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Thomas W. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County
State: Wisconsin
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 1996AP002361-W
Case Date: 12/16/1997
Plaintiff: Thomas W. Reimann
Defendant: Circuit Court for Dane County
Preview:SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.:                                                             96-2361-W
Complete Title
of Case:
State  of  Wisconsin  ex  rel.  Thomas  W.  Reimann,
Petitioner,
v.
Circuit  Court  for  Dane  County  and  the  Honorable
Michael  B.  Torphy,
Respondents-Petitioners.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
(No  Cite)
Opinion Filed:                                                        December  16,  1997
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument:                                                        October  8,  1997
Source of APPEAL
COURT:                                                                Circuit
COUNTY:                                                               Dane
JUDGE:                                                                Michael  B. Torphy, Jr.
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS:                                                            For the  respondents-petitioners the cause  was
argued by James H. McDermott,  assistant attorney general, with
whom on  the briefs was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney
general.
For the  petitioner there  was a  brief by Peter
DeWind and Legal  Assistance to  Institutionalized Persons, Madison
and oral  argument  by Peter DeWind.




No.  96-2361-W
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification.   The final version will appear in
the bound volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                          96-2361-W
                                                                             STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                  :            IN  SUPREME  COURT
FILED
State  of  Wisconsin  ex  rel.  Thomas  W.
Reimann,
DEC 16, 1997
Petitioner,
Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk of Supreme Court
v.                                                                           Madison, WI
Circuit  Court  for  Dane  County  and  the
Honorable  Michael  B.  Torphy,
Respondents-Petitioners.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Modified  and
as  modified,  affirmed.
¶1    DONALD  W.  STEINMETZ,  J.    There  is  one  issue  presented
for  review:     when  a  person  complains  to  a  circuit  court  judge
that  such  person  believes  a  crime  has  been  committed  within  that
judge's   jurisdiction,   does   Wis.   Stat.                                §  968.261                                            (1995-96)2
1  Wis.   Stat.                                                              §  968.26   provides,   in   pertinent   part,   as
follows:
John  Doe  Proceeding.    If  a  person  complains  to  a
judge  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to  believe  that  a
crime    has    been    committed    within    his    or    her
jurisdiction,  the  judge  shall  examine  the  complainant
under  oath  and  any  witnesses  produced  by  him  or  her
and  may,  and  at  the  request  of  the  district  attorney
shall,   subpoena   and   examine   other   witnesses   to
ascertain  whether  a  crime  has  been  committed  and  by
whom  committed.     The  extent  to  which  the  judge  may
proceed   in   the   examination   is   within   the   judge's
discretion.                                                                  .  If  it  appears  probable  from  the
testimony  given  that  a  crime  has  been  committed  and
who   committed   it,   the   complaint   may   be   reduced   to
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No.  96-2361-W
require  the  judge  to  examine  under  oath  the  complainant  and  any
witnesses  produced  by  him  or  her.     We  conclude  that  Wis.  Stat.
§  968.26   requires   a   circuit   court   judge   to   conduct   such   an
examination    only    when    the    complainant    has    sufficiently
established  that  he  or  she  has  "reason  to  believe"  that  a  crime
has  been  committed  within  that  judge's  jurisdiction.
¶2    This  is  a  review  of  the  decision  of  the  court  of
appeals  granting  a  supervisory  writ  sought  by  Thomas  Reimann
against  the  Circuit  Court  for  Dane  County  and  Judge  Michael  B.
Torphy,  Jr.,  State  ex  rel.  Reimann  v.  Circuit  Court  for  Dane
County,  No.                                                                    96-2361-W                                                 (Wis.  Ct.  App.  November   13,   1996).   We
modify  the  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals,  and  we  affirm  the
decision,  as  modified,  granting  a  supervisory  writ  directing
Judge  Torphy  to  conduct  further  proceedings,  consistent  with
this  opinion,  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26.
