concluded that the supreme court in
Serocki “indicated … that the right of substitution [found in                              § 801.58, STATS.,]
cannot be implied where it does not expressly exist, either specifically or by
incorporation.”   The trial court then applied this standard and held that because
Chapter 980 is silent with respect to judicial substitution, no such right exists.   The
trial court erred, however, by misreading Serocki, and by applying the wrong legal
standard  to  the  issue  presented.    Under                                              § 801.01(2),  STATS.,3  the  procedures
established in Chapters  801 to  847, STATS., including  § 801.58, automatically
apply to civil proceedings except where a different procedure is prescribed by a
statute or a rule.   As both the State and the amicus curiae concede, proceedings
under Chapter 980, STATS., are civil commitment proceedings.   See Carpenter,
197 Wis.2d at 258, 541 N.W.2d at 107; Post, 197 Wis.2d at 294, 541 N.W.2d at
118.   Therefore, because Chapter 980 does not prescribe a “different procedure,”
the default rule requires that the right to judicial substitution under § 801.58 does,
rather than does not, apply.
In Serocki,  the issue  before the supreme court was  “whether an
individual  subject  to  recommitment  under  sec.                                         51.20 (13)                                (g)3  may,  at  a
recommitment hearing held before a circuit judge who presided at the original
commitment  proceeding  or  at  a  previous  recommitment  hearing,  request
substitution for the circuit judge pursuant to sec. 801.58(1).”   Serocki, 163 Wis.2d
at 154, 471 N.W.2d at 50.   All of the parties in Serocki agreed that the right of
3  Section 801.01(2), STATS., provides:
(2) SCOPE.  Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and practice
in circuit courts of this state in all civil actions and special
proceedings whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of
statutory origin except where different procedure is prescribed
by statute or rule.   Chapters 801 to 847 shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
judicial  substitution  embodied  in                                                    § 801.58,  STATS.,  applied  to  recommitment
proceedings  under  Chapter                                                             51,  STATS.    The  only  dispute  was  whether  the
recommitment hearing held before the same judge who committed the individual
was a continuation of the original commitment proceeding or a new proceeding
which would make a request for substitution at the recommitment hearing timely.
In a footnote which amounted to dictum, given that all of the parties agreed that
§ 801.58(1), STATS., applied to recommitment hearings under § 51.20(13)(g)3, the
supreme court stated:
Section  51.20,  Stats.  1989-90,  incorporates  by  reference
sec. 801.58, Stats. 1989-90.   Section 51.20(10)(c) provides
that  in  recommitment  hearings                                                        “except  as  otherwise
provided  in  this  chapter,  the  rules  of  evidence  in  civil
actions and s. 801.01(2) apply to any judicial proceeding or
hearing under this chapter.”   Sec. 801.01(2) provides that
“[c]hapters                                                                             801-847  govern  procedure  and  practice  in
circuit  courts  of  this  state  in  all  civil  actions                               …”    The
substitution statute, sec. 801.58, is part of chapter 801.
Serocki, 163 Wis.2d at 155 n. 3, 471 N.W.2d at 51 n. 3.   The trial court, relying
solely  on  this  footnoted  dictum,  concluded  that  the  supreme  court              “required
specific language incorporating the right of judicial substitution before it would
consider substitution to be available in Chapter 51 proceedings.”   Thus, the trial
court concluded that the supreme court had “indicated its opinion that the right of
substitution cannot be implied where it does not expressly exist, either specifically
or by incorporation.”   We disagree.   Such an interpretation would run contrary to
the plain language of § 801.01(2), STATS., and extensive prior case law, indicating
exactly the opposite conclusion—that the procedures established in Chapters 801
to                                                                                      847,  STATS.,  including  the  right to judicial substitution found in  § 801.58,
automatically apply to civil proceedings unless a different procedure is prescribed
by a statute or a rule.
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
Section 801.01(2), STATS., reads, in relevant part, “SCOPE.   Chapters
801 to 847 govern procedure and practice in circuit courts of this state in all civil
actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of
statutory origin except where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule.”
A reading of the relevant parts of § 801.01(2), STATS., indicates in plain language
that the default rule is inclusion rather than exclusion, and that unless a “different
procedure is prescribed by statute or rule,” Chapters  801 to  847 automatically
apply to all civil proceedings.   Although the statute’s language makes its meaning
clear, examples from case law also support our conclusion.   See State v. Jody
A.E., 171 Wis.2d 327, 335-37, 491 N.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the joinder provisions of § 803.03(1), STATS., govern paternity proceedings
under  Chapter                                                                           767,  STATS.,  because  Chapters    801  to   847  govern  special
proceedings as well as civil actions, unless the special procedure statute says to the
contrary and since Chapter  767, STATS., is silent regarding who is or is not a
necessary  party,  § 803.03(1),  STATS.  applies);  and  see  Hoberg  v.  Berth,  157
Wis.2d 717, 719-20, 460 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that unless a
different  procedure  is  prescribed  by  Chapter                                        867,  STATS.,  governing  special
administration, § 801.01(2) requires that § 804.05(1) applies).
Given the clear language of the statute, and the supporting caselaw,
we decline to read the court’s dictum in Serocki as a reversal of the standard
established by § 801.01(2).   As a result, the procedures established in Chapters
801 to 847 automatically apply to all civil actions and special procedures unless a
“different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule.”   Chapter 980 proceedings are
civil commitment proceedings.   See Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d at 258, 541 N.W.2d at
107;  Post,  197  Wis.2d  at  294,  541  N.W.2d  at  118.    Thus,  under  the  proper
standard, the right to judicial substitution applies unless Chapter 980 prescribes a
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
“different procedure.”   As the trial court correctly noted, Chapter 980 is silent with
respect  to  judicial  substitution.    Therefore,  it  fails  to  prescribe  a            “different
procedure” and the right to judicial substitution embodied by § 801.58 applies.
