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Susan M. Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company
State: Wisconsin
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 2002 WI 71
Case Date: 06/25/2002
Plaintiff: Susan M. Lodl
Defendant: Progressive Northern Insurance Company
Preview:2002  WI  71
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                                      00-0221
COMPLETE TITLE:
                                                                               Susan  M.  Lodl,
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant,
Kohl's  Department  Store,
Involuntary-Plaintiff,
v.
Progressive  Northern  Insurance  Company,
Defendant-Third-Party  Plaintiff-
Co-Appellant,
Liberty  Mutual  Insurance  Company,
Defendant-Appellant,
Wausau  Underwriters  Insurance  Company,  Officer
Brian  M.  Fredericks  and  Town  of  Pewaukee,
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners,
v.
Walker  J.  Young,  Jr.,
Third-Party  Defendant-Appellant.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
2001  WI  App  3
                                                                               Reported  at:                                         240  Wis.  2d  652,  625  N.W.2d  601
                                                                                                                                     (Published)
OPINION FILED:                                                                 June  25,  2002
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                                 November  6,  2001
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                         Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                        Waukesha
JUDGE:                                                                         Kathryn  W.  Foster
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:                                                                     BRADLEY,  J.,  dissents  (opinion  filed).
ABRAHAMSON,  C.J.,  joins  dissent.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For    the                                                                     defendants-respondents-petitioners    there    were
briefs   by   Raymond   J.   Pollen,   Michele   M.   Ford   and   Crivello,
Carlson,   Mentkowski   &   Steeves,   S.C.,   Milwaukee,   and   oral
argument  by  Michele  Ford.




For   the   defendant-appellant   and   third-party   defendant-
appellant  there  was  a  brief  by  Thomas  A.  Cabush  and  Kasdorf,
Lewis  &  Swietlik,  S.C.,  Milwaukee,  and  oral  argument  by  Thomas
A.  Cabush.
For   the   plaintiff-co-appellant   and   defendant-third-party
plaintiff-co-appellant  there  was  a  brief  by  John  D.  Surma  and
Hills  &  Hicks,  S.C.,  Brookfield,  and  Mark  L.  Thomsen,  Sarah  E.
Frink  and  Cannon  &  Dunphy,  S.C.,  Brookfield,  and  oral  argument
by  Mark  L.  Thomsen.
2




2002  WI  71
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
                                                                         editing   and   modification.           The
                                                                         final  version  will  appear  in  the
                                                                         bound   volume   of   the   official
                                                                         reports.
No.                                             00-0221
(L.C.  No.                                      99  CV  497)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                            :                        IN  SUPREME  COURT
Susan  M.  Lodl,
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant,
Kohl's  Department  Store,
Involuntary-Plaintiff,
v.
Progressive  Northern  Insurance  Company,
Defendant-Third-Party  Plaintiff-
Co-Appellant,                                   FILED
JUN  25,  2002
Liberty  Mutual  Insurance  Company,
Cornelia G. Clark
Defendant-Appellant,                            Clerk of Supreme Court
Wausau  Underwriters  Insurance  Company,
Officer  Brian  M.  Fredericks  and  Town  of
Pewaukee,
Defendants-Respondents-
Petitioners,
v.
Walker  J.  Young,  Jr.,
Third-Party  Defendant-Appellant.




No.                                                                           00-0221
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Reversed.
¶1    DIANE  S.  SYKES,  J.     This  case  concerns  the  scope  and
proper   application   of   the   judicially-created   "known   danger"
exception  to  municipal  and  public  officer  immunity  under  Wis.
Stat.  §  893.80(4)  (1997-98).1
¶2  The  plaintiff  Susan  Lodl  was  injured  in  an  intersection
accident  in  the  Town  of  Pewaukee.    The  traffic  control  lights  at
the  intersection  were  inoperable  because  of  an  evening  storm,
and  so  the  Town  of  Pewaukee  dispatched  a  police  officer  to  the
scene.     Lodl  sued  the  officer  and  the  Town,  claiming  that  the
officer    negligently    failed    to    control    traffic    at    the
intersection,  and  that  the  Town  was  liable  for  the  officer's
negligence  under  respondeat  superior  theory.
¶3  The  circuit  court  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of
the  officer  and  the  Town,  concluding  that  they  were  immune  under
Wis.   Stat.                                                                  §                                                                   893.80(4).                     The   court   of   appeals   reversed,
concluding  that  the  known  danger  exception  to  immunity  applied,
and  that  material  factual  issues  regarding  the  adequacy  of  the
officer's   response   to   the   known   danger   precluded   summary
judgment.     We  accepted  review,  and  now  reverse  the  court  of
appeals.
                                                                              ¶4    The  "known  danger"  exception  to  municipal  and  public
officer   immunity   under   Wis.   Stat.                                     §                                                                   893.80(4)   is   a   narrow,
1  All  future  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  will  be  to
the  1997-98  version,  unless  otherwise  noted.
2




No.                                                                             00-0221
judicially-created  exception  that  arises  only  when  there  exists
a  danger  that  is  known  and  compelling  enough  to  give  rise  to  a
ministerial  duty  on  the  part  of  a  municipality  or  its  officers.
Here,  the  plaintiff  contends  that  the  danger  created  by  the
inoperative   stoplights   at   the   intersection   gave   rise   to   a
ministerial  duty  on  the  part  of  the  officer  to  undertake  manual
traffic  control.
¶5   We   conclude   that   the   situation   at   the   intersection,
while  admittedly  dangerous,  nonetheless  allowed  for  the  exercise
of  officer  discretion  as  to  the  mode  of  response,  and  therefore
did   not   give   rise   to   a   ministerial   duty   to   perform   manual
traffic  control.     Accordingly,  the  known  danger  exception  to
municipal  and  public  officer  immunity  does  not  apply.     Summary
judgment  based  upon  statutory  immunity  was  properly  granted.
I
¶6    On  the  night  of  July                                                  18,                 1998,  a  storm  in  Waukesha
County  caused  the  power  to  go  out.     The  power  outage  affected
the  traffic  control  lights  at  the  intersection  of  Capitol  Drive
and   Highway   J   in   the   Town   of   Pewaukee.                            The   inoperative
stoplights  turned  what  is  normally  a  controlled  intersection
into  an  uncontrolled  one.    In  addition,  the  heavy  rain  decreased
visibility  at  the  intersection.
¶7    The   Town   of   Pewaukee   Police   Department   dispatched
Sergeant   Richard   Ryman   to   investigate   the   blackout   at   the
intersection.    Ryman  testified  in  deposition  that  he  "dropped,"
or  opened,  the  folded  stop  signs  affixed  to  the  poles  of  the
3




