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2004  WI  47
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                                 02-2860
COMPLETE TITLE:
In  re  the  Termination  of  Parental  Rights  to
Alexander  V.,  a  Person  Under  the  Age  of  18:
Steven  V.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Kelley  H.,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
2003  WI  App  110
Reported  at:  263  Wis.  2d  241,  663  N.W.2d  817
(Ct.  App.  2003-Published)
OPINION FILED:                                                            April  28,  2004
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                            October  8,  2003
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                    Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                   Grant
JUDGE:                                                                    Robert  P.  VanDeHey
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:                                                                ABRAHAMSON,  C.J.,  concurs  (opinion  filed).
BRADLEY,  J.,  joins  concurrence.
DISSENTED:                                                                PROSSER,  J.,  dissents  (opinion  filed).
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For  the  respondent-appellant-petitioner  there  were  briefs
and  oral  argument  by  Philip  J.  Brehm,  Janesville.
For  the  petitioner-respondent  there  was  a  brief  and  oral
argument  by  Duane  M.  Jorgenson,  Darlington.
A  guardian  ad  litem  brief  was  filed  by  Douglas  J.  Heenan
and  Block,  Scott  &  Heenan,  LLC,  Platteville,  and  oral  argument
by  Douglas  J.  Heenan.




An   amicus   curiae   brief   was   filed   by   David   Wambach,   E.
Michael  McCann,  Mary  Sowinski,  and  Thomas  Binger,  on  behalf  of
Wisconsin  District  Attorney’s  Association.
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2004  WI  47
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
editing  and  modification.    The  final
version   will   appear   in   the   bound
volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                          02-2860
(L.C.  No.                                                                   01  TP  6)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                                         :                                                                    IN  SUPREME  COURT
In  re  the  Termination  of  Parental  Rights
to  Alexander  V.,  a  Person  Under  the  Age
of  18:
FILED
Steven  V.,
Petitioner-Respondent,                                                       APR  28,  2004
v.                                                                           Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk of Supreme Court
Kelley  H.,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Affirmed.
¶1    DIANE   S.   SYKES,   J.                                               This   termination   of   parental
rights  (TPR)  case  presents  two  issues  for  our  review:  1)  whether
partial  summary  judgment  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08  (2001-
02)1  is  available  in  the  first  phase  of  a  TPR  case,  at  which
parental  unfitness  is  adjudicated;  and                                   2)  whether  the  circuit
court  is  required  at  the  initial  TPR  hearing  to  advise  the
nonpetitioning  party  of  his  or  her  right  under  Wis.  Stat.           §
1                                                                            All  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are  to  the  2001-
02  version  unless  otherwise  noted.




No.                                                                              02-2860
48.422(5)  to  a  continuance  to  consult  with  counsel  on  the  issue
of  judicial  substitution.
¶2     Alexander  V.'s  father  filed  a  petition  to  terminate
Kelley  H.'s  parental  rights  to  Alexander,  alleging  as  grounds
that  Kelley  had  been  denied  physical  placement  and  visitation  by
court  order  for  more  than  one  year  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.              §
48.415(4).    Kelley  requested  a  jury  trial.    At  the  fact-finding
hearing  the  circuit  court  granted  the  guardian  ad  litem's  motion
for  summary  judgment  on  the  issue  of  unfitness,  based  upon  the
undisputed   fact   that   Kelley   had   been   denied   placement   and
visitation  by  a  court  order  that  had  been  in  place,  unmodified,
for  more  than  two  years.     After  a  dispositional  hearing,  the
circuit  court  terminated  Kelley's  parental  rights.    The  court  of
appeals  affirmed,  concluding  that  although  the  circuit  court  had
committed  two  procedural  errors——by  employing  summary  judgment
procedure  and  failing  to  advise  Kelley  of  her  statutory  right  to
a    continuance    to    consult    with    counsel    about    judicial
substitution——these  errors  were  harmless.     Steven  V.  v.  Kelley
H.,  2003  WI  App  10,  263  Wis.  2d  241,  663  N.W.2d  817.    We  affirm,
although  on  different  reasoning.
¶3     A  parent  who  contests  a  TPR  petition  has  a  statutory
right  to  a  jury  trial  at  the  fact-finding  hearing  at  which  his
or    her    parental    unfitness    is    adjudicated——the    so-called
"grounds"  or  "unfitness"  phase  of  a  TPR  proceeding.    Wis.  Stat.
§                                                                                48.31(2).     The  statutory  grounds  for  termination  of  parental
rights  are  specified  in  Wis.  Stat.                                          §                                                                       48.415,  and  several  of
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No.                                                                            02-2860
these  may  be  proved  by  official  documentary  evidence.      See,
e.g.,  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(1m),  (4),  (9),  and  (9m).
¶4     By  statute  and  as  a  matter  of  procedural  due  process,
parental   unfitness   must   be   proved   by   clear   and   convincing
                                                                               evidence.     Wis.  Stat.                                        §                                                             48.31(1);  Santosky  v.  Kramer,                         455  U.S.
745                                                                            (1982).                                                                                                                        The   jury   trial   right,   however,   is   entirely
statutory,  not  mandated  by  constitutional  due  process,  and  is
therefore   generally   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the   civil
procedure  code,  including  the  summary  judgment  statute,  Wis.
Stat.  §  802.08,  unless  the  TPR  statutes  provide  otherwise.    See
Wis.   Stat.                                                                   §                                                                801.01(2).                                                    The   TPR   statutes   do   not   provide
otherwise,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly.
¶5                                                                             We   conclude   that   partial   summary   judgment   in   the
unfitness   phase   of   a   TPR   case   is   available   where   the
requirements  of  the  summary  judgment  statute  and  the  applicable
legal  standards  in  Wis.  Stat.  §§  48.415  and  48.31  have  been  met.
An   order   granting   partial   summary   judgment   on   the   issue   of
parental  unfitness  where  there  are  no  facts  in  dispute  and  the
applicable  legal  standards  have  been  satisfied  does  not  violate
the  parent's  statutory  right  to  a  jury  trial  under  Wis.  Stat.  §§
48.422(4)  and                                                                 48.31(2),  or  the  parent's  constitutional  right  to
procedural  due  process.
