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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                        This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 8, 2011
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                                 petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                                Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                                and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                                Cir. Ct. No.   2009SC39991
Appeal No.                                                                             2010AP2030
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                                DISTRICT I
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN:
TAHNISHA LAMB,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT,
V.
THE NEW HORIZONS CENTER, INC.,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT.
APPEAL  from  a  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  for  Milwaukee
County:  JOHN SIEFERT, Judge.   Reversed and cause remanded.
¶1                                                                                     FINE,  J.    The  New  Horizon  Center,  Inc.,  appeals  the  judgment
entered in favor of Tahnisha Lamb by the circuit court following its de novo
review  of  a  court  commissioner’s  determination.    See  WIS.  STAT.  § 799.207.
Lamb cross-appeals, contending that the circuit court should have awarded her
double costs under WIS. STAT.  §  807.01  (offer of settlement).   We reverse the




No.   2010AP2030
circuit court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
This moots the other issues argued by New Horizon as well as Lamb’s cross-
appeal.   See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938)
(only dispositive issues need be addressed); State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688,
703,  442  N.W.2d  514,  520  (Ct. App.  1989)  (cases should be decided on the
“narrowest possible ground”).
I.
¶2                                                                                      Lamb worked for New Horizon from August of 2007 until October
of 2008.   After leaving her employment with New Horizon, she sought monies she
contended that New Horizon owed her as a result of her overtime work.   A letter
from her lawyer to New Horizon in May of 2009 asserted that Lamb had worked
“281.5 unpaid hours of overtime,” which meant, according to the letter, that New
Horizon owed Lamb “$8,867.25.”   The letter also requested that New Horizon pay
Lamb’s  “attorney’s fees, which are currently expected not to exceed  $4,500.00
should the matter be immediately resolved.”                                             (Footnote omitted.)    One month
later,  the  lawyer  for  New  Horizon  wrote  back  and  set  out  what  the  letter
represented was a table showing Lamb’s overtime-work hours, which the letter
calculated as, “79.5, not 281.5,” resulting in Lamb’s “entitle[ment] to an additional
$417.38.”1   The matter was not settled, and Lamb sued New Horizon in small-
claims court.
¶3                                                                                      Lamb’s  nine-page  complaint  alleged  three  claims:     an  alleged
violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,  29 U.S.C.  §  201; and two
1  A parenthetical showing the mathematics mistakenly gives “$413.38” as the total.
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No.   2010AP2030
alleged violations of what the complaint characterized as, “the Wisconsin Payment
Laws.”   Ultimately, the matter was submitted to the circuit court on cross- motions
for summary judgment on the third claim, which asserted that New Horizon had
not paid Lamb what they had agreed to pay her, and that this violated WIS. STAT.
ch. 109.   The circuit court denied New Horizon’s motion for summary judgment,
and granted summary judgment to Lamb for overtime wages of $417.38 under her
employment  contract,  plus  a  one-half  penalty  of                                  $208.76.    See  WIS.  STAT.
§ 109.11(2)(a).  The circuit court also awarded Lamb attorney’s fees of $15,896.
II.
¶4                                                                                     In essence, WIS. STAT. ch.  109, permits employees who have not
received timely payment of wages that are due under their employment contracts
to recover those unpaid wages.   WIS. STAT. §§ 109.01(3) & (4); 109.03(1), (5) &
(6).   Under WIS. STAT. § 109.03(6), “the court may allow the prevailing party, in
addition  to  all  other  costs,  a  reasonable  sum  for  expenses.”                  “‘[E]xpenses’”
includes reasonable attorney’s fees.   See Jacobson v. American Tool Companies,
Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 398-402, 588 N.W.2d 67, 73-75 (Ct. App. 1998).
¶5                                                                                     The  pertinent  part  of  Lamb’s  employment  agreement  with  New
Horizon provides:
All  hourly  employees  who  work  in  excess  of                                      40-hour
workweek  performed  at  the  approval  of  the  department
head shall be recorded as overtime.   The overtime rate shall
be the employee’s hourly rate plus ½. Under federal wage
guidelines, some categories of employment are not eligible
for  overtime  pay.    Department  head  will  clarify  those
eligible for overtime.   All salaried employees are required
to work a minimum of 44 hours a week.   All hours over 44
are considered compensatory time.
