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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                         This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 16, 2011
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                            petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                           Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                           and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                           Cir. Ct. No.   2006CF1143
Appeal No.                                                                              2010AP15-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                         IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
RICHARD L. WESLEY,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Kenosha County:
DENNIS J. BARRY, Judge.  Affirmed.
Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Reilly, J.
¶1                                                                                      PER CURIAM.    Richard Wesley appeals from a circuit court order
denying his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The  circuit  court  denied  the  motion  because  Wesley  did  not  testify  at  the




No.   2010AP15-CR
evidentiary hearing on his motion, and he did not establish that he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s conduct at sentencing.   We affirm.
¶2                                                                                            Wesley pled guilty to hit and run involving death.   We affirmed his
conviction.   State v. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, 321 Wis. 2d 151, 772 N.W.2d 232
(Wesley  I).    However,  we  reversed  the  circuit  court  order  denying  Wesley’s
postconviction  motion  alleging  ineffective  assistance  of  trial  counsel,  and  we
remanded to the circuit court for a hearing on Wesley’s claim.   Id., ¶24.   This
appeal is taken from the proceedings on remand.
¶3                                                                                            The plea agreement required Wesley to plead guilty to hit and run
involving death; a negligent homicide charge would be “dismissed outright.”   Id.,
¶3.   The parties were free to argue at sentencing.   At sentencing, the State argued
that Wesley drove negligently.
¶4                                                                                            Postconviction, Wesley argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
at sentencing because she did not object to the State’s references to negligent
driving and to a portion of the presentence investigation report that discussed
negligent conduct.   Id., ¶6.   Wesley argued that because the negligent homicide
charge was “dismissed outright,” the State breached the plea agreement by these
references.   Id.   In the alternative, Wesley argued that if the “dismissed outright”
agreement did not prohibit the State from emphasizing Wesley’s driving, then
Wesley did not understand the plea agreement.   Id., ¶7.   Wesley claimed that his
trial  counsel  did  not  explain  that  the  State  could  use  at  sentencing  the  facts
underlying the negligent homicide charge.   The circuit court denied the motion.
¶5                                                                                            In Wesley I, we concluded that the plea agreement’s  “dismissed
outright” provision was ambiguous.   Id., ¶17.                                                                                                                               “Dismissed outright” could have
meant                                                                                         (1)  that  the  negligent  homicide  charge  was  dismissed  and  the  facts
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No.   2010AP15-CR
underlying the charge could not be referred to at sentencing or (2) even though
Wesley no longer faced conviction and sentencing for negligent homicide, the
parties  were  free  to  argue  the  underlying  facts  and  their  significance  for
sentencing.   Id.   We concluded that what Wesley understood about “dismissed
outright” was relevant to whether he entered a knowing and intelligent plea.   Id.,
¶24.   Therefore, we remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing under
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).   Wesley
I, 321 Wis. 2d 151, ¶24.   We stated that if Wesley testified on remand about his
understanding of the plea agreement, the circuit court should make findings of
fact.   Id.
¶6                                                                                         Wesley declined to testify at the hearing on remand.   Wesley argued
that what he understood about the plea could be discerned from trial counsel’s
testimony.   Trial counsel conceded that she should have objected when the State
referred  at  sentencing  to  negligent  driving.    The  State  moved  to  dismiss  the
postconviction  motion  because  Wesley  elected  not  to  testify  about  his
understanding of the significance of  “dismissed outright,” and Wesley did not
meet his burden.
¶7                                                                                         The circuit court agreed with the State that Wesley did not meet his
burden because he did not offer evidence about his understanding of the plea and
what he believed “dismissed outright” actually meant.   The court noted that in the
absence  of  Wesley’s  testimony,  there  was  no  proof  regarding  his  claimed
confusion about the meaning of the plea agreement.
¶8                                                                                         The  court  also  applied  the  prejudice  prong  of  the  ineffective
assistance  analysis  and  concluded  that  Wesley  was  not  prejudiced  during
sentencing  regardless  of  what  the  State  argued  and  trial  counsel  failed  to
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No.   2010AP15-CR
challenge.   See State v. Moats,  156 Wis.  2d  74,  100,  457 N.W.2d  299  (1990)
(defendant must establish that counsel’s conduct prejudiced him or her).    The
court did not find credible trial counsel’s testimony that she would have objected
to the State’s argument because she also admitted that she had not reviewed the
sentencing transcript prior to testifying at the Machner hearing.
¶9                                                                                      Finally, the court concluded that it properly considered the facts
surrounding  the  incident.     The  court  reviewed  its  sentencing  remarks  and
concluded that it sentenced Wesley after considering the proper sentencing factors.
The court denied Wesley’s postconviction motion, and Wesley appeals.
¶10    A defendant may satisfy the  manifest injustice standard for plea
withdrawal, State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d
836, by showing that he or she did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
enter a plea, State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d
891, or was denied the effective assistance of counsel, State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d
554, 558, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).
¶11    On  appeal,  Wesley  argues  that  he  established  his  ineffective
assistance claim as a matter of law even if he did not present his own testimony
because trial counsel testified that she should have objected at sentencing.   The
circuit court did not find trial counsel’s concession credible.   We are bound by the
circuit court’s finding regarding trial counsel’s credibility.   See State v. Owens,
148 Wis. 2d 922, 930, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989).   That finding disposes of Wesley’s
reliance upon counsel’s concession as a basis for his ineffective assistance claim.
¶12    Because trial counsel’s testimony was not credible and Wesley did
not testify in support of  his claim,  Wesley did not meet his burden to show
prejudice  arising  from trial counsel’s conduct.    Wesley did not show  that he
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No.   2010AP15-CR
misunderstood some aspect of the plea, and he would not have entered the plea
had he  understood it.    See  State  v.  Bentley,  201  Wis.  2d  303,  311-312,  548
N.W.2d 50 (1996).
¶13    Finally,  we  agree  with  the  circuit  court  that  the  State  properly
referred to how Wesley drove on the night in question.   The facts of the incident
were the facts of the incident, and Wesley agreed at the plea hearing that the
complaint established  a  factual basis for  the  plea.    The  trial court cannot  be
expected to conduct a sentencing in a vacuum.   The court has the responsibility “to
acquire full knowledge of the character and behavior of the convicted defendant
before imposing sentence.”   Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559
(1980).
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
                                                                                         This  opinion  will  not  be  published.     See  WIS.  STAT.  RULE
809.23(1)                                                                                (b)5. (2009-10).
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