No.                                                                            00-0221
traffic  control  signals.    Ryman  then  called  dispatch  to  have  an
officer  sent  to  the  intersection,  and  left  the  scene.
¶8    At  approximately                                                        8:49  p.m.,  Officer  Brian  Fredericks
was  dispatched  to  the  intersection,  arriving  about  two  minutes
later.     Fredericks  parked  his  squad  car  on  the  south  side  of
Capitol  Drive.     The  parties  disagree  about  what  happened  next.
It  is  clear  at  the  very  least  that  Fredericks  got  out  of  his
car,   put   on   an   orange   or   yellow   raincoat   and   grabbed   a
flashlight.    It  is  also  undisputed  that  he  called  for  backup  and
requested    that    portable    stop    signs    be    brought    to    the
intersection.
¶9  The  factual  dispute——and  the  basis  for  the  claim  of
negligence  here——concerns  the  extent  to  which  Fredericks  was
actually   directing   traffic   at   the   time   of   the   accident.
Fredericks  testified  in  deposition  that  he  was  in  the  center  of
the  intersection  attempting  manual  traffic  control,  but  that
"nobody  was  yielding  to  nobody,"  which  prompted  his  call  for
assistance  and  portable  signs.    Walker  J.  Young,  Jr.,  the  driver
of  the  car  Lodl  was  riding  in,  testified  only  that  he  saw
Fredericks  standing  on  the  shoulder  of  the  road  as  he  approached
the  intersection.
¶10   The  accident  occurred  within  minutes  of  Fredericks'
arrival  at  the  scene,  and  before  the  police  backup  or  portable
signs  arrived.    Young  and  Lodl  entered  the  intersection  from  the
westbound  lanes  of  Capitol  Drive.     At  the  same  time,  a  car
driven  by  James  R.  Radmer  entered  the  intersection  from  the
4




No.                                                                           00-0221
northbound  lane  of  Highway  J,  colliding  with  Young's  car  and
injuring  Lodl.
¶11   Lodl  sued,  alleging  that  Fredericks  was  negligent  in
his  manner  of  directing  traffic  at  the  intersection,  and  that
the  Town  of  Pewaukee  was  liable  for  Fredericks'  negligence  under
respondeat  superior  theory.     The  Town  and  its  officer  asserted
municipal    and    public    officer    immunity    under    Wis.    Stat.
§  893.80(4).
¶12   After   extensive   discovery,   Fredericks   and   the   Town
moved  for  summary  judgment  on  the  basis  of  statutory  immunity.
The   Waukesha   County   Circuit   Court,   the   Honorable   Kathryn   W.
Foster,  granted  the  motion.     Lodl  appealed,  arguing  that  the
Town  and  its  officer  were  not  immune  because  the  officer  had  a
ministerial    duty    to    manually    control    traffic    at    the
intersection,  by  statute  and  Town  policy,  and  by  operation  of
the  known  danger  exception.
¶13  The  court  of  appeals  concluded  that  while  no  statute,
regulation,  or  policy  created  a  ministerial  duty  to  manually
control  traffic  at  the  intersection,  the  known  danger  exception
to   immunity   applied,   because   the   inoperative   traffic   lights
created  a  hazardous  situation  requiring  a  response.     The  court
of  appeals  also  concluded  that  the  factual  dispute  regarding  the
sufficiency  of  Fredericks'  response  precluded  summary  judgment
on  the  issue  of  the  known  danger  exception.
¶14  More  specifically,  the  court  of  appeals  concluded  that
the   known   danger   exception   required   that   Fredericks   "do
something   about   the   compelling   and   known   danger   at   the
5




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    No.                                 00-0221
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                intersection."     Lodl  v.  Progressive  Northern  Ins.  Co.,                                                          2001  WI
App                                                                            3,                                                                           ¶16,                                                                240  Wis.  2d  652,                                              625  N.W.2d  601   (Ct.  App.                          2000).
Because  there  were  material  issues  of  fact  in  dispute  about
whether   Fredericks   "nonetheless   did   nothing,"   the   court   of
appeals   reversed   the   summary   judgment   and   remanded   to   the
circuit  court  with  these  instructions:
The  factual  issue  at  trial  will  be  whether  the  police
officer   in   fact   tried   to   alleviate   a   dangerous
situation  or  whether  he  simply  sat  at  the  intersection
and  did  nothing.    The  question  of  immunity  will  depend
on  that  factual  finding  .  .  .
If  the  finder  of  fact  concludes  that  Fredericks  acted,
Fredericks  and  Pewaukee  are  entitled  to  governmental
immunity   even   if   his   direction   of   traffic   was
negligent.
Id.  at  ¶¶17-18.
II
¶15   We  review  an  order  granting  summary  judgment  de  novo,
applying  the  same  methodology  as  the  circuit  court,  benefiting
from  the  lower  courts'  analyses.    See  Yahnke  v.  Carson,  2000  WI
74,                                                                            ¶10,                                                                         236  Wis.  2d  257,                                                 613  N.W.2d  102.     Summary  judgment  is
granted  when  the  pleadings,  depositions,  affidavits,  and  other
moving  papers  establish  that  no  material  facts  are  in  dispute
and  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.
See  Wis.  Stat.  §  802.08.
                                                                                                                                                            ¶16   "The   well-established   purpose   of   summary   judgment
                                                                               procedure   is   to   determine   the   existence   of   genuine   factual
                                                                               disputes  in  order  to  'avoid  trials  where  there  is  nothing  to
try.'"     Yahnke,                                                             2000  WI                                                                                                                                         74,                                                              ¶10                (citing  Rollins  Burdick  Hunter
6




