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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                                       This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 21, 2002
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
                                                                                                      Cornelia G. Clark                                                petition to review an adverse decision by the
                                                                                                      Clerk of Court of Appeals                                        Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                                       and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                                       Cir. Ct. No.   99-CT-464
Appeal No.                                                                                            02-0758
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                                     IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                                       DISTRICT IV
IN THE MATTER OF THE REFUSAL OF
ROBERT P. EGGIMANN:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
ROBERT P. EGGIMANN,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL  from  an  order  of  the  circuit  court  for  Dane  County:
PATRICK J. FIEDLER, Judge.   Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                                    ROGGENSACK, J.1    Robert Eggimann appeals the circuit court’s
order revoking his driver’s license.   Eggimann argues that Wisconsin’s implied
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (1999-
2000).   In addition, all further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 version
unless otherwise noted.




No.   02-0758
consent law, WIS. STAT. § 343.305, violates his Fourth Amendment right to refuse
consent to searches and seizures by imposing punishment for his refusal to submit
to  a  chemical  test  for  intoxication.    Because  we  conclude  that  any  pressure
employed  by the statute to obtain consent is reasonable and does not violate
Fourth Amendment protections, we affirm the circuit court’s order.
BACKGROUND
¶2                                                                                        The facts are undisputed.   In February 1999, deputy officer James
Hodges  arrested  Eggimann  for  operating  a  motor  vehicle  while  intoxicated.
Hodges transported Eggimann to Meriter Hospital for a blood draw to determine
his blood  alcohol concentration.    At the hospital, Hodges read Eggimann the
Informing the Accused form, as required by WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4).   Eggiman
refused to submit to a blood draw.   The Department of Transportation issued him
the  “Notice of  Intent to Revoke Operating Privileges” and Eggimann did not
request a hearing.   In March 1999, the circuit court revoked his driver’s license for
three years.
¶3                                                                                        Eggimann then made an untimely demand for a refusal hearing and
moved to vacate the order based on a defect in the notice of intent to revoke.   The
circuit court denied his motion and Eggimann appealed.   We reversed the circuit
court’s decision because of a defect in the notice Eggimann received.   The circuit
court scheduled a refusal hearing and Eggimann moved to dismiss the proceeding
alleging  that  WIS.  STAT.                                                               §  343.305  was  unconstitutional.    In  January  2002,
following a hearing on the issues, the circuit court denied Eggimann’s motion and
entered a final order of revocation.   Eggimann appeals.
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No.   02-0758
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review.
¶4                                                                                         Whether a statute is constitutional present a question of law that we
review de novo.   State v. Pittman,  174 Wis.  2d  255,  276,  496 N.W.2d  74,  83
(1993).
WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305.
¶5                                                                                         WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(2) provides in relevant part:
IMPLIED CONSENT.   Any person who … operates a
motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state … is
deemed to have given consent to one or more tests of his or
her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining
the presence or quantity in his or her blood or breath, of
alcohol ….
If a person improperly refuses to submit to testing, his or her operating privileges
are revoked.   Section 343.305(10).
¶6                                                                                         Eggimann  argues  that  WIS.  STAT.  § 343.305  is  unconstitutional
because  it  coerces  consent  to  a  search  and  seizure.    He  maintains  that  the
threatened sanction of a loss of driving privileges for refusing to submit to a
chemical  test  for  intoxication  invalidates  his  consent  for  Fourth  Amendment
purposes.   We disagree.
¶7                                                                                         We addressed this precise issue in State v. Wintlend, No. 02-0965,
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2002, publication recommended).   In that case, we
considered  whether  WIS.  STAT.  § 343.305  unreasonably  coerced  a  motorist’s
consent to a blood alcohol test.   Wintlend, slip op. at ¶1.   We held that the pressure
employed by the statute to obtain a motorist’s consent was not unreasonable and
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No.   02-0758
affirmed the constitutionality of  §  343.305.    Id. at  ¶19.    The law set forth in
Wintlend is clear and we are obligated to follow it.   Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d
166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246, 256 (1997) (stating that we “may not overrule, modify,
or  withdraw  language  from  a  previously  published  decision  of  the  court  of
appeals.”).
¶8                                                                                         As we noted in Wintlend, driving is a privilege, not a constitutional
right.   Wintlend, slip op. at ¶9; see also Kopf v. State, 158 Wis. 2d 208, 214, 461
N.W.2d 813, 815 (Ct. App. 1990).  As a condition of obtaining a driver’s license, a
would-be motorist consents to submit to a prescribed chemical test if arrested for
driving  while  intoxicated.    WIS.  STAT.                                                § 343.305(2).    The  pertinent  time  of
consent is when a license is obtained.   State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193, 289
N.W.2d  828,  830  (1980).    And  the  choice  is  there:    either  obtain  a  license
conditioned on submitting to an intoxication test or exercise the right to travel by
alternative means.   There is no coercion or psychological pressure.   The motorist’s
consent is therefore free and voluntary.
¶9                                                                                         Additionally, a chemical test for intoxication is not overly intrusive
or unreasonable.   Wintlend, slip op. at ¶17.   Both the United States Supreme Court
and  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court  have  recognized  that  a  blood  test  is  safe,
relatively painless and commonplace.   South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563
(1983); State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶57, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385.
Because the “bodily intrusion the motorist is being asked to allow … is a minimal
one,” the choice between retaining driving privileges and refusing to submit to an
intoxication test is not unreasonable.   Wintlend, slip op. at ¶17.   Accordingly, we
reject Eggimann’s argument that WIS. STAT.  § 343.305 is unconstitutional and
affirm the circuit court’s revocation order.
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No.   02-0758
CONCLUSION
¶10    We conclude that any pressure employed by WIS. STAT. § 343.305
to  obtain  consent  is  reasonable  and  does  not  violate  Fourth  Amendment
protections.   Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s revocation order.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
                                                                                  This   opinion   will   not   be   published.   WIS.   STAT.   RULE
809.23(1)                                                                         (b)(4).
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