¶6    Accordingly,  partial  summary  judgment  may  be  granted  in
the   unfitness   phase   of   a   TPR   case   where   the   moving   party
establishes  that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to  any  material
fact  regarding  the  asserted  grounds  for  unfitness  under  Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §                                                                48.415,  and,  taking  into  consideration  the  heightened
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No.                                                                           02-2860
burden  of  proof  specified  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.31(1)  and  required
by  due  process,  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a
matter  of  law.      We  overrule  Walworth  County  Dep't  of  Human
Servs.  v.  Elizabeth  W.,                                                    189  Wis.  2d  432,                                                525  N.W.2d  384                               (Ct.
App.                                                                          1994),  to  the  extent  that  it  outright  prohibited  summary
judgment  in  TPR  proceedings.    The  circuit  court's  use  of  summary
judgment  procedure  was  not  error.
¶7    We  also  withdraw  the  language  in  M.W.  and  I.W.  v.
Monroe  County  Dep't  of  Human  Servs.,  116  Wis.  2d  432,  342  N.W.2d
410  (1984),  that  purported  to  articulate  a  requirement  that  the
circuit  court  advise  any  nonpetitioning  party  in  a  TPR  case  of
his  or  her  right  under  Wis.  Stat.                                       §                                                                  48.422(5)  to  a  continuance
to  consult  with  counsel  about  judicial  substitution.     M.W.  and
I.W.  described  too  broadly  the  statutory  duties  of  the  circuit
court  at  the  initial  TPR  hearing  under  Wis.  Stat.                     §                                                                  48.422(1).
In  fact,  the  statute  does  not  require  the  circuit  court  to
advise   nonpetitioning   parties   of   the   statutory   right   to   a
continuance    to    consult    with    counsel    regarding    judicial
substitution.    The  circuit  court's  failure  to  do  so  here  was  not
error.
I.    FACTS  AND  PROCEDURAL  HISTORY
¶8    On   August                                                             8,                                                                 2001,   Steven   V.,   Alexander's   father,
filed  a  petition  in  Grant  County  Circuit  Court  to  terminate
Kelley   H.'s   parental   rights   to   Alexander.                           As   grounds   for
termination  Steven  alleged  continuing  court-ordered  denial  of
physical   placement   and   visitation   for   more   than   one   year
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No.                                                                           02-2860
pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.                                                     §  48.415(4).2     In  his  petition,  Steven
alleged   that   Kelley   had   been   denied   custody,   placement,   and
visitation  of  Alexander  by  an  order  of  the  Brown  County  Circuit
Court  that  had  been  in  place  and  remained  unmodified  for  more
than  one  year.
¶9    Steven's  petition  did  not  contain  the  order  to  which
it  referred,  but  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  that  is  the
focus  of  this  appeal  did.    The  documentary  record  reflects  that
on  May                                                                       12,                                             1999,  in  Brown  County  Circuit  Court,  the  Honorable
William   C.   Griesbach   awarded   Steven   sole   legal   custody   and
physical   placement   of   Alexander,   and   denied   Kelley   custody,
placement,   and   visitation.                                                In   written   "Findings   of   Fact,
2  Wisconsin  Statute  §  48.415(4)  provides:
Continuing  denial  of  periods  of  physical  placement  or
visitation.     Continuing  denial  of  periods  of  physical
placement  or  visitation,  which  shall  be  established  by
proving  all  of  the  following:
(a)   That   the   parent   has   been   denied   periods   of
physical   placement   by   court   order   in   an   action
affecting  the  family  or  has  been  denied  visitation
                                                                              under   an   order   under   s.                 48.345,                                                     48.363,                               48.365,
938.345,                                                                      938.363   or                                                                                                938.365   containing   the   notice
required  by  s.  48.356(2)  or  938.356(2).
(b)     That  at  least  one  year  has  elapsed  since  the
order   denying   periods   of   physical   placement   or
visitation    was    issued    and    the    court    has    not
subsequently   modified   its   order   so   as   to   permit
periods  of  physical  placement  or  visitation.
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No.                                                                             02-2860
Conclusions   of   Law,   and   Judgment   of   Custody   and   Placement,"
filed  on  June  28,  1999,  the  circuit  court  found  that  Kelley  had
physically  neglected  Alexander  and  had  emotionally  abused  him  by
trying  to  "brainwash  him"  into  believing  that  his  father  was
evil.    The  court  also  found  that  Kelley  had  attempted  to  arrange
the  murder  of  Steven  and  his  wife,  had  absconded  to  California
with  Alexander,  and  had  made  false  accusations  of  child  abuse
against  Steven  and  his  wife.    The  court  awarded  sole  custody  and
physical  placement  of  Alexander  to  Steven,  and  denied  Kelley
custody,  placement,  and  "any  and  all  visitation,"  concluding
that  contact  between  mother  and  child  would  endanger  Alexander's
physical   and   especially   emotional   health.                               The   court   also
imposed  a  number  of  conditions  that  Kelley  would  need  to  satisfy
before   any   modification   of   the   ban   on   visitation   would   be
considered.
¶10   An  initial  hearing  on  the  TPR  petition  was  held  in
Grant  County  Circuit  Court  on  September                                    4,                   2001,  before  the
Honorable  Robert  B.  VanDeHey.    Kelley  appeared  with  her  attorney
and  requested  a  jury  trial.
¶11     On  September                                                           17,                  2001,  Alexander's  guardian  ad  litem
filed   a   "Motion   for   Summary   Judgment   or   in   the   Alternative
Directed  Verdict"  in  which  he  asserted  that  no  genuine  issue  of
material  fact  existed  as  to  the  grounds  for  termination  alleged
in  the  petition  and  that  Steven  was  entitled  to  judgment  as  a
matter  of  law.      The  motion  was  supported  by  an  affidavit  of  the
guardian  ad  litem  recounting  the  procedural  history  of  the  Brown
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No.                                                                            02-2860
County   custody   proceeding,   and   included   a   copy   of   Judge
Griesbach's  June  28,  1999,  order.