¶3    Thomas    Reimann    filed    a    petition    for    John    Doe
proceedings   under   Wis.   Stat.                                              §  968.26   in   the   circuit   court,
alleging  certain  criminal  conduct  by  a  Wisconsin  Department  of
Justice  special  agent  and  by  an  assistant  district  attorney  of
Dane   County.                                                                  The   petition   was   given   under   oath   and   was
certified  by  a  notary  public.    Judge  Torphy  denied  the  petition
without  conducting  a  hearing  or  examining  Reimann.    Upon  review
of  Reimann's  petition,  the  judge  determined  that  some  of  the
writing   and   signed   and   verified;   and   thereupon   a
warrant  shall  issue  for  the  arrest  of  the  accused.
2  All  future  references  to  Wis.  Stats.  will  be  to  the  1995-
96  version  of  the  statutes  unless  otherwise  indicated.
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No.  96-2361-W
allegations  contained  therein  were  not  actionable  since  they
fell  outside  the  statute  of  limitations.      Judge  Torphy  also
concluded  that  since  Reimann  presented  his  petition  under  oath
and  with  supporting  documents,  "it  [was]  not  necessary  to  again
place  Reimann  under  oath  and  take  further  evidence  from  him  .  .
.  ."
¶4    Reimann  then  petitioned  the  court  of  appeals  for  a
supervisory  writ  under  Wis.  Stat.                                        §  809.51(1)3  compelling  Judge
Torphy  to  conduct  further  proceedings  on  the  John  Doe  petition.
The  court  of  appeals  granted  a  supervisory  writ  ordering  that
"Judge  Torphy  shall  conduct  an  examination  of  the  complainant
and  his  witnesses,  if  any."     The  court  relied  heavily  on  the
mandatory   portion   of   Wis.   Stat.                                      §  968.26,   which   states   "the
judge  shall  examine  the  complainant                                      ."     The  court  also
concluded   that   Wis.   Stat.                                              §  968.26   does   not   require   the
complainant  to  satisfy  any  threshold  test  before  an  examination
is  required.     Based  on  the  mandatory  language  of  Wis.  Stat.
§  968.26  and  the  absence  of  any  threshold  requirement,  the  court
concluded  that  Judge  Torphy  was  required  to  conduct  a  John  Doe
examination  of  Reimann.    We  accepted  Judge  Torphy's  petition  for
review.
¶5    The  sole  issue  presented  for  review  is  whether  Wis.
Stat.                                                                        §  968.26   requires   a   judge   to   examine   under   oath   the
3                                                                            Wis.  Stat.                                                            §  809.51(1)  provides  as  follows:     "A  person
may  request  the  court  to  exercise  its  supervisory  jurisdiction
or  its  original  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  prerogative  writ  over  a
court  and  the  presiding  judge,  or  other  person  or  body,  by
filing  a  petition  and  supporting  memorandum.  .  .                      ."
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No.  96-2361-W
complainant  and  any  witnesses  produced  by  him  or  her,  whenever
such  person  complains  that  he  or  she  believes  a  crime  has  been
committed  within  that  judge's  jurisdiction.    This  is  a  question
of  statutory  interpretation.
¶6    Statutory  interpretation  is  a  question  of  law.     See
Stockbridge   School   Dist.   v.   DPI,                                       202   Wis.  2d                                                          214,                                                          219,   550
N.W.2d  96  (1996);  Jungbluth  v.  Hometown,  Inc.,  201  Wis.  2d  320,
327,  548  N.W.2d  519  (1996).    This  court  reviews  questions  of  law
de  novo,  without  giving  deference  to  the  decisions  of  the  lower
courts.  See  Jungbluth                                                        201  Wis.  2d  at                                                       327;  Hughes  v.  Chrysler
Motors  Corp.,  197  Wis.  2d  973,  979,  542  N.W.2d  148  (1996).