                                                                                                                            No.                                                                        00-0221
of   Wisconsin,   Inc.   v.   Hamilton,                                       101   Wis.  2d  460,                          470,                                                                       304
N.W.2d  752  (1981)).    If  Fredericks  and  the  Town  are  entitled  to
statutory  immunity,  then  there  is  nothing  to  try  even  though
factual   disputes   may   exist   on   the   issue   of   the   officer's
negligence.
¶17   The   immunity   defense   assumes   negligence,   focusing
instead  on  whether  the  municipal  action  (or  inaction)  upon  which
liability  is  premised  is  entitled  to  immunity  under  the  statute,
and  if  so,  whether  one  of  the  judicially-created  exceptions  to
immunity  applies.    See  Kimps  v.  Hill,  200  Wis.  2d  1,  11-12,  546
N.W.2d  151                                                                                                                 (1996);   Ottinger   v.   Pinel,                                           215   Wis.  2d  266,                        572
N.W.2d  519                                                                   (Ct.  App.                                    1997).                                                                     The  application  of  the  immunity
                                                                                                                            statute  and  its  exceptions  involves  the  application  of  legal
                                                                                                                            standards  to  a  set  of  facts,  which  is  a  question  of  law.  See
                                                                              Kierstyn  v.  Racine  Unified  Sch.  Dist.,                                                                              228  Wis.  2d  81,                    88,   596
N.W.2d  417  (1999).
¶18   As  we  have  noted,  there  is  a  factual  dispute  in  this
case  about  whether  Fredericks  was  in  the  intersection  attempting
traffic  control  or  merely  standing  on  the  side  of  the  road  at
the  time  of  the  accident.    The  circuit  court  considered  this  to
be  a  factual  dispute  on  the  issue  of  whether  the  officer  was
negligent.     The  court  of  appeals  characterized  it  instead  as  a
factual  dispute  on  the  issue  of  the  known  danger  exception  to
statutory  immunity.
¶19  The  circuit  court  had  it  right.     The  dispute  about
whether  Fredericks  was  actually  manually  directing  traffic  at
the  intersection  when  the  accident  occurred  goes  to  the  question
7




No.                                                                           00-0221
of  whether  he  was  negligent.    We  assume  negligence  for  purposes
of  the  immunity  defense,  and  apply  the  test  for  immunity  and  its
exceptions  to  the  municipal  act  alleged  to  have  been  negligently
performed  or  omitted.
III
¶20   The    governmental    immunity    statute,    Wis.    Stat.
§  893.80(4),  confers  broad  immunity  from  suit  on  municipalities
and  their  officers  and  employees:
No  suit  may  be  brought  against  any  volunteer  fire
company                                                                       organized                               under                                                       ch.               213,   political
corporation,   governmental   subdivision   or   any   agency
thereof  for  the  intentional  torts  of  its  officers,
officials,   agents   or   employes   nor   may   any   suit   be
brought   against   such   corporation,   subdivision   or
agency   or   volunteer   fire   company   or   against   its
officers,  officials,  agents  or  employes  for  acts  done
in   the   exercise   of   legislative,   quasi-legislative,
judicial  or  quasi-judicial  functions.
¶21    The    statute    immunizes    against    liability    for
legislative,   quasi-legislative,   judicial,   and   quasi-judicial
acts,  which  have  been  collectively  interpreted  to  include  any
act   that   involves   the   exercise   of   discretion   and   judgment.
                                                                                                                      See  Willow  Creek  Ranch,  L.L.C.  v.  Town  of  Shelby,                            2000  WI             56,
235  Wis.                                                                     2d                                      409,  ¶25,  611  N.W.2d                                     693;  Kierstyn,          228  Wis.   2d  at
                                                                              90;  Scarpaci  v.  Milwaukee  County,                                                               96   Wis.         2d     663,        683,     292
N.W.2d                                                                        816                                     (1980);  Lifer  v.  Raymond,                                80  Wis.          2d     503,        512,     259
N.W.2d  537  (1977).
8




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        No.                                         00-0221
                                                                                                                                                                                ¶22   Municipal  immunity  derives  from  the  common  law2  and  was
                                                                                                                                          first  adopted  by  this  court  in   1873.                                                                   See  Hayes  v.  City  of
Oshkosh,                                                                       33  Wis.                                                   314,                                  318                                                                     (1873).     It  was  partially  abrogated
almost  100  years  later,  in  Holytz  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  17  Wis.
2d  26,  37,  115  N.W.2d  618  (1962),3  and  was  eventually  codified  by
the    legislature    in    what    is    now    Wis.  Stat.  §  893.80(4).
Municipal  immunity  differs  from  its  state  counterpart  in  that
liability  is  the  rule  and  immunity  is  the  exception.    See  Kimps,
200  Wis.  2d  at  11  n.6.
¶23   Immunity  for  public  officers  and  employees,  both  state
and    municipal,    is    based    largely    upon    public    policy
considerations  that  spring  from  the  interest  in  protecting  the
public  purse  and  a  preference  for  political  rather  than  judicial
redress  for  the  actions  of  public  officers.     See  Kierstyn,           228
Wis.  2d  at  89-90.                                                           The  policy  considerations  include:
(1)  The  danger  of  influencing  public  officers  in  the
performance   of   their   functions   by   the   threat   of   a
lawsuit;  (2)  the  deterrent  effect  which  the  threat  of
personal   liability   might   have   on   those   who   are
considering  entering  public  service;                                        (3)  the  drain  on
valuable   time   caused   by   such   actions;                                (4)   the
unfairness    of    subjecting    officials    to    personal
liability  for  the  acts  of  their  subordinates;  and                       (5)
the  feeling  that  the  ballot  and  removal  procedures  are
more  appropriate  methods  of  dealing  with  misconduct  in
public  office.
2  Municipal  and  public  officer  immunity  is  distinct  from  the
constitutionally-based    doctrine    of    sovereign    immunity,    a
"distinction                                                                   [that]  is  often  overlooked."     Kierstyn  v.  Racine
Unified  Sch.  Dist.,  228  Wis.  2d  81,  89,  596  N.W.2d  417  (1999).
3  Holytz  left  immunity  for  legislative,  quasi-legislative,
judicial  and  quasi-judicial  acts  in  place.    Holytz  v.  City  of
Milwaukee,  17  Wis.  2d  26,  40,  115  N.W.2d  618  (1962).
9