¶12                                                                            Kelley   responded   to   the   motion   by   arguing   that
Elizabeth   W.   prohibits   summary   judgment   in   TPR   proceedings.
Kelley  conceded  that  directed  verdicts  were  permissible  in  TPR
cases,  but  insisted  that  before  a  directed  verdict  could  be
entered  in  her  case,  the  court  was  required  to  empanel  a  jury  to
hear  evidence.
                                                                               ¶13   On  October                                              15,                                                                         2001,  the  circuit  court  conducted  a
                                                                                                                                              hearing  at  which  counsel  and  the  court  discussed  the  procedural
                                                                                                                                              issues    occasioned    by    the    guardian    ad    litem's    motion.
                                                                                                                                              Ultimately,   the   court   scheduled   a   fact-finding   hearing   for
November                                                                       2,                                                             2001,   and   stated   that   Kelley   would   have   until
October                                                                        25,                                                            2001,  to  identify  any  facts  in  dispute  that  would
                                                                                                                                              necessitate  a  jury  trial  for  fact-finding  with  respect  to  the
                                                                                                                                              TPR  grounds  alleged  in  Steven's  petition.
                                                                                                                                              ¶14   Kelley   did   not   respond   by   the   October                     25,                                        2001,
                                                                               deadline.     At  the  November                                2,                                                                          2001,  hearing,  the  parties  were
presented  with  an  order  of  the  court  apparently  prepared  and
submitted  sometime  earlier  by  the  guardian  ad  litem  but  dated,
signed,  and  filed  on  November                                              2,                                                             2001.     The  order  memorialized
what  had  occurred  at  the  prior  hearing,  and  further  provided  as
follows:
[t]his  matter  will  be  scheduled  for  fact  finding  on
November  2,  2001  at  2:30  p.m.  at  which  time  the  Court
will  rule  in  favor  of  the  Guardian  ad  Litem's  motion
for   directed   verdict   unless   Attorney   Gaskell,   on
behalf  of  Kelley  H.,  files  notification  to  the  Court
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No.                                                                            02-2860
on  or  before  October  25,  2001  that  a  legitimate  issue
exists  to  be  tried  at  trial.
The  order  also  stated  that  the  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  or  in
the  Alternative  for  Directed  Verdict  would  be  heard  on  October
15,                                                                            2001,  that  is,  the  date  of  the  prior  hearing,  two  weeks
before  the  order  was  signed  and  entered.
¶15    Despite  these  incongruities,  the  parties  agreed  at  the
November  2  hearing  that  there  were  no  facts  in  dispute  as  to  the
existence  of  an  unmodified  court  order  denying  Kelley  placement
and  visitation  with  Alexander,  and  that  the  order  had  been  in
place  for  more  than  one  year.     Kelley's  attorney  stated  that
"it's  clear  that,  based  on  what  the  elements  are  as  grounds  in
this  case,  that  the  Court  does  have  the  authority  to  direct  a
verdict  in  regard  to  that——or  summary  judgment,  I  guess,  type
motion."    There  was  a  brief  discussion  about  whether  the  reasons
for   Kelley's   noncompliance   with   the   conditions   set   forth   in
Judge  Griesbach's  order  for  modification  of  the  visitation  ban
would  be  relevant  at  the  unfitness  phase  or  at  the  dispositional
phase.     Kelley's  position  was  not  entirely  clear,  although  at
one  point  her  attorney  conceded  that  "if  the  reasons  why  she  did
not  comply  with  that  order  we  believe  would  not  be  relevant  at
the  first  phase  of  that,  then  I  agree  that  fact-finding  hearing
is  not  required  and  we  don't  need  a  trial."
¶16                                                                            The   circuit   court   concluded   that   the   reasons   for
Kelley's   noncompliance   "are   very   relevant   but   not   at   this
stage."    The  court  then  took  judicial  notice  of  the  file  in  the
Brown  County  case,  which  "substantiate[s]  that  both  elements  are
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No.                                                                            02-2860
present,   first   that                                                        [Kelley   H.]   has   been   denied   periods   of
physical  placement  by  court  order  in  an  action  affecting  the
family  and  that  the  notice  was  given,  and  second  that  at  least  a
year   elapsed   since   the   order   denying   periods   of   physical
placement  was  issued,  and  there  was  no  modification."    The  court
then   scheduled   a   dispositional   hearing,   and   discussed   with
counsel  the  parameters  of  that  hearing.     On  November                  9,                                                   2001,
the  circuit  court  entered  a  written  order  directing  a  verdict  in
favor  of  Steven  on  the  issue  of  Kelley's  parental  unfitness
pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.                                                      §                                                    48.415(4).     The  dispositional  hearing
was  held  on  April  11  and  12,  2002,  after  which  the  circuit  court
concluded  that  it  was  in  Alexander's  best  interests  to  terminate
Kelley's  parental  rights,  and  entered  judgment  accordingly.
¶17   Kelley  moved  for  new  fact-finding  and  dispositional
hearings,  arguing  that  she  had  been  denied  her  right  to  a  jury
trial  for  fact-finding  and  her  right  to  due  process,  and  that
there  was  insufficient  evidence  to  support  termination.     She
also  argued  that  at  the  time  of  the  initial  hearing  she  had  not
been  informed  of  her  right  under  Wis.  Stat.                             §  48.422(5)  to  a
continuance    to    consult    with    counsel    regarding    judicial
substitution.    The  circuit  court  denied  the  motion.
¶18   Kelley   appealed,   reiterating   the   claims   of   error
stated  in  her  post-judgment  motion.     The  court  of  appeals  held
that  pursuant  to  Elizabeth  W.,  the  circuit  court  had  erred  by
granting  what  amounted  to  summary  judgment  at  the  grounds  phase.
However,  the  court  concluded  that  the  error  was  harmless  because
there   was   no   dispute   of   fact   relevant   to   the   grounds   for
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No.                                                                            02-2860
termination,  and  Kelley  was  not  prejudiced  by  the  error.    Kelley
H.,                                                                            263   Wis.  2d  241,                               ¶¶22-28.   The   court   of   appeals   also
suggested  that  Elizabeth  W.'s  prohibition  on  summary  judgment  in
TPR  proceedings  might  be  overbroad,  considering  that  certain
grounds  for  termination  were  provable  by  undisputed  court  order.