¶7    The  ultimate  goal  of  statutory  interpretation  is  to
ascertain  and  give  effect  to  the  intent  of  the  legislature.    See
Stockbridge   School   Dist.,                                                  202   Wis.  2d   at                                                     219;   Hughes,                                                197
Wis.  2d  at  979;  Rolo  v.  Goers,  174  Wis.  2d  709,  715,  497  N.W.2d
724                                                                            (1993).     To  achieve  this  goal,  we  first  look  to  the  plain
language  of  the  statute.    See  Jungbluth,  201  Wis.  2d  at  327;  In
re  Interest  of  Kyle  S.-G.,  194  Wis.  2d  365,  371,  533  N.W.2d  794
(1995).    If  a  statute  is  unambiguous,  this  court  will  apply  the
ordinary  and  accepted  meaning  of  the  language  of  the  statute  to
the  facts  before  it,  see  Swatek  v.  County  of  Dane,                    192  Wis.  2d
47,  57,  531  N.W.2d  45  (1995),  and  we  are  prohibited  from  looking
beyond  such  language  to  ascertain  its  meaning.    See  Stockbridge
School  Dist.,  202  Wis.  2d  at  220  (quoting  Jungbluth,  201  Wis.  2d
at                                                                             327).                                                                   If   a   statute   does   not   clearly   set   forth   the
legislative  intent,  we  may  look  at  the  history,  scope,  context,
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No.  96-2361-W
subject  matter,  and  object  of  the  statute.    See  id.;  Interest  of
Kyle  S.-G.,  194  Wis.  2d  at  371.
¶8    We   therefore   turn   to   the   language   of   Wis.   Stat.
§  968.26  to  determine  whether  it  clearly  sets  forth  the  intent
of  the  legislature.    Section  968.26  provides  in  pertinent  part:
"If  a  person  complains  to  a  judge  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to
believe   that   a   crime   has   been   committed   within   his   or   her
jurisdiction,  the  judge  shall  examine  the  complainant  under  oath
and  any  witnesses  produced  by  him  or  her  .  .  .                         ."
¶9    The  obligation  Wis.  Stat.                                               §  968.26  places  on  circuit
court  judges  is  clear  and  unambiguous.     The  plain  language  of
Wis.  Stat.                                                                      §  968.26  requires  a  judge  to  examine  a  John  Doe
complainant   and   his   or   her   witnesses,   if   any,   when   the
complainant  has  reason  to  believe  a  crime  has  been  committed
within  that  judge's  jurisdiction.     The  legislature  made  this
requirement  mandatory  by  stating  "the  judge  shall  examine."    The
general  rule  is  that  the  word  "shall,"  when  used  in  a  statute,
is   presumed   to   be   mandatory   unless   another   construction   is
necessary  to  carry  out  the  clear  intent  of  the  legislature.    See
Wagner  v.  State  Medical  Examining  Bd.,  181  Wis.  2d  633,  643,  511
N.W.2d  874  (1994);  C.A.K.  v.  State,  154  Wis.  2d  612,  621-22,  453
N.W.2d  897  (1990).    There  is  no  indication  that  this  portion  of
the   statute   is   meant   to   be   read   in   any   manner   other   than
mandatory.
¶10   The  mandatory  nature  of  this  requirement  is  supported
by  the  legislature's  careful  choice  of  language.    When  the  words
"shall"  and  "may"  are  used  in  the  same  section  of  a  statute,  the
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No.  96-2361-W
court  can  infer  that  the  legislature  was  aware  of  the  different
denotations   and   intended   the   words   to   have   their   precise
meanings.     See  Karow  v.  Milwaukee  County  Civil  Serv.  Comm.,           82
Wis.  2d                                                                        565,                                                     571,                                                                       263  N.W.2d                                            214,   217       (1978).    The  relevant,
first  sentence  of  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  contains  the  word  "shall"
twice  and  the  word  "may"  once.     In  total,  Wis.  Stat.                 §  968.26
employs  the  words  "shall"  and  "may"  alternatively                         12  different
times.     We  can  therefore  infer  that  the  legislature  intended
"shall"  to  have  its  precise,  mandatory  meaning.     Applying  the
precise  meaning  of  the  statutory  text,  we  conclude  that  once  a
John  Doe  complainant  has  shown  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to
believe   that   a   crime   has   been   committed,   the   judge   has   no
discretion  to  refuse  to  examine  the  complainant.      With  this
conclusion  of  the  court  of  appeals,  we  agree.