The amicus curiae, however, argues that the procedural time limits
of  Chapter  980  are                                                                      “incompatible”  with  judicial  substitution,  and  thus,  even
though  Chapter  980  does  not  explicitly  establish  a  “different  procedure,”  we
should hold that § 801.58 does not apply.   The amicus curiae’s argument is based
on specific language from State v. Tammy F., 196 Wis.2d 981, 539 N.W.2d 475
(Ct. App.  1995), and David S. v. Laura S.,  179 Wis.2d  114,  507 N.W.2d  94
(1993).   In David S., the supreme court held that, although Chapter 48, STATS., did
not  prescribe  a  different  procedure  for  intervention,  the  intervention  statute,
§ 803.09, STATS. 1991-92, did not apply because it was not “consistent with the
purposes and policies underlying the statutory proceedings set forth in ch.  48
which limit the persons who must be notified of the proceedings.”   David S., 179
Wis.2d at 143-44, 507 N.W.2d at 105.   Also, in Tammy F., this court stated that:
“The decision in David S. thus reveals that we are to look not only for distinct
differences in procedure, but also to whether the procedures established in the
different chapters are consistent.”   Tammy F., 196 Wis.2d at 986, 539 N.W.2d at
477.    The  amicus  curiae  contends  that  because  of  these  statements,  a  mere
showing of “incompatibility” or “inconsistency” is enough to bar application of
Chapters 801 to 847.   We disagree.
Notwithstanding the language quoted by the amicus curiae, the facts
and contexts of these cases reveal that the standard enunciated in  § 801.01(2),
STATS., has not been changed, and that mere alleged incompatibility, without an
explicit or implicit prescription by the statute of a “different procedure,” will not
bar the application of the provisions of Chapter 801 to 847 to civil actions and
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Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
special proceedings.    In David S., the issue was whether  § 803.09 applied to
termination  of  parental  rights  proceedings  under  Chapter                             48,  thus  entitling  a
child’s grandparents to intervene as parties in the proceeding.   See David S., 179
Wis.2d  at  143-44,  507  N.W.2d at  104-05.    The  “inconsistency”  at issue  was
created  by language  from  § 48.42(2),  STATS.,  which  limited  the  persons  who
needed to be notified and summoned to the proceedings.   See id.   This language,
beyond creating an inconsistency, implicitly established a  “different procedure”
that  was  incompatible  with  the  intervention  statute,                                 § 803.09.    Likewise,  in
Tammy F., this court held that the general discovery rules established by Chapter
804, STATS., did not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings under
Chapter 48.   See Tammy F., 196 Wis.2d at 986-87, 539 N.W.2d at 476-77.   The
decision  in  Tammy F.,  however,  was not based on  mere  “incompatibility”  or
“inconsistency.”    Instead, our  holding was based on the  fact that Chapter  48
contained specific procedures which were explicitly different from those provided
by Chapter 804.   See id. at 985-87, 539 N.W.2d at 476-77.   Thus, the context and
facts of David S. and Tammy F. show that for an “inconsistency” to be relevant, it
must result from the legislature’s creation of a different procedure, either explicitly
or implicitly.
As the amicus curiae notes, Chapter  980 does contain restrictive
procedural time limits.   If the subject of a Chapter 980 commitment petition is
incarcerated,  a  probable  cause  hearing  must  be  held  within                         72  hours  of  the
petition’s filing.   Section 980.04, STATS.   Also, the trial must begin within 45 days
of the probable cause hearing.   Section 980.05(1), STATS.   We acknowledge that
these time limits, coupled with the exercise of a right to judicial substitution, may
cause  administrative  difficulties,  especially  in  one-judge  counties.    We  note,
however,  that  judicial  substitution  inevitably puts  great  pressure  on  the  court
9




Nos. 96-1211 & 96-1393
system, as it must accommodate the removal of one judge and the appointment of
another.    Nonetheless,  the  right  to  judicial  substitution  exists  in  many  other
proceedings which also contain restrictive time limits.   For example, the right to
judicial substitution exists in civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 51,
STATS., in spite of the fact that probable cause hearings must be held within 72
hours after an individual is detained.   See § 51.20(7)(a), STATS.; and Serocki, 163
Wis.2d at 155, 471 N.W.2d at 51.   The right to judicial substitution also applies in
criminal cases, even though a preliminary examination must be held within  10
days  of  a  defendant’s  initial  appearance  if  the  defendant  is  in  custody.    See
§§ 971.20 &  970.03(2), STATS.   Thus, we cannot conclude that the legislature,
merely by including restrictive procedural time limits in Chapter 980, intended to
therefore implicitly create a “different procedure,” inconsistent with the right to
judicial substitution.   Therefore, in the absence of an explicit or implicit “different
procedure,”  we  conclude  that  the  alleged                                                “incompatibility”  presented  by  the
amicus curiae does not prevent the application of the right to judicial substitution
embodied in § 801.58, STATS.
Because our interpretation of Chapter 980 and § 801.01(2), STATS.,
is dispositive, we decline to address Brown’s and Williams’s equal protection
arguments.   See Gross v. Hoffman,  227 Wis.  296,  300,  277 N.W.2d  663,  665
(1938).    Thus, in conclusion, we reverse and remand to the circuit court with
directions to honor Brown’s and Williams’s requests for judicial substitution.
By the Court.—Orders reversed and cause remanded.
10

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