Id.,  ¶¶15-21.    The  court  nevertheless  considered  itself  bound  by
Elizabeth  W.,  and  stated  that  any  argument  that  the  case  had
been  incorrectly  decided  must  be  directed  to  this  court.     Id.,
¶21.
¶19   The   court   of   appeals   also   held   that   the   circuit
court's  failure  to  inform  Kelley  of  her  right  to  request  a
continuance   to   consult   with   her   attorney   about   judicial
substitution  was  error,  citing  language  in  this  court's  decision
in   M.W.   and   I.W.   that   purports   to   impose   such   a   warning
requirement.     Id.,                                                          ¶¶31-35.     While  the  statutory  right  to  a
continuance  to  confer  with  counsel  about  judicial  substitution
was  not  in  fact  at  issue  in  M.W.  and  I.W.,  this  court's  opinion
contained    broad    language    specifying    the    circuit    court's
statutory  duties  at  the  initial  TPR  hearing,  including  a  duty  to
advise   the   nonpetitioning   party   of   his   or   her   right   to   a
continuance  to  consult  with  counsel  about  judicial  substitution.
See  M.W.  and  I.W.,  116  Wis.  2d  at  440-41.    The  court  of  appeals
majority   declined   to   treat   this   language   as   dicta,   but
ultimately  concluded  that  the  circuit  court's  error  in  failing
to  follow  it  was  harmless.    Kelley  H.,  263  Wis.  2d  241,  ¶¶34-35,
41-42.
II.  STANDARD  OF  REVIEW
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No.                                                                           02-2860
¶20     The  two  questions  in  this  case——whether  the  summary
judgment  statute  applies  in  TPR  cases  and  whether  a  circuit
court  is  statutorily  required  to  advise  a  nonpetitioning  party
in  a  TPR  case  of  his  or  her  right  to  a  continuance  to  consult
with  counsel  about  judicial  substitution——are  questions  of  law
subject  to  de  novo  review.    Brandon  S.S.  v.  Laura  S.,               179  Wis.
2d  114,  127,  507  N.W.2d  94  (1993).
III.    ANALYSIS
¶21   Parental   rights   termination   adjudications   are   among
the  most  consequential  of  judicial  acts,  involving  as  they  do
"the  awesome  authority  of  the  State  to  destroy  permanently  all
legal  recognition  of  the  parental  relationship."  Evelyn  C.R.  v.
Tykila  S.,                                                                   2001  WI                                                          110,        246  Wis.  2d  1,   629  N.W.2d  768   (quoting
M.L.B.  v.  S.L.J.,  519  U.S.  102,  127-28  (1996)).    Termination  of
parental  rights  permanently  extinguishes  "all  rights,  powers,
privileges,  immunities,  duties  and  obligations  existing  between
parent  and  child."    Wis.  Stat.  §  48.40(2).
¶22     A  parent's  interest  in  the  parent-child  relationship
and  in  the  care,  custody,  and  management  of  his  or  her  child  is
recognized  as  a  fundamental  liberty  interest  protected  by  the
                                                                              Fourteenth  Amendment.     Santosky  v.  Kramer,                  455  U.S.   745,                753
(1982).                                                                       The   United   States   Supreme   Court   has   described   the
fundamental  nature  of  parental  rights  in  this  way:
It  is  plain  that  the  interest  of  a  parent  in  the
companionship,  care,  custody,  and  management  of  his  or
her  children  "come[s]  to  this  Court  with  a  momentum
for  respect  lacking  when  appeal  is  made  to  liberties
which                                                                         derive                                                            merely      from                shifting           economic
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No.                                                                           02-2860
arrangements."                                                                Kovacs   v.   Cooper,                                                      336   U.S.                                         77,                                          95
(1949)(Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring).
The    Court    has    frequently    emphasized    the
importance  of  the  family.    The  rights  to  conceive  and
to  raise  one's  children  have  been  deemed  "essential,"
                                                                              Meyer  v.  Nebraska,                                                       262  U.S.                                          390,                                         399                    (1923),  "basic
                                                                                                                                                         civil  rights  of  man,"  Skinner  v.  Oklahoma,                                                                       316  U.S.
535,                                                                          541                                                                                                                           (1942),  and  "rights  far  more  precious
                                                                                                                                                         than  property  rights,"  May  v.  Anderson,                                                                           345  U.S.         528,
533  (1953).    "It  is  cardinal  with  us  that  the  custody,
care  and  nurture  of  the  child  reside  first  in  the
parents,  whose  primary  function  and  freedom  include
preparation   for   obligations   the   state   can   neither
supply  nor  hinder."    Prince  v.  Massachusetts,  321  U.S.
158,  166  (1944).
Stanley  v.  Illinois,  405  U.S.  645,  651  (1972).
¶23      Thus,  due  process  requires  that  "[w]hen  the  State
moves  to  destroy  weakened  familial  bonds,  it  must  provide  the
parents  with  fundamentally  fair  procedures."    Santosky,  455  U.S.
at  753-54.    These  include  the  requirement  of  a  hearing,  Stanley,
405  U.S.  at                                                                 649,  and  proof  of  parental  unfitness  by  clear  and
convincing  evidence,  Santosky,  455  U.S.  at  747-48.
¶24  Wisconsin  has  a  two-part  statutory  procedure  for  the
involuntary  termination  of  parental  rights.     Sheboygan  County
DHHS   v.   Julie   A.B.,                                                     2002   WI                                                                  95,                                                ¶24,                                         255   Wis.  2d  170,   648
N.W.2d  402.    In  the  first,  or  "grounds"  phase  of  the  proceeding,
the  petitioner  must  prove  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that
one   or   more   of   the   statutorily   enumerated   grounds   for
termination  of  parental  rights  exist.     Wis.  Stat.                     §  48.31(1);
Waukesha  County  Dep't  of  Soc.  Servs.  v.  C.E.W.,  124  Wis.  2d  47,
60,  368  N.W.2d  47  (1985).