¶11   We   disagree,   however,   with   the   court   of   appeals'
conclusion  that  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  does  not  impose  a  threshold
requirement  on  the  John  Doe  complainant.     The  operative  clause
of  Wis.  Stat.                                                                 §  968.26  provides:  "If  a  person  complains  to  a
judge  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to  believe  that  a  crime  has  been
committed                                                                       ."                                                                                                                                  (emphasis  added).     As  we  view  this  language,
                                                                                                                                         there  is  one  prerequisite  to  triggering  the  judge's  duty  to
                                                                                                                                         examine   the   complainant—that   the   complainant   first   establish
                                                                                                                                         that  he  or  she  has  "reason  to  believe"  that  a  crime  has  been
                                                                                committed.     See  Wolke  v.  Fleming,                                                                                             24  Wis.  2d                                           606,   612-13,   129
N.W.2d                                                                          841                                                      (1964),  cert.  denied,                                                    380  U.S.                                              917    (1965)    (stating
that   Wis.   Stat.                                                             §  968.26   requires   that   the   complainant   have
reason   to   believe   a   crime   has   been   committed   within   the
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No.  96-2361-W
                                                                                                                                             magistrate's  jurisdiction);  see  also  State  v.  Doe,                                                                              78  Wis.  2d
161,                                                                            165,          254   N.W.2d                                   210                                                        (1977)                                                                     (stating   that   a   John   Doe
proceeding  can  be  commenced  only  if  a  person  complains  to  a
judge  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to  believe  that  a  crime  has  been
committed  within  the  jurisdiction).     Absent  a  showing  in  the
petition  that  the  complainant  has  reason  to  believe  that  a  crime
has    been    committed    within    the    circuit    court    judge's
jurisdiction,   the   judge   is   not   required   to   examine   the
complainant.
¶12   The  language  of  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  is  ambiguous  as  to
what   threshold   showing   is   sufficient   to   establish   that   the
complainant   has   "reason   to   believe"   that   a   crime   has   been
committed.     The  term  "reason  to  believe"  is  not  defined  in  the
statute,  and  its  meaning  is  "capable  of  being  understood  by
reasonably  well-informed  persons  in  either  two  or  more  senses."
                                                                                              Parental   Rights   to   SueAnn   A.M.,                                                                   176   Wis.  2d                                                             673,                               678,            500
N.W.2d                                                                          649                                                                                                                     (1993)(quoting  In  Interest  of  P.A.K.,                                                                     119  Wis.  2d
                                                                                                                                                                                                        871,  878-79,  350  N.W.2d  677  (1984)).  Compare  State  v.  Flanagan,
251   Wis.                                                                      517,          520,                                           29   N.W.2d                                                771                                                                        (1947)(applying   objective
                                                                                                                                                                                                        standard  to  determine  whether  "reason  to  believe"  existed  under
Wis.  Stat.                                                                                   §  29.05(6)                                                                                               (1947))4  with  Kurkierewicz  v.  Cannon,                                                                                     42
4  In  State  v.  Flanagan,  251  Wis.  517,  29  N.W.2d  771  (1947),
the   court   determined   whether   an   officer   lawfully   searched   a
vehicle  under  Wis.  Stat.                                                     §  29.05(6)   (1947),  which  provided  that
"an   officer   may,   with   or   without   warrant,   open,   enter   and
examine  all  .  .  .  vehicles  .  .  .  where  he  has  reason  to  believe
that  wild  animals,  taken  or  held  in  violation  of  this  chapter
are  to  be  found                                                              ."            (emphasis  added).     Based  on  observable
acts  and  inferences  drawn  therefrom,  the  court  concluded  that
the  search  was  lawful.    See  id.  at  520.
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No.  96-2361-W
Wis.  2d                                                                       368,                        381,            166   N.W.2d          255         (1969)(applying   subjective
standard  to  determine  whether  "any  reason  to  believe"  existed
under  Wis.  Stat.  §  966.01).5
¶13   When  faced  with  an  ambiguous  statute,  courts  should
use   the   established   rules   of   statutory   construction   to   help
determine  the  intent  of  the  legislature.6    See  SueAnn  A.M.,  176
Wis.  2d  at                                                                   679;  State  v.  Charles,   180  Wis.  2d   155,                  158,        509
N.W.2d  85  (Ct.  App.  1993).    Applying  accepted  rules  of  statutory
construction,  we  conclude  that  the  legislature  intended  to  adopt
an  objective,  threshold  requirement  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26.
¶14   First,   we   must   attempt   "to   find   the   common   sense
meaning   and   purpose   of   the   words   employed   in   the   statute."