No.                                                                           00-0221
Lister  v.  Board  of  Regents,  72  Wis.  2d  282,  299,  240  N.W.2d  610
(1976).
¶24   Both   state   and   municipal   immunity   are   subject   to
several   exceptions   "representing   a   judicial   balance   struck
between  'the  need  of  public  officers  to  perform  their  functions
freely  [and]  the  right  of  an  aggrieved  party  to  seek  redress.'"
C.L.   v.   Olson,                                                            143   Wis.  2d  701,   710,                                                                    422   N.W.2d  614                    (1988)
(quoting   Lister,                                                            72   Wis.  2d  at                                                                              300).   There   is   no   immunity
against   liability   associated   with:                                                                                                                                     1)   the   performance   of
ministerial   duties   imposed   by   law;                                                                                                                                   2)   known   and   compelling
                                                                                                     dangers  that  give  rise  to  ministerial  duties  on  the  part  of
public   officers   or   employees;                                                                                                                                          3)   acts   involving   medical
discretion;   and                                                                                    4)   acts   that   are   malicious,   willful,   and
intentional.     See  Willow  Creek  Ranch,                                                          2000  WI                                                                56,                                  ¶25.  Lodl
invokes  the  "ministerial  duty"  and  "known  danger"  exceptions  to
immunity.
¶25   The   ministerial   duty   exception   is   not   so   much   an
exception   as   a   recognition   that   immunity   law   distinguishes
between   discretionary   and   ministerial   acts,   immunizing   the
performance  of  the  former  but  not  the  latter.    See  Kierstyn,  228
Wis.  2d  at                                                                  91.                    A  ministerial  duty  is  one  that  "is  absolute,
certain  and  imperative,  involving  merely  the  performance  of  a
specific  task  when  the  law  imposes,  prescribes  and  defines  the
time,  mode  and  occasion  for  its  performance  with  such  certainty
that  nothing  remains  for  judgment  or  discretion."     Lister,           72
Wis.  2d  at  301.
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No.                                                                            00-0221
¶26  Put  another  way,  a  duty  is  regarded  as  ministerial  when
it  has  been  "'positively  imposed  by  law,  and  its  performance
required  at  a  time  and  in  a  manner,  or  upon  conditions  which  are
specifically    designated,    the    duty    to    perform    under    the
conditions   specified   not   being   dependent   upon   the   officer's
judgment  or  discretion.'"    Meyer  v.  Carmann,  217  Wis.  329,  332,
73  N.W.2d  514  (1955)  (quoting  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Filer,  145  So.
204                                                                            (Fla.                                                      1933)).     If  liability  is  premised  upon  the  negligent
performance                                                                    (or  non-performance)  of  a  ministerial  duty  imposed
by  law  or  government  policy,  then  immunity  will  not  apply.
¶27   Lodl  relies  on  Wis.  Stat.  §  346.40  and  Section  4.23  of
the  Town  of  Pewaukee  Police  Department's  Operations  Policy  to
support  her  contention  that  Fredericks  had  a  ministerial  duty  to
manually  control  traffic  at  the  intersection.    Section  346.40  of
the  Wisconsin  Statutes  describes  the  various  whistle  blasts  a
law  enforcement  officer  must  use  when  directing  traffic  using  a
whistle.4    The  statute  does  not,  however,  direct  law  enforcement
officers   to   perform   manual   traffic   control   in   any   given
situation,   or   otherwise   remove   officer   discretion   over   the
decision  to  undertake  manual  traffic  control.
¶28  Section                                                                   4.23  of  the  Operations  Policy  Manual  describes
the  procedure  an  officer  should  follow  when  conducting  manual
traffic  control:
4  Wisconsin  Statute  §  346.40(1)  states:  "Whenever  traffic  is
alternately  being  directed  to  stop  and  to  proceed  by  a  traffic
officer  using  a  whistle,  such  officer  shall  use  the  following
whistle  signals  which  shall  signify  as  follows  .  .  .                  ."
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No.                                                                             00-0221
POLICY  4.23  -  CONTROL  AND  DIRECTION  OF  TRAFFIC
I.  PURPOSE                                                                     -  The  purpose  of  controlling  and  directing
traffic   is   to   facilitate   the   safe   and   efficient
movement  of  such  traffic.  It  is  up  to  the  police  to
see  that  traffic  moves  as  safely  and  as  quickly  as
possible.
II.  PROCEDURE  -  Direction  and  Control  -  Officer  should
first  place  himself  in  the  center  of  traffic  flow.
Using  police  whistle  signals  as  indicated  in  State
Statutes                                                                        346.40,  officer  should indicate  traffic  which
should   stop   by   holding   both   arms   horizontal,   with
palms   of   hands   facing   traffic.   After   traffic   has
stopped,  officer  should then  turn  his  body  to  face  one
lane  of  traffic  which  has  stopped.  In  this  manner,  the
officer's   body   acts   as   a   token   barricade   to   the
stopped   traffic.   To   begin   movement   of   a   column   of
vehicles,   officer   should  look   directly   at   the   lead
driver,  point  at  him,  and  then  indicate  with  whistle
signal  and  arm  motion  that  he  should  move.  To  begin
traffic  flow  from  the  opposite  direction,  repeat  this
procedure  with  lead  driver  in  that  column.  After  flow
has   started,   intermittent   arm   signals   will   keep
traffic   moving.   Arm   signals   should  be   intermittent,
however,  not  continuous,  and  should  be  crisp.  Left
turning  should  be  directed to  do  so  in  front  of  the
officer,   rather   than   behind.   In   this   manner,   the
officer  can  observe  the  vehicle  throughout  the  turn,
thereby  lessening  the  possibility  of  being  struck  by
the   turning   vehicle.   During   hours   of   darkness,
officers  should use  a  flashlight  or  flares  to  assist
him/her   in   directing   traffic,   officers   should   also
wear  reflective  clothing  to  enhance  his/her  safety.
(Emphasis  added.)
¶29   Pewaukee  Police  Chief  Denny  Stone,  who  drafted                      the
procedures  and  policies  contained  in  the  manual,  testified  that
Section  4.23  "is  a  guideline.    There  is  no  way  for  me  to  sit  in
an  office  and  tell  them  the  best  way  to  do  many,  many  of  the
jobs   that   we   have   to   perform,   and   this   is   a   classic
example  .  .  .                                                                .  It  is  simply  a  guideline.     It  is  nothing  more
than  that."
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No.                                                                           00-0221
¶30   The  Forward  to  the  manual  states  that  "[o]fficers  are
expected  to  use  judgment  in  handling  problems,"  and  the  manual
contemplates   that   officers   may   have   to   deviate   from   the
guidelines  in  cases  of  "unforeseen  circumstances."    As  the  court
of  appeals  noted,  the  policy  regarding  traffic  direction  and
control  is  itself  cast  in  discretionary  terms,  using  the  word
"should"  throughout.
¶31  Finally,  while  the  manual  describes  the  procedure  that
an  officer  should  ordinarily  follow  when  manually  controlling
traffic,   it   does   not   eliminate   the   officer's   discretion   to
decide  when  or  whether  to  undertake  manual  traffic  control  in
the   first   instance.      Considered   separately   or   together,   the
statute   and   the   policy   manual   merely   establish   the   general
protocols  for  manual  traffic  control  when  an  officer,  in  the
exercise  of  his  judgment  and  discretion,  decides  to  undertake
it.    Accordingly,  we  agree  with  the  court  of  appeals'  conclusion
that  neither  the  statute  nor  the  policy  manual  establishes  a
ministerial  duty  to  manually  direct  traffic.
¶32   We  cannot  agree,  however,  with  the  court  of  appeals'
analysis  of  the  known  danger  exception.    The  exception  was  first
announced  in  Cords  v.  Anderson,                                           80  Wis.  2d  525,                259  N.W.2d  672
(1977),  a  case  which  involved  an  accident  on  a  state  park  hiking
trail.     The  trail  ran  alongside  a                                      90-foot  unguarded  gorge,  and
the  plaintiffs  were  seriously  injured  when  they  fell  into  the
steep  gorge  while  hiking  at  dusk.     They  sued  the  park  manager,
alleging  that  he  knew  of  the  hazard  presented  by  the  sharp
13