¶25                                                                           There   are                                                                12   statutory   grounds   of   unfitness   for
                                                                              termination  of  parental  rights,  see  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(1)-(10),
                                                                                                                                                         12




No.                                                                            02-2860
and  if  a  petitioner  proves  one  or  more  of  the  grounds  for
termination  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence,  "the  court  shall
find  the  parent  unfit."    Wis.  Stat.  §  48.424(4);  Julie  A.B.,  255
Wis.  2d  170,  ¶26.    There  are  no  "degrees  of  unfitness"  under  the
statutory  scheme;  a  court  has  no  discretion  to  refrain  from
finding  a  parent  unfit  after  all  the  elements  of  a  statutory
ground  have  been  established.    Id.,  ¶¶36-37.
¶26   The   consistent   legislative   objective   throughout   the
Children's  Code  is  "the  best  interests  of  the  child."     Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §  48.01(1).     However,  in  TPR  cases,  the  "best  interests"
standard  does  not  "dominate  every  step  of  every  proceeding."
Julie  A.B.,                                                                   255  Wis.  2d  170,                                                  ¶22.     The  best  interests  of  the
child  do  not  "prevail"  until  the  parent  has  been  declared  unfit
after  fact-finding  by  the  court  or  jury  at  the  grounds  phase  of
the  TPR  proceeding.    Id.    A  finding  of  parental  unfitness  is  a
necessary  prerequisite  to  termination  of  parental  rights,  but  a
finding  of  unfitness  does  not  necessitate  that  parental  rights
be  terminated.    Once  the  court  has  declared  a  parent  unfit,  the
proceeding  moves  to  the  second,  or  dispositional  phase,  at  which
the  child's  best  interests  are  paramount.    Id.,  ¶28.
¶27     At  the  dispositional  phase,  the  court  is  called  upon
to  decide  whether  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the  child  that
the  parent's  rights  be  permanently  extinguished.     Wis.  Stat.
§  48.426(2).    "The  outcome  of  this  hearing  is  not  predetermined,
but  the  focus  shifts  to  the  interests  of  the  child."     Julie
A.B.,  255  Wis.  2d  170,  ¶28.    In  making  this  determination,  which
we  have  described  as  "one  of  the  most  wrenching  and  agonizing  in
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  No.   02-2860
                                                                                                                                 the  law,"  the  court  "should  welcome"  any  evidence  relevant  to
                                                                                                                                 the  issue  of  disposition,  including  any  "factors  favorable  to
                                                                                                                                 the   parent,"   and   must   at   a   minimum   consider   the   six   "best
                                                                              interests"  factors  set  forth  in  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                   §   48.426(3).                   Id.,
¶29.
A.    Summary  judgment  in  TPR  proceedings
¶28   We    are    concerned    here    with    the    "grounds"    or
"unfitness"  phase  of  a  TPR  case,  and  specifically  whether  the
use  of  summary  judgment  procedure  under  Wis.  Stat.                     §                                                  802.08  at
this  first  phase  of  the  proceeding  violates  the  parent's  rights
under   the   TPR   statutes   or   procedural   due   process.               Kelley
asserts  that  this  question  has  already  been  answered  by  the
court  of  appeals'  decision  in  Elizabeth  W.
¶29    Elizabeth  W.  involved  a  petition  to  terminate  parental
rights   on   grounds   of   abandonment   and   continuing   need   of
protection  or  services.    Elizabeth  W.,  189  Wis.  2d  at  434.    The
circuit   court   granted   a   motion   for   summary   judgment   against
Elizabeth,  having  concluded  that  the  affidavit  and  supporting
documents  filed  by  her  attorney  in  opposition  to  the  motion  were
nonevidentiary   and   insufficient   to   defeat   the   petitioner's
motion.    Id.  at  435.    After  a  dispositional  hearing,  the  circuit
court   terminated   Elizabeth's   parental   rights   to   her   two
children.    Id.
¶30   The  court  of  appeals  reversed,  broadly  concluding  that
"summary  judgment  is  inappropriate  in  TPR  cases  where  a  parent
contests  the  termination."    Id.  at  436.    The  court  premised  this
conclusion  on  the  principle  that  parental  rights  are  fundamental
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No.                                                                            02-2860
liberty  interests  protected  by  the  due  process  clause  of  the
Fourteenth   Amendment,   and   therefore   any   state   action   to
terminate  parental  rights  "'must  be  accomplished  by  procedures
meeting  the  requisites  of  the  Due  Process  Clause.'"    Id.  at  436-
37  (quoting  Santosky,  455  U.S.  at  753).    The  court  stated  that  a
hearing  on  the  issue  of  unfitness  is  required  by  statute,  Wis.
Stat.  §§  48.422(2),  48.31(1),  as  well  as  by  due  process.    Id.  at
437.    The  court  of  appeals  then  concluded  that:
[A]   TPR   proceeding   can   never   be   without   material
issues   of   fact   if   a   parent   refuses   to   voluntarily
terminate  his  or  her  right  to  the  child.                                .  By
contesting   the   termination,   a   parent   automatically
raises  the  issue  of  whether  he  or  she  is  a  fit  parent.
This  creates  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  which
cannot  be  disposed  of  by  summary  judgment.
Id.  at  438.
¶31    The  principles  underlying  the  decision  in  Elizabeth  W.
were   unquestionably   sound   and   well-established;   we   conclude,
however,  that  the  court's  holding  was  overbroad.     Neither  due
process  nor  the  TPR  statutes  require  an  absolute  prohibition  on
summary  judgment  in  the  grounds  or  unfitness  phase  of  a  TPR
proceeding.    That  a  parent  has  contested  the  termination  of  his
or  her  parental  rights  does  not  automatically  mean  there  are
material  facts  in  dispute  regarding  the  grounds  for  unfitness.
¶32     The  code  of  civil  procedure  applies  to  "all  civil
actions  and  special  proceedings"  unless  a  "different  procedure
is  prescribed  by  statute  or  rule."     Wis.  Stat.                        §          801.01(2).