SueAnn  A.M.,                                                                  176  Wis.  2d  at           679.            Wisconsin  Statutes   §  968.26
does  not  define  the  term  "reason  to  believe."    In  the  absence  of
statutory  definitions,  this  court  construes  all  words  according
to  their  common  and  approved  usage,  which  may  be  established  by
5  In  Kurkierewicz  v.  Cannon,  42  Wis.  2d  368,  166  N.W.2d  255
(1969),  the  court  determined  whether  a  district  attorney  was
required  to  order  a  coroner's  inquest  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  966.01,
which  provided  that  a  district  attorney,  having  notice  of  death,
"shall  order  an  inquest  if,  from  the  surrounding  circumstances,
there  is  any  reason  to  believe  that  death  was  caused  by  criminal
conduct,  suicide,  or  unexplained  and  suspicious  circumstances."
(emphasis   added).      The   court   concluded   that   the   legislature
selected   the   district   attorney   to   make   this   determination
because,  with  his  experience  and  training,  he  could  make  the
subjective  judgment  required  by  the  statute.    See  id.  at  381.
6  Courts  may  also  look  to  the  legislative  history  of  the
statute  to  determine  the  legislature's  intent.     Although  there
is  some  legislative  history  concerning  Wis.  Stat.                        §  968.26,  it
is  not  helpful  in  answering  the  specific  question  before  this
court.
8




No.  96-2361-W
dictionary  definitions.    See  Swatek,  192  Wis.  2d  at  61  (quoting
State   v.   Gilbert,                                                          115   Wis.  2d                                                       371,                                                                           377-78,                                                      340   N.W.2d          511
(1983)).7                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The   word   "reason"   is   commonly   defined   as   "an
                                                                                                                                                    underlying   fact   or   cause   that   provides   logical   sense   for   a
                                                                                                                                                    premise  or  an  occurrence:  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the
accused   did   not   commit   this   crime."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   American   Heritage
Dictionary  of  the  English  Language  1506                                                                                                                                                                                       (3rd  ed.                                                    1992)(emphasis
original).     The  word  "believe"  is  commonly  defined  as  meaning
"to  accept  as  true  or  real"  or  "to  credit  with  veracity."    See
id.  at  169.
¶15   Employing  the  common  definitions  of  the  words  "reason"
and  "believe,"  we  conclude  that  the  precise  language  of  Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §  968.26  requires  a  John  Doe  complainant  to  do  more  than
merely   allege   in   conclusory   terms   that   a   crime   has   been
committed.                                                                     The   allegation   must   be   supported   by   objective,
factual  assertions  before  a  circuit  court  judge  is  required  to
conduct  an  examination  of  the  complainant.     Accordingly,  if  a
John  Doe  complainant,  in  his  or  her  petition,  presents  only
conclusory  allegations,  or  fails  to  allege  facts  sufficient  to
raise   a   reasonable   belief   that   a   punishable   crime   has   been
committed,  the  circuit  court  judge  may,  in  the  exercise  of  his
or   her   legal   discretion,   deny   the   petition   without   an
examination.     Cf.  Nelson  v.  State,                                       54  Wis.  2d                                                         489,                                                                           497-98,                                                      195
7  However,  this  general  rule  of  statutory  construction  does
not  apply  to  technical  words  and  phrases  that  have  a  peculiar
meaning.    See  State  v.  Martin,  162  Wis.  2d  883,  904,  470  N.W.2d
900  (1991).
9




No.  96-2361-W
N.W.2d                                                                         629                                                            (1972)(finding  denial  of  motion  to  vacate  a  guilty
plea  without  conducting  an  evidentiary  hearing  was  not  an  abuse
of    discretion    where    defendant    presented    only    conclusory
allegations);  State  v  Smith,  60  Wis.  2d  373,  383,  210  N.W.2d  678
(1973)(affirming  decision  to  deny,  without  evidentiary  hearing,
motion    for    postconviction    relief    where    allegations    were
conclusory   and   failed   to   raise   question   of   fact);   State   v.