No.                                                                           00-0221
unguarded  drop-off,  and  that  his  failure  to  post  signs  warning
against  it  was  negligence.
¶33   This   court   concluded   that   the   compelling   danger
presented  by  the  trail,  which  was  known  to  the  park  manager,
gave  rise  to  a  ministerial  duty  requiring  the  manager  to  post
warning  signs  on  the  trail  or  to  advise  his  superiors  of  the
hazardous  condition  so  that  they  could  do  so.    See  id.  at          541.
The  court  held  that  the  compellingly  dangerous  circumstances
established  a  duty  to  warn  that  was  "so  clear  and  so  absolute
that  it  falls  within  the  definition  of  a  ministerial  duty."    Id.
at  542.
¶34   We  elaborated  on  the  known  danger  exception  in  C.L.,
143  Wis.  2d  at                                                             714-18,  which  involved  allegations  that  a  state
parole  agent  negligently  supervised  a  paroled  sex  offender,  who
abducted  and  raped  the  plaintiff  while  under  the  agent's  parole
supervision.    There,  we  indicated  that:
[A]   public   officer's   duty   is   ministerial   where   a
danger  is  known  and  of  such  quality  that  the  public
officer's  duty  to  act  becomes  "absolute,  certain  and
imperative  .  .  ."  Cords,                                                  80  Wis.                                                2d  at   541    (quoting
Lister,  72  Wis.  2d  at  301).    Stated  otherwise,  where  a
public  officer's  duty  is  not  generally  prescribed  and
defined  by  law  in  time,  mode,  and  occasion,  such  that
"nothing    remains    for    judgment    or    discretion,"
circumstances  may  give  rise  to  such  a  certain  duty
where,   as   in   Cords,   the   nature   of   the   danger   is
compelling  and  known  to  the  officer  and  is  of  such
force  that  the  public  officer  has  no  discretion  not  to
act.    As    subsequently    explained    in    Scarpaci    v.
Milwaukee   County,                                                           96   Wis.                                               2d       663,   292   N.W.2d   816
(1980),  it  is  the  nature  of  the  specific  act  upon
which    liability    is    based,    as    opposed    to    the
categorization   of   the   general   duties   of   a   public
14




No.                                                                            00-0221
officer,  which  is  determinative  of  whether  an  officer
is  immune  from  liability.
C.L.,                                                                          143  Wis.  2d  at                                                 715-16                                     (footnote  omitted)(emphasis  added).
We  concluded  in  C.L.  that  the  known  danger  exception  did  not
apply,  because  the  danger  presented  by  the  parolee  was  not  of
"such   a   degree   of   probability"   that   the   parole   agent   was
deprived  of  discretion  regarding  the  manner  and  level  of  parole
supervision  required.    Id.  at  724-25.
                                                                               ¶35   Similarly,   in   Barillari   v.   City   of   Milwaukee,                                              194
Wis.  2d  247,                                                                 533   N.W.2d  759                                                 (1995),   we   held   that   the   known
danger  exception  did  not  apply  to  a  claim  that  the  City  of
Milwaukee  Police  Department  was  negligent  in  failing  to  fulfill
a  promise  to  arrest  a  sex  offender.     In  that  case,  the  police
had  promised  a  sexual  assault  victim  that  they  would  arrest  her
assailant,  a  former  boyfriend,  but  did  not  do  so  because  the
district  attorney  decided  to  give  the  suspect  a  few  days  to  turn
himself  in.      In  the  meantime,  the  former  boyfriend  attacked
again,  this  time  killing  the  victim  and  himself.     We  concluded
that  "the  nature  of  law  enforcement  requires  moment-to-moment
decision  making  and  crisis  management  which,  in  turn,  requires
that  the  police  department  have  the  latitude  to  decide  how  best
to  utilize  law  enforcement  resources."    Id.  at  260.
¶36   Other   cases   involving   the   application   of   the   known
danger  exception  to  the  alleged  negligence  of  law  enforcement
officers   have   produced   mixed   results.                                  In   Hoskins   v.   Dodge
County,  2002  WI  App  40,  251  Wis.  2d  276,  642  N.W.2d  213,  a  case
involving  a  claim  of  negligent  search-and-rescue,  the  exception
15




                                                                                                                                                                                                                          No.                                      00-0221
                                                                                                                                            was  held  inapplicable  where  law  enforcement  received  a  report  of
                                                                                                                                            a  boat  in  trouble,  sent  a  deputy  to  investigate  by  land  but  did
                                                                                                                                            not   dispatch   a   rescue   boat.   In   Ottinger   v.   Pinel,                                                      215
Wis.  2d  266,                                                                572  N.W.2d  519                                              (Ct.  App.                                                                    1997),  the  exception  was
                                                                                                                                            also   held   inapplicable   to   a   claim   that   corrections   officers
                                                                                                                                            negligently  failed  to  prevent  an  inmate's  escape  from  a  work-
release  facility.
                                                                                                                                            ¶37  In  contrast,  in  Linville  v.  City  of  Janesville,                                                            174
Wis.  2d  571,                                                                497   N.W.2d  465                                             (Ct.   App.                                                                   1993),   aff'd,                          184
Wis.  2d  705,                                                                516  N.W.2d  427                                                                                                                            (1994),  the  known  danger  exception
                                                                                                                                            applied  to  pierce  immunity  for  negligent  failure  to  attempt  an
                                                                                                                                            immediate  rescue  of  occupants  of  a  van  submerged  in  a  park  pond.
                                                                              And   in   Domino   v.   Walworth   County,                                                                                                 118   Wis.  2d  488,                     347
N.W.2d  917                                                                   (Ct.  App.                                                    1984),  the  known  danger  exception  applied
where   a   sheriff's   department   failed   to   send   an   officer   to
investigate  a  tree  that  had  fallen  across  a  road  at  night.
¶38   These  cases,  and  others  not  involving  law  enforcement
officers,5  demonstrate  the  case-by-case  nature  of  the  immunity
inquiry.     Nevertheless,  the  legal  standard  remains  the  same:  a
dangerous  situation  will  be  held  to  give  rise  to  a  ministerial
5  See  Kierstyn,                                                             228  Wis.  2d  at  96  (reduction  of  disability
benefits   due   to   mistaken   advice   by   school   district   benefits
specialist  not  a  known  and  compelling  danger);  Kimps  v.  Hill,
200  Wis.  2d  1,  17-18,  546  N.W.2d  151  (1996)  (separation  of  metal
base   from   volleyball   stand   in   state   university   physical
education  class  not  a  known  and  compelling  danger);  Bauder  v.
Delavan-Darien  Sch.  Dist.,  207  Wis.  2d  310,  315,  558  N.W.2d  881
(Ct.  App.                                                                    1996)(use  of  partially-deflated  soccer  ball  in  indoor
gym  class  at  public  school  not  a  known  and  compelling  danger).
16