Parental  rights  termination  proceedings  under  Chapter                     48   are
civil   proceedings,   and   this   general   rule   of   civil   procedure
15




No.                                                                           02-2860
applicability  has  been  cited  in  the  context  of  TPR  cases  on
numerous  occasions:  Evelyn  C.R.,                                           246  Wis.                                                         2d                                                           1,                                              ¶17                                                       (default
judgment  as  a  sanction  for  violation  of  a  court  order  pursuant
to   Wis.   Stat.                                                             §§                                                                802.10(7),                                                   804.12(2)                                       (a),   and                                                805.03   is
available  in  TPR  proceedings;  also,  the  harmless  error  rule  of
Wis.  Stat.  §  805.18(2)  applies  in  TPR  cases);  Brandon  S.S.,  179
Wis.                                                                          2d  at                                                            143-44,                                                      (citing  the  general  rule  that  the  civil
procedure  code  governs  Chapter                                             48   proceedings  but  concluding
that   the   general   intervention   statute,   Wis.   Stat.                 §                                                                 803.09,
conflicts  with  the  exclusive  procedure  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.42(2)
for  determining  proper  parties  to  a  TPR  proceeding);  Waukesha
                                                                              County  DSS,                                                      124   Wis.                                                                                                   2d  at                                                    53,                                                                       66-70          (rules  regarding  jury
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       instructions,  preremptory  strikes  and  summation  pursuant  to  Wis.
Stat.                                                                         §                                                                 805.13(3),                                                                                                                                                             805.08(3),    and                                                                        805.10    apply   in   TPR
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       proceedings);  Door  County  Dep't  of  Health  &  Family  Servs.  v.
                                                                              Scott   S.,                                                       230   Wis.                                                   2d                                              460,                                                      465,                                                                      602   N.W.2d   167                          (Ct.   App.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             1999)(directed   verdict   pursuant   to   Wis.   Stat.                                                                                            §                            805.14(4)
applies  in  TPR  proceedings);  J.A.B.  v.  Waukesha  County  Human
Servs.  Dep't,                                                                153  Wis.                                                         2d                                                           761,                                            765,                                                      451  N.W.2d                                                               799            (Ct.  App.
1989)(same).
¶33     There  is  nothing  in  the  TPR  statutes  that  explicitly
or  implicitly  prohibits  the  use  of  summary  judgment  procedure
under  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08  in  the  unfitness  phase  of  a  TPR  case.
Nor  do  the  TPR  statutes  prescribe  a  procedure  different  from
Wis.  Stat.                                                                   §                                                                 802.08  for  TPR  cases  in  which  there  is  no  genuine
dispute  of  fact  on  the  issue  of  unfitness  under  Wis.  Stat.          §
48.415.                                                                       Kelley   argues   that   a   court   order   granting   partial
16




No.                                                                            02-2860
summary  judgment  on  parental  unfitness  conflicts  with  the  right
to  a  jury  trial  at  the  fact-finding  hearing,  which  she  contends
is    an    absolute    right    under    the    statutes,    Wis.    Stat.
§§  48.422(3),  (4),  and  48.31(2),  and  as  a  matter  of  due  process.
We  disagree.
¶34     The  jury  trial  right  at  the  fact-finding  hearing  in
the  unfitness  phase  of  a  TPR  case  is  entirely  statutory,  not
mandated  by  constitutional  due  process,  and  is  therefore  subject
to  the  general  provisions  of  the  civil  procedure  code,  including
the  provisions  regarding  summary  judgment,  Wis.  Stat.                    §  802.08.
A  parent  may,  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.422(4),  request  a  jury
for  the  fact-finding  hearing,  and  the  jury,  if  one  is  requested,
makes  findings  of  fact  on  the  grounds  for  unfitness  alleged  in
the  TPR  petition  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.31(3)  and  (4).    The
circuit  court,  however,  is  always  responsible  for  conclusions  of
law,  as  is  specifically  recognized  in  the  TPR  statutes.     See
Wis.  Stat.  §  48.31(4).    If  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  made
and  supported  as  prescribed  by  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08,  the  circuit
court  may  properly  conclude  at  the  fact-finding  hearing  that
there  is  no  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  in  dispute  and  the
moving  party  is  entitled  to  partial  summary  judgment  on  parental
unfitness  as  a  matter  of  law.    See  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08(2).
¶35     Summary  judgment  is  a  legal  conclusion  by  the  court,
and,   if   carefully   administered   with   due   regard   for   the
importance   of   the   rights   at   stake   and   the   applicable   legal
standards,  is  just  as  appropriate  in  the  unfitness  phase  of  a
TPR  case  where  the  facts  are  undisputed  as  it  is  in  any  other
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No.                                                                            02-2860
type  of  civil  action  or  proceeding  which  carries  the  right  to  a
jury  trial.3      Summary  judgment  procedure  requires  notice,  an
opportunity  to  respond,  and  a  hearing,  and  imposes  on  the  moving
party   the   burden   of   demonstrating   both   the   absence   of   any
genuine  factual  disputes  and  entitlement  to  judgment  as  a  matter
of  law  under  the  legal  standards  applicable  to  the  claim.    Wis.
Stat.  §  802.08(2)  and  (3).