Bentley,                                                                       201   Wis.  2d                                                 303,                                                        319,            548   N.W.2d   50     (1996)(holding
circuit  court  did  not  erroneously  exercise  its  discretion  in
denying,  without  evidentiary  hearing,  defendant's  postconviction
motion).8
¶16   Second,  it  is  a  basic  rule  of  statutory  construction
that  courts  are  to  give  effect  to  every  word  of  a  statute,  if
possible,   so   that   no   portion   of   the   statute   is   rendered
superfluous.    See  Lake  City  v.  Mequon,  207  Wis.  2d  156,  163,  558
N.W.2d                                                                         100                                                            (1997);  State  v.  Petty,                                  201  Wis.  2d   337,           355,   548
N.W.2d  817  (1996).    Reimann  argues  that  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  does
not  impose  a  threshold  requirement  on  John  Doe  complainants.    In
essence,  Reimann  asks  us  to  adopt  a  subjective  test  of  "reason
to   believe,"   that   a   judge   is   required   to   examine   every
complainant  who  complains  that  he  or  she  subjectively  believes  a
8  Although  the  purpose  of  conducting  an  examination  of  a
John  Doe  complainant  under  Wis.  Stat.                                     §  968.26  is  substantively
different  than  holding  an  evidentiary  hearing  under  Wis.  Stat.
§  974.06                                                                      (postconviction   procedure),   the   discretion   conferred
upon  the  circuit  court  judge  in  each  situation  is  similar  as  to
whether  the  movant  has  alleged  sufficient  facts  to  entitle  him
or  her  to  an  examination  or  evidentiary  hearing.
10




No.  96-2361-W
crime  has  been  committed.     This  reading  of  Wis.  Stat.                §  968.26
would  render  the  "reason  to  believe"  language  superfluous.    The
only  logical  purpose  for  including  this  language  would  be  to
require  the  complainant  to  establish  something  more  than  mere
subjective  belief.     Had  the  legislature  intended  to  employ  a
subjective   test,   it   could   have   done   so   by   requiring   an
examination  if  a  person  simply  complains  to  a  judge  "that  he  or
she  believes  that  a  crime  has  been  committed."    The  legislature
chose  not  to  use  such  language.
¶17   To  the  contrary,  the  legislature  specifically  added
the  "reason  to  believe"  language  in  the                                  1949  revision  of  the
criminal  code.    See  §  33,  ch.  631,  Laws  of  1949.    Prior  to  the
1949  revision,  the  John  Doe  statute  required  a  magistrate  to
examine    a    complainant    merely    "[u]pon    complaint    to    such
                                                                               magistrate  that  a  criminal  offense  had  been  committed                                                       ."
Wis.  Stat.                                                                    §  361.02                                                      (1947).9     Noticeably  absent  from  the   1947
statute   is   any   language   requiring   the   complainant   to   show
"reason  to  believe"  that  a  crime  has  been  committed.     The  pre-
revision  language  of  the  John  Doe  statute  may  have  supported
Reimann's  subjective-test  interpretation;  the  current  language
9  Wis.  Stat.  §  361.02  (1947)  provided  in  pertinent  part:
361.02                                                                         Complaint    and    warrant;    John    Doe
Proceeding.                                                                    (1)   Upon   complaint   made   to   any   such
magistrate  that  a  criminal  offense  has  been  committed,
he  shall  examine,  on  oath,  the  complainant  and  any
witness   produced   by   him,   and   shall   reduce   the
complaint  to  writing  and  shall  cause  the  same  to  be
subscribed  by  the  complainant;  .  .  .
11




No.  96-2361-W
does  not.     The  current  language  of  Wis.  Stat.                         §  968.26  retains
the  additional  "reason  to  believe"  requirement  added  in                 1949.
The   legislature   has   chosen   not   to   remove   this   threshold
requirement  from  the  John  Doe  statute.    We  refuse  to  do  so  here.
¶18   Third,  statutes  should  be  interpreted  in  a  manner  that
supports  their  underlying  purpose.    See  Lukaszewicz  v.  Concrete
Research,  Inc.,  43  Wis.  2d  335,  342,  168  N.W.2d  581,  585  (1969).
The  procedure  required  by  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  must,  of  course,
be  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  the  statute.