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No.   2010AP2030
¶6                                                                                       In  support  of  its  motion  for  summary  judgment,  New  Horizon
submitted an affidavit by Esther G. Crawford-Brown, New Horizon’s  “Human
Resources/Residential Director.”    As pertinent to this appeal, Crawford-Brown
averred that Lamb “underst[ood]” that New Horizon had “no funding to pay her
overtime,” and that Lamb thus,  “offered and agreed to work additional hours
without overtime pay.”                                                                   (Bolding and underlining omitted.)   Further, Crawford-
Brown  averred  that,  as  a  department  head,  she  “ma[de]  certain  categories  of
employment ineligible for overtime and  [she] did so with Ms. Lamb’s explicit
understanding that  [New Horizon] could not fund her overtime hours.”    Lamb
submitted an affidavit saying that this was not true.   As noted, the circuit court
granted summary judgment to Lamb for her overtime-wage claim, plus the one-
half penalty.
¶7                                                                                       A court may only grant summary judgment if:                           “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact” and a party “is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.”   WIS. STAT. RULE 802.08(2).   We review de novo a circuit court’s rulings on
summary judgment, and apply the governing standards  “just as the trial court
applied those standards.”   Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-
317,                                                                                     401  N.W.2d  816,                                                     820-821                (1987).   Further,  we  look  at  the  parties’
submissions  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the  party  against  whom  summary
judgment is sought, Johnson v. Rogers Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶30,
283 Wis. 2d 384, 401, 700 N.W.2d 27, 35, and all reasonable inferences are to be
assessed against the party seeking summary judgment, Lecus v. American Mut.
Ins. Co. of Boston,  81 Wis.  2d  183,  189-190,  260 N.W.2d  241,  244  (1977).
There may, however, be disputed issues of fact that preclude a grant of summary
judgment  even  though  the  parties  filed  cross-motions  for  summary judgment.
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No.   2010AP2030
Stone v. Seeber, 155 Wis. 2d 275, 278, 455 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Ct. App. 1990).
That is the case here.
¶8                                                                                                  As we have seen, New Horizon claimed that Lamb agreed to be paid
what they paid her, and Lamb said that that was not true.   This a paradigm conflict
of material fact because if Lamb agreed to modify her employment agreement to
eschew  entitlement  to  overtime  pay,  then  New  Horizon  did  not  violate  its
employment agreement with Lamb.   All this, of course, requires a trial.2
¶9                                                                                                  New Horizon also objects to the circuit court’s acceptance, without
specific articulated analysis, of a billing statement submitted by Lamb’s lawyer in
support of the attorney’s fee request.   As a result of our reversal of the circuit
court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment,  the  attorney’s  fee  matter  is  moot.
Nevertheless, we remind the circuit court that fees awarded in contravention of the
American Rule must be “reasonable” in both the hourly rate charged and the time
“reasonably necessary to perform the work,” in conjunction with all the other
circumstances.   Lynch v. Crossroads Counseling Center, Inc., 2004 WI App 114,
¶42, 275 Wis. 2d 171, 197, 684 N.W.2d 141, 153.   This and an analysis of all the
material factors generally require an evidentiary hearing.   See Kolupar v. Wilde
Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶34 n.6, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 22 n.6, 683 N.W.2d
58,                                                                                                 69  n.6.    See  also  id.,                                           2004  WI  112,  ¶¶31-52,  275  Wis.  2d  at  19-28,
2  WISCONSIN STAT. § 109.03(5) provides, with an exception not material here, that:                 “no
employer may by special contract with employees or by any other means secure exemption from
this section.”   The circuit court did not assess whether this provision affects the right of New
Horizon to ask, and Lamb to agree (if she did agree), that Lamb give up overtime that might be
due under the contract.   This and the conflict in the summary-judgment affidavits that we have
already discussed should be explored at trial.
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No.   2010AP2030
683 N.W.2d at 67-72.   We also do not address Lamb’s cross-appeal because the
offer of settlement is moot at this point.
¶10    We  reverse  the  judgment  and  remand  for  further  proceedings
consistent with this opinion.3   We are also disturbed by the tendentious tone of
both parties’ briefs and remind counsel that respect for the courts and counsel
requires civility.   See WIS. SCR 62.02; Aspen Services, Inc. v. IT Corp., 220 Wis.
2d 491, 508-509, 583 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Ct. App. 1998).
By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
This   opinion   will   not   be   published.   See   WIS.    STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
3  New Horizon seeks to have us specify that this matter on remand be assigned to a
different judge. Although we have supervisory jurisdiction over the circuit court, WIS. STAT.
§ 752.02, we deny the request because New Horizon has a remedy under WIS. STAT. § 799.205(4)
(substitution of judge). We also deny New Horizon’s undeveloped contention that it is entitled to
appeal costs under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3) (frivolous appeals).
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