¶36                                                                            In   many   TPR   cases,   the   determination   of   parental
unfitness  will  require  the  resolution  of  factual  disputes  by  a
court  or  jury  at  the  fact-finding  hearing,  because  the  alleged
3                                                                              Article  I,                                                      §        5  of  the  Wisconsin  Constitution  states
that  "[t]he  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain  inviolate,  and
shall  extend  to  all  cases  at  law  without  regard  to  the  amount  in
controversy."                                                                  Kelley   does   not   argue   that   she   has   a   state
constitutional  right  to  a  jury  trial  under  art.  I,  §                  5;  in  any
event,  no  case  has  ever  held  that  the  summary  judgment  statute
                                                                               is  unconstitutional  under  art.  I,                                     §                                                                           5,  that  is,  that  summary
                                                                                                                                                         judgment  procedure  violates  the  state  constitutional  jury  trial
right.                                                                                                                                                   The   general   statutory   civil   jury   trial   right   is
contained  in  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                                                      §                                                                                    805.01,  and  several  other  statutes
                                                                                                                                                         confer  the  right  to  a  jury  in  specific  types  of  cases.     See,
e.g.,  Wis.  Stat.                                                             §                                                                879.45   (probate  code);  Wis.  Stat.                                               §                                        767.50
(paternity);  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                                                       §        799.21                                                                      (small  claims);  Wis.  Stat.            §
345.43                                                                         (traffic  code).      No  case  has  ever  held  that  summary
judgment  procedure  violates  any  of  these  statutory  jury  trial
provisions                                                                     (although  it  would  be  highly  unusual  for  a  party  to
attempt  to  invoke  summary  judgment  in  some  of  these  very  fact-
intensive  contexts.)     Thus,  while  we  certainly  agree  with  the
dissent's  discussion  of  the  importance  of  the  jury  trial  as  a
check  on  government  power,  dissent,                                        ¶66,  we  cannot  agree  that
the  careful  application  of  the  summary  judgment  statute  imperils
the  civil  jury  trial  right,  whether  constitutional  or  statutory.
If  summary  judgment  procedure  does  not  impermissibly  impair  the
state  constitutional  or  statutory  civil  jury  trial  right  in  any
other  context,  we  know  of  no  independent  basis  to  hold  that  it
impermissibly  impairs  the  jury  trial  provisions  of  Wis.  Stat.  §§
48.422(3),  (4),  and  48.31(2).
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               No.            02-2860
                                                                                                                                               grounds   for   unfitness   involve   the   adjudication   of   parental
                                                                            conduct     vis-à-vis     the     child.                                                                                                                                                                       See     Wis.     Stat.                                                       §
48.415(1)                                                                   (abandonment);    Wis.    Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                §                                      48.415(2)    (child    in
                                                                                                                                               continuing   need   of   protection   or   services);   Wis.   Stat.                                                                                                                                                     §
48.415(3)                                                                                                                                      (continuing    parental    disability);    Wis.    Stat.                                                                                                                                                                 §
48.415(5)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (child  abuse);  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(6)(failure  to  assume
parental                                                                    responsibility);                                                                                                                                                                                               Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(7)(incestuous
parenthood).     Summary  judgment  will  ordinarily  be  inappropriate
in   TPR   cases   premised   on   these   fact-intensive   grounds   for
parental  unfitness.
¶37     Some  statutory  grounds  for  unfitness,  however,  are
expressly  provable  by  official  documentary  evidence,  such  as
court  orders  or  judgments  of  conviction.     See     Wis.  Stat.       §
48.415(1m)(relinquishment,  provable  by  court  order);  Wis.  Stat.
§                                                                           48.415(4)                                                          (continuing  denial  of  periods  of  physical  placement
or   visitation,   provable   by   court   order);   Wis.   Stat.           §
48.415(8)                                                                   (homicide  or  solicitation  to  commit  homicide  of  parent,
provable     by     judgment     of     conviction);     Wis.     Stat.     §
48.415(9)                                                                   (parenthood  as  a  result  of  sexual  assault,  provable  by
judgment  of  conviction);  Wis.  Stat.                                     §                                                                  48.415(9m)(commission  of
serious  felony  against  one  of  the  person's  children,  provable  by
                                                                            judgment    of    conviction);    Wis.    Stat.                                                                                                                                                                §                                      48.415(10)   (prior
                                                                                                                                               involuntary  termination  of  parental  rights  to  another  child,
provable   by   court   order).4                                                                                                                                                                                          Some   of   these   so-called   "paper
4                                                                           We  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  general  categorization
of   statutory   grounds   in   this   and   the   preceding   paragraph
represent  a  definitive  statement  about  the  propriety  of  summary
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No.                                                                            02-2860
grounds"   for   parental   unfitness   have   been   recently   adopted,
seriously  undermining  the  broad  holding  of  Elizabeth  W.
¶38     In                                                                     1995,  the  legislature  enacted  a  new  ground  for
termination   in   cases   of   parenthood   as   a   result   of   sexual
assault:  Wis.  Stat.                                                          §  48.415(9)  provides  that  conception  as  a
result  of  sexual  assault  "may  be  proved  by  a  final  judgment  of
conviction                                                                     .  .  .  indicating   that   the   person   who   may   be   the
father   of   the   child   committed,   during   a   possible   time   of
conception,   a   sexual   assault   as   specified   in   this   paragraph
against  the  mother."    Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(9).    Later  in  the  same
session,   the   legislature   enacted   two   more   new   grounds   for
unfitness:  commission  of  a  serious  felony  against  one  of  the
parent's   children,   "as   evidenced   by   a   final   judgment   of
conviction,"  see  Wis.  Stat.                                                 §  48.415(9m);  and  prior  involuntary
termination  of  parental  rights  to  another  child,  provable  by
court  order,  see  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(10).
¶39   Each  of  these  newly-created  grounds  for  involuntary
termination  of  parental  rights  expressly  provides  that  circuit
court   orders   or   judgments   constitute   proof   of   unfitness.
Similarly,   the   ground   for   termination   alleged   in   this   case,
continuing    denial    of    periods    of    physical    placement    or
visitation,  is  expressly  provable  by  evidence  of  a  court  order.
See   Wis.   Stat.                                                             §  48.415(4)(a)   and                                              (b).                                                                     This   evinces   the
                                                                                                                                                  legislature's  manifest  intent  to  enable  unfitness  determinations
judgment   in   any   particular   case.                                       The   propriety   of   summary
judgment  is  determined  case-by-case.