No.                                                                           00-0221
duty  only  when  "there  exists  a  known  present  danger  of  such
force   that   the   time,   mode   and   occasion   for   performance   is
evident   with   such   certainty   that   nothing   remains   for   the
exercise  of  judgment  and  discretion."    C.L.,  142  Wis.  2d  at  717.
¶39  In  this  context,  the  ministerial  duty  arises  not  by
operation  of  law,  regulation  or  government  policy,  but  by  virtue
of  particularly  hazardous  circumstances——circumstances  that  are
both  known  to  the  municipality  or  its  officers  and  sufficiently
dangerous  to  require  an  explicit,  non-discretionary  municipal
response.    If    liability    is    premised    upon    the    negligent
performance                                                                   (or   non-performance)   of   a   ministerial   duty   that
arises  by  virtue  of  a  known  and  compelling  danger,  then  immunity
will  not  apply.6
¶40  The  cases  also  demonstrate  that  not  every  dangerous
situation  will  give  rise  to  a  duty  that  can  be  characterized  as
ministerial  for  purposes  of  piercing  immunity.     A  ministerial
duty——whether   imposed   by   law   or   arising   out   of   dangerous
circumstances——is  one  that  is  absolute,  certain,  and  imperative.
6  The  dissent  views  this  opinion  as  collapsing  the  known
danger  exception  into  the  ministerial  duty  exception.     This  is
untrue;  the  exceptions  remain  separate  and  distinct.     As  the
cases   make   clear,   however,   both   exceptions   derive   from   the
principle   that   only   discretionary   acts   are   immunized.             The
exceptions   constitute   two   different   legal   theories   by   which
courts  determine  that  a  particular  municipal  or  public  officer
duty   was   non-discretionary   and   therefore   not   entitled   to
immunity.     The  ministerial  duty  exception  applies  when  a  law,
statute,  ordinance,  government  policy,  or  the  like  establishes
the  ministerial  duty.     The  known  danger  exception  applies  when
the   known   dangerous   circumstances   establish   the   ministerial
duty.
17




No.                                                                            00-0221
To  qualify  as  ministerial,  the  time,  mode,  and  occasion  for
performance  of  the  duty  must  be  so  certain  that  discretion  is
essentially   eliminated.                                                      For   the   known   danger   exception   to
apply,  the  danger  must  be  compelling  enough  that  a  self-evident,
particularized,    and    non-discretionary    municipal    action    is
required.     The  focus  is  on  the  specific  act  the  public  officer
or  official  is  alleged  to  have  negligently  performed  or  omitted.
¶41   The   court   of   appeals   concluded   that   the   inoperable
traffic  lights  at  the  intersection  constituted  a  known  danger
requiring  the  responding  officer  to  "do  something,"  and  because
there    is    a    factual    dispute    about    whether    the    officer
nevertheless  "did  nothing,"  summary  judgment  on  the  immunity
issue  was  improper.     There  are  two  problems  with  the  court's
analysis.
¶42    First,    as    noted    above,    the    court    of    appeals
misconstrued  the  factual  dispute  about  Fredericks'  negligence  as
a  factual  dispute  about  the  applicability  of  the  known  danger
exception.    For  purposes  of  the  immunity  defense,  we  assume  that
the  public  officer  was  negligent  in  performing  or  omitting  to
perform  the  act  in  question,  and  focus  instead  on  whether  the
act  negligently  performed  or  omitted  can  be  characterized  as
ministerial  in  nature  because  of  known  dangerous  circumstances.
That  there  is  a  factual  dispute  about  the  officer's  negligence
is  irrelevant  to  the  immunity  inquiry.
¶43  Second,  the  court  of  appeals'  analysis  is  incomplete.
The  court  determined  only  that  the  situation  at  the  intersection
was   sufficiently   dangerous   to   require   the   officer   to   "do
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No.                                                                           00-0221
something"  about  it.    The  generic  "doing"  of  "something"  cannot
possibly  be  characterized  as  a  ministerial  duty.
¶44  A  ministerial  duty  is  not  an  undifferentiated  duty  to
act  but  a  duty  to  act  in  a  particular  way:  to  post  a  warning
sign                                                                          (Cords),  to  attempt  an  immediate  rescue  of  occupants  of  a
submerged   van                                                               (Linville),   to   send   a   squad   to   investigate   a
downed  tree  in  a  roadway  at  night  (Domino).    A  ministerial  duty,
by  definition,  is  explicit  as  to  time,  mode,  and  occasion  for
performance,  and  does  not  admit  of  any  discretion.7
¶45  Accordingly,  in  this  case,  a  proper  application  of  the
known    danger    exception    begins    with    the    assumption    that
Fredericks  was  negligent  in  failing  to  perform,  or  inadequately
performing,  manual  traffic  control.    To  pierce  immunity  pursuant
to   this   exception,   we   must   be   able   to   conclude   that   the
circumstances  were  sufficiently  dangerous  so  as  to  give  rise  to
a  ministerial  duty——not  merely  a  generalized  "duty  to  act"  in
some  unspecified  way,  but  a  duty  to  perform  the  particular  act
7  We  acknowledge  that  there  is  language  in  some  of  the  cases
referring  generally  to  a  "duty  to  act"  instead  of  a  duty  to
perform  a  particular  act.    As  we  have  noted,  a  generalized  "duty
to   act,"   without   more,   could   never   be   characterized   as
ministerial  in  nature,  because  it  is  too  non-specific  and  leaves
the  mode  of  official  action  open  to  discretion.     We  note  again
that  a  ministerial  duty,  whether  imposed  by  law  or  arising  out
of  known  dangerous  circumstances,  requires  specificity  as  to
time,  mode,  and  occasion  for  performance  so  that  nothing  remains
for   the   exercise   of   discretion.                                       Despite   the   sometimes
generalized    language,    the    cases    finding    a    known    danger
sufficient  to  pierce  immunity  are  premised  on  conclusions  that
particularized   government   responses   were   required   by   the
dangerous  circumstances  in  question.
19




No.                                                                           00-0221
upon  which  liability  is  premised,  here,  manual  traffic  control.
We  cannot  do  so.
¶46   While   the   circumstances   posed   by   the   uncontrolled
intersection  were  certainly  known  and  dangerous,  the  situation
nonetheless  allowed  for  the  exercise  of  the  officer's  discretion
as  to  the  mode  of  response.    Stated  differently,  the  situation,
while    dangerous,    did    not    compel    a    particularized,    non-
discretionary   action   on   the   part   of   the   responding   officer.
More  particularly,  Fredericks  did  not  have  a  ministerial  duty  to
perform  manual  traffic  control.
¶47  The  officer  could  reasonably  conclude,  in  his  judgment,
that  the  situation  at  the  intersection  was  not  conducive  to
manual  traffic  control  by  a  single  officer,  or  he  could  choose
to  address  the  danger  in  another  way                                    (e.g.,  portable  signs,
flares,  flashing  squad  lights).     In  any  event,  where,  as  here,
the  public  officer  clearly  retained  discretionary  authority  over
the  nature  and  mode  of  his  response  to  the  known  dangerous
situation,  the  circumstances  did  not  give  rise  to  a  duty  that
can   be   characterized   as   ministerial,   and   the   known   danger
exception   to   municipal   and   public   officer   immunity   does   not
apply.
¶48   Because  a  ministerial  duty  to  manually  control  traffic
did  not  exist  by  operation  of  law,  regulation,  or  government
policy,  or  arise  by  virtue  of  a  known  and  compelling  danger,
Fredericks   and   the   Town   are   entitled   to   municipal   immunity
pursuant   to   Wis.  Stat.  §  893.80(4).                                    Summary   judgment   was
20




No.                                                                       00-0221
properly  granted,  and  the  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals  is
reversed.
By  the  Court.—  The  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals  is
reversed.
21




No.                                                                           00-0221.awb
¶49   ANN    WALSH    BRADLEY,    J.                                          (dissenting).      Today's
majority  opinion  reduces  the  number  of  recognized  exceptions  to
public   officer   immunity,   thereby   expanding   immunity.                It
accomplishes  this  change  in  the  law  by  collapsing  the  known
danger  exception  into  the  ministerial  duty  exception,  and  then
adding  a  heretofore  unknown  "specific  act"  requirement.    Because
the  majority  opinion's  new  approach  is  contrary  to  precedent  and
without  authority,  I  respectfully  dissent.
¶50     Numerous  public  officer  immunity  cases  of  both  this
court   and   the   court   of   appeals   discuss   the   known   danger
exception  as  distinct  from  the  ministerial  duty  exception.    See,
e.g.,  Kierstyn  v.  Racine  Unified  Sch.  Dist.,  228  Wis.  2d  81,  91,
95,                                                                           596  N.W.2d  417                                                                                                                                   (1999);  Sheridan  v.  City  of  Janesville,                                    164
Wis.  2d                                                                      420,               426,                                                     474   N.W.2d  799                                                      (Ct.   App.                                    1991).                           Most
                                                                                                                                                          recently,  this  court  confirmed  the  known  danger  exception  as
                                                                                                                                                          distinct  in  Willow  Creek  Ranch,  LLC  v.  Town  of  Shelby,                                                       2000  WI
56,                                                                           235   Wis.  2d     409,                                                     611   N.W.2d                                                           693.                                           The  court  explained:
                                                                                                 "immunity  does  not  apply  to  the  performance  of:                                                                                                                         (1)  ministerial
duties;                                                                                                                                                   (2)  duties  to  address  a  'known  danger;'                                                                         (3)  actions
                                                                                                 involving   medical   discretion                                                                                                                                               (the   Scarpaci   rule);   and   (4)
actions  that  are  'malicious,  willful,  and  intentional.'"    Id.  at
¶26.
¶51   Yet  the  majority  appears  unwilling  to  be  bound  by  this
precedent.     Instead,  without  withdrawing  language  or  overruling
cases,  the  majority  transforms  established  precedent  and  adds  a
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No.                                                                            00-0221.awb
new  standard  that  requires  a  "particularized"  "specific  act."
Majority  op.  at  ¶40.
¶52   To  be  sure,  there  is  ample  language  in  the  case  law
that  relates  the  known  danger  exception  to  the  ministerial  duty
exception.                                                                     However,   the   majority   goes   too   far,   not   just
relating  the  two  exceptions  but  ultimately  equating  them.     The
two  exceptions  are  not  the  same.
ESTABLISHED  PRECEDENT
¶53   Any  analysis  of  the  known  danger  exception  must  begin
with  Cords  v.  Anderson,                                                     80  Wis.  2d  525,                                           259  N.W.2d  672                          (1977).
Although  the  court  in  Cords  discussed  a  "ministerial  duty"  and
did  not  use  phrases  such  as  "known  and  compelling  danger"  or
"known  danger,"  over  time  Cords  became  the  cornerstone  for  the
known  danger  exception.    The  majority  agrees  that  "[t]he  [known
danger]  exception  was  first  announced  in  Cords."     Majority  op.
at  ¶32.
¶54   The  plaintiffs  in  Cords  fell  into  a  deep  gorge  at  a
state  park,  sustaining  severe  injuries.    One  of  them  fell  while
on  a  hiking  trail  only  one  foot  from  a  steep  drop-off  into  the
gorge.     Cords,                                                              80  Wis.  2d  at                                             532.     The  park  manager,  Anderson,
had  neither  marked  the  trail  with  warning  signs  nor  informed  his
superiors  of  the  danger,  even  though  it  was  his  job  to  make  sure
the  trails  were  in  a  safe  condition  and  to  give  reports  to  his
superiors  as  to  any  steps  to  be  taken  to  reduce  safety  hazards.
Id.  at  536-37.
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No.                                                                            00-0221.awb
¶55   This  court  in  Cords  set  up  its  analysis  using  the
standards   that   describe   the   ministerial   duty   exception   to
immunity.                                                                      80  Wis.  2d  at  541.    However,  the  court's  application
of  the  these  standards  and  its  holding  marked  the  beginning  of
the  known  danger  exception  as  a  distinct  exception  to  immunity.
The  court  explained  as  follows:
Anderson  knew  the  terrain  at  the  glen  was  dangerous
particularly  at  night;  he  was  in  a  position  as  park
manager  to  do  something  about  it;  he  failed  to  do
anything  about  it.     He  is  liable  for  the  breach  of
this  duty.
Id.    The  court  then  concluded:
We  hold  that  the  duty  to  either  place  warning
signs  or  advise  superiors  of  the  conditions  is,  on  the
facts  here,  a  duty  so  clear  and  so  absolute  that  it
falls  within  the  definition  of  a  ministerial  duty.
Id.  at  542.
¶56   Thus,   in   Cords,   it   was   not   that   the   park   manager
failed  to  perform  a  "specific  act"  for  which  "the  law  imposes,
prescribes   and   defines   the   time,   mode   and   occasion   for   its
performance   with   such   certainty   that   nothing   remains   for
judgment  or  discretion."     Rather,  it  was  that  the  park  manager
failed  to  act  in  the  face  of  a  dangerous  situation  that  clearly
required  him  to  take  action.
¶57   After  Cords,  subsequent  decisions  solidified  the  known
danger  exception  as  an  exception  separate  from  the  ministerial
duty  exception  with  overlapping  but  different  contours.     For
example,  in  C.L.  v.  Olson,  143  Wis.  2d  701,  715,  422  N.W.2d  614
(1988),   this   court   acknowledged   the   relationship   of   the   two
exceptions:
3