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No.                                                                           02-2860
to  conclusively  flow  from  certain  existing  court  orders  that
satisfy  the  statutory  requirements.     We  fail  to  see  how  this
intent  is  furthered  by  requiring  the  empanelment  of  a  jury  to
receive  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  court  order  or  judgment
about  which  there  is  no  dispute.     The  availability  of  partial
summary  judgment  in  the  grounds  phase  of  a  TPR  proceeding  where
the  entire  proof  of  unfitness  under  the  statute  is  an  undisputed
court    record    furthers    the    legislature's    purpose    and    is
consistent  with  the  general  rule  that  the  provisions  of  the  code
of  civil  procedure  apply  to  all  civil  actions  and  proceedings.5
¶40     Kelley's  argument  that  applying  summary  judgment  at
the  unfitness  phase  of  a  TPR  case  violates  due  process  is  not
well-developed.                                                               Its   premise   seems   to   be   that   there   is   a
constitutional  right  to  fact-finding  by  a  jury  in  all  TPR  cases,
5  The  dissent  concludes  that  the  legislature  intended  the
statutory  jury  trial  right  in  TPR  cases  to  be  unconditional  and
absolute,  essentially  the  equivalent  of  the  jury  trial  right  in
criminal  cases.    Dissent,  ¶¶75,  86.    In  the  context  of  enacting
a   civil   proceeding   for   the   adjudication   of   alleged   sexually
violent   persons,   the   legislature   has   expressed   itself   quite
explicitly  in  creating  the  statutory  equivalent  of  a  criminal
jury                                                                          trial                                                     right     in            a   civil   proceeding.                    See
Wis.  Stat.  §§                                                                                                                         980.03,   980.05(1m).               If   the   legislature   had
intended  to  enact  a  right  to  a  jury  trial  in  TPR  cases  that  is
the  equivalent  of  a  constitutional  criminal  jury  trial  right,  it
would  have  expressly  said  so,  as  it  did  in  Chapter  980.
21




No.                                                                            02-2860
even  where  the  facts  of  unfitness  are  undisputed.6    This  appears
also  to  be  the  premise  of  Elizabeth  W.,  although  the  court  of
appeals  did  not  apply  the  Supreme  Court's  three-part  test  for
determining  what  process  is  constitutionally  due  in  TPR  cases.
In  Santosky,  the  Supreme  Court  held:
[T]he  nature  of  the  process  due  in  parental  rights
termination  proceedings  turns  on  a  balancing  of  the
"three   distinct   factors"   specified   in   Mathews   v.
Eldridge,                                                                      424  U.S.                                                      319,   335,   96  S.Ct.                                       893,   903,   47
L.Ed.2d                                                                        18                                                                           (1976):  the  private  interest  affected  by
the   proceeding;   the   risk   of   error   created   by   the
State's   chosen   procedure;   and   the   countervailing
governmental   interest   supporting   the   use   of   the
challenged  procedure.
Santosky,  455  U.S.  at  754.
¶41    Applying  this  test  here,  we  reiterate  that  the  private
interest  affected  by  a  TPR  proceeding  is  unquestionably  very
strong.    However,  the  remaining  two  factors  in  the  three-factor
test  weigh  heavily  against  a  conclusion  that  a  jury  trial  is
constitutionally  required  in  TPR  cases.
¶42    The  risk  of  error  in  applying  partial  summary  judgment
at  the  grounds  phase  of  a  TPR  proceeding  where  the  facts  of
unfitness  are  undisputed  is  extremely  low.      The  grounds  for
unfitness  most  likely  to  form  the  basis  of  a  successful  motion
6  Kelley's  constitutional  argument  is  grounded  in  procedural
due   process.                                                                 She   does   not   mount   a   facial   or   as-applied
substantive  due  process  challenge  to  the  statutory  ground  for
unfitness  invoked  in  her  case,  Wis.  Stat.  §  48.415(4).      This
difference  distinguishes  this  case  from  Monroe  County  Department
of  Human  Services  v.  Kelli  B.,  2004  WI  48,  ___  Wis.  2d  ___,  ___
N.W.2d                                                                         ___,  another  termination  of  parental  rights  case  also
mandated  this  date.
22




No.                                                                           02-2860
for  partial  summary  judgment  in  a  TPR  case  are  those  that  are
sustainable  on  proof  of  court  order  or  judgment  of  conviction,
the   reliability   of   which   is   generally   readily   apparent   and
conceded.    Furthermore,  as  we  have  noted,  a  finding  of  unfitness
is  only  the  first  of  two  steps  in  the  process.     A  finding  of
unfitness——whether  on  fact-finding  by  the  court  or  jury  where
the  facts  are  disputed  or  on  partial  summary  judgment  where  the
facts  are  undisputed——does  not  mandate  termination  of  parental
rights,   nor   does   it   foreclose   the   parent's   opportunity   to
present    evidence    and    argue    against    termination    at    the
dispositional  hearing.
¶43     Finally,  the  countervailing  governmental  interest  in
avoiding  pointless  jury  trials  where  there  is  nothing  to  try  is
substantial.                                                                  Jury   trials   are   expensive   and   time-consuming.
Parental    rights    termination    cases    generally    require    the
participation  of  at  least  three  publicly-financed  attorneys  (the
guardian  ad  litem,  and  the  attorneys  for  the  county  and  the
parent),  as  well  as  the  circuit  court  judge,  court  staff,  and
jurors.                                                                       Elizabeth   W.'s   bright-line   prohibition   of   summary
judgment  in  TPR  cases  appears  to  require  the  empanelment  of  a
jury  to  listen  to  evidence  even  when  it  is  a  foregone  conclusion
that   a   directed   verdict   is   the   only   possible   outcome.         To
mandate  a  jury  trial  where  the  parent  does  not  dispute  the  facts
regarding  unfitness  alleged  in  the  petition  is  a  complete  waste
of  judicial  resources.
¶44    Accordingly,  although  the  private  interest  at  stake  is
fundamental,  we  conclude  that  due  process  does  not  mandate  a
23




No.                                                                             02-2860
jury  trial  in  the  unfitness  phase  of  a  TPR  case.    The  jury  trial
right  in  TPR  cases  is  statutory  only,  and  is  therefore  subject
to  the  provisions  of  the  code  of  civil  procedure,  including
summary  judgment  procedure  as  specified  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08.
Due  process  requires  a  hearing,  Stanley,                                   405  U.S.  at                                                   649,  and
clear  and  convincing  p

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