No.                                                                            00-0221.awb
a  public  officer's  duty  is  ministerial  where  a  danger
is  known  and  of  such  quality  that  the  public  officer's
duty    to    act    becomes    "absolute,    certain    and
imperative."
It  then  indicated  the  difference:
[W]here   a   public   officer's   duty   is   not   generally
prescribed   and   defined   by   law   in   time,   mode,   and
occasion,  such  that  "nothing  remains  for  judgment  or
discretion,"  circumstances  may  give  rise  to  such  a
certain  duty  where,  as  in  Cords,  the  nature  of  the
danger  is  compelling  and  known  to  the  officer  and  is
of   such   force   that   the   public   officer   has   no
discretion  not  to  act.
Id.  (emphasis  added)  (internal  quotations  omitted).
¶58   Similarly,   in   Kimps   v.   Hill,                                     200   Wis.  2d  1,                                         546
N.W.2d  151                                                                    (1996),  the  court  related  the  two  exceptions,  but
characterized   the   known   danger   exception   as   involving   the
failure  to  act:     "a  public  officer's  duty  becomes  ministerial
only  'where,  as  in  Cords,  the  nature  of  the  danger  is  compelling
and  known  to  the  officer  and  is  of  such  force  that  the  public
officer  has  no  discretion  not  to  act.'"     Id.  at                      15                                                         (emphasis
added).     The  Kimps  court  also  noted  that  the  facts  in  Cords
"warranted  a  special  exception  be  made  to  the  general  rule  of
public  employee  immunity."    Id.
¶59   In  short,  the  duty  to  act  in  a  known  danger  case  need
not   be   "prescribed   and   defined   by   law   in   time,   mode,   and
occasion    such    that    'nothing    remains    for    judgment    or
discretion.'"      C.L.,                                                       143   Wis.  2d  at                                         715.        Rather,   liability
attaches  because  the  danger  is  of  such  a  quality  that  the  public
officer  "has  no  discretion  not  to  act."    Id.
4




No.                                                                            00-0221.awb
¶60   To   put   it   simply,   the   distinction   between   the   two
exceptions   is   this:                                                        the   foundation   for   liability   in   the
ministerial   duty   exception   is   that   the   defendant   failed   in
performing                                                                     (or  failed  to  perform)  a  highly  particularized  and
prescribed   task   whereas   the   foundation   for   liability   in   the
known  danger  exception  is  that  the  defendant  failed  to  act  in
the  face  of  a  danger  clearly  requiring  action.
FROM  ESTABLISHED  PRECEDENT  TO  THE  NEW  STANDARD
¶61   The  majority  rejects  the  distinction  between  the  two
exceptions  and  collapses  the  known  danger  exception  into  the
ministerial  duty  exception.     It  does  so  by  departing  from  the
"has  no  discretion  not  to  act"  standard  associated  with  the
known  danger  exception  and  replacing  that  standard  with  its  own
new  standard.     The  majority  makes  three  leaps  in  the  law  of
public   officer   immunity   to   accomplish   this   transformation.
These  leaps  are  contrary  to  precedent  and  without  authority.
¶62   As  a  first  leap,  the  majority  begins  the  process  of
collapsing  one  exception  into  the  other  by  questioning  whether
the  ministerial  duty  exception  is  itself  a  distinct  exception  to
immunity.                                                                      The   majority   makes   this   announcement:               "The
ministerial  duty  exception  is  not  so  much  an  exception  as  a
recognition                                                                    that                                                        immunity   law   distinguishes   between
discretionary  and  ministerial  acts,  immunizing  the  performance
of  the  former  but  not  the  latter.    See  Kierstyn,  228  Wis.  2d  at
91."    Majority  op.  at  ¶25.
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No.                                                                           00-0221.awb
¶63   Although  the  majority  is  correct  that  Kierstyn  states
that  "the  law  has  drawn  a  distinction  between  discretionary  and
ministerial  acts,"                                                           228  Wis.  2d  at  91,  the  majority  is  incorrect
in  citing  Kierstyn                                                          (or  any  authority)  for  the  proposition  that
the  performance  of  ministerial  acts  is  not  actually  an  exception
to  immunity.    Our  precedent,  including  Kierstyn,  clearly  states
the  contrary.    Willow  Creek,  2000  WI  56,  ¶26  ("[t]his  court  has
recognized  four  exceptions  .  .  .  (1)  ministerial  duties  .  .  .");
Kierstyn,                                                                     228  Wis.  2d  at                                      90   ("this  court  has  recognized  four
exceptions  to  public  officer  immunity");  Kimps,                          200  Wis.  2d  at
10  ("doctrine  of  immunity  is  not  without  exception,  however,  the
most  common  of  which  is  .  .  .  ministerial  duty").
¶64   The  second  leap  the  majority  makes  is  to  graft  the
time,  mode  and  occasion  test  of  the  ministerial  duty  exception
onto  the  known  danger  exception.      Citing  C.L.,  the  majority
explains  that  the  known  danger  must  be  of  such  force  that  "the
time,  mode  and  occasion  for  performance  is  evident  with  such
certainty  that  nothing  remains  for  the  exercise  of  judgment  and
discretion."     Majority  op.  at                                            ¶38.     However,  when  C.L.  cited
Cords  for  this  proposition,  it  did  so  incorrectly.    Cords,  which
left  it  to  the  park  manager's  discretion  to  either  post  signs
indicating  the  danger  or  inform  his  superiors,  cannot  be  read
for   this   proposition   that   C.L.   attributes   to   it.          
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