                                                                                                                            ¶19   The   purpose   of   Wis.   Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     §  968.26   is   two-fold.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 First,  and  most  obvious,  a  John  Doe  proceeding  is  intended  as  an
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 investigatory  tool  used  to  ascertain  whether  a  crime  has  been
                                                                                                                                                                             committed  and  if  so,  by  whom.      See  State  v.  Cummings,                                                                                                                                                                       199
Wis.  2d                                                                       721,                                         736,                                             546   N.W.2d                                                        406                                                                           (1996)                                                   (citing   State   v.
                                                                               Washington,                                  83  Wis.  2d                                     808,                                                                822,                                                                          266  N.W.2d                                              597                          (1978));  see
                                                                               also  Wis.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               §  968.26.     Second,  the  John  Doe  proceeding  is
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 designed   to   protect   innocent   citizens   from   frivolous   and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 groundless  prosecutions.    As  we  explained  in  State  ex  rel.  Long
                                                                                                                            v.  Keyes,  75  Wis.  288,  294-95,  124  N.W.                                                                                                                                                                                                              (1889):
                                                                               When                                                                                                                                                              [the   John   Doe]   statute   was   first   enacted   the
common-law  practice  was  for  the  magistrate  to  issue
the  warrant  on  a  complaint  of  mere  suspicion,  and  he
was  protected  in  doing  so.     This  was  found  to  be  a
very   unsafe   practice.                                                      Many   arrests   were   made   on
groundless  suspicion,  when  the  accused  were  innocent
of   the   crime   and   there   was   no   testimony   whatever
against   them.                                                                This   statute   was   made   to   protect
citizens  from  arrest  and  imprisonment  on  frivolous  and
groundless  suspicion.
12




No.  96-2361-W
A   John   Doe   proceeding   under   Wis.   Stat.                             §  968.26,   therefore,
serves  both  as  an  inquest  into  the  discovery  of  crime  and  as  a
screen  to  prevent  "reckless  and  ill-advised"  prosecutions.    See
Washington,  83  Wis.  2d  at  822.
¶20   Applying   an   objective   test   to   determine   whether   a
complainant  has  established  "reason  to  believe"  a  crime  has  been
committed  is  consistent  with  both  purposes  of  the  statute.    The
objective   test   permits   complainants   to   initiate   reasonable,
fact-based  John  Doe  proceedings  to  determine  whether  a  crime  has
been  committed  and  if  so,  by  whom.     At  the  same  time,  it  also
allows  the  judge  to  screen  for  and  weed  out  groundless  and
frivolous  petitions  without  requiring  further  proceedings  that
may  be  injurious  to  the  accused.
¶21   Although  we  recognize  that  crime  victims  and  other
complainants  should  have  recourse  to  the  judicial  branch  when
the  executive  branch  fails  to  respond  to  their  complaints,  we
reject  the  argument  that  Wis.  Stat.                                       §  968.26  was  designed  to
give  all  John  Doe  complainants  their  day  in  court.      As  we
explained  in  Washington,  the  John  Doe  judge  has  no  authority  to
ferret  out  crime.     See  Washington,                                       83  Wis.  2d  at                         822.     Rather,
the  John  Doe  investigation  is  essentially  limited  to  the  subject
matter  of  the  petition  filed  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26.    See  id.
¶22   Finally,   it   is   a   fundamental   rule   of   statutory
construction  that  any  result  that  is  absurd  or  unreasonable  must
                                                                               be  avoided.    See  State  v.  Peete,                                                               185  Wis.  2d  4,   17,   517  N.W.2d
149                                                                            (1994);  State  v.  Pham,                137  Wis.  2d                                               31,                 34,   403  N.W.2d   35
(1987).                                                                                                                 Adopting   Reimann's   interpretation   of   Wis.   Stat.
13




No.  96-2361-W
§  968.26  would  lead  to  absurd  results.    We  specifically  held  in
Washington  that  a  John  Doe  proceeding  cannot  be  used  to  obtain
evidence   against   a   defendant   for   a   crime   with   which   the
defendant  has  already  been  charged.    See  Washington,  83  Wis.  2d
at                                                                             824.                                                                    Under  the  interpretation  Reimann  suggests,  a  circuit
court  judge  would  have  no  choice  but  to  examine  under  oath  a
complainant,  and  his  or  her  witnesses,  even  if  that  judge  were
precluded  by  our  decision  in  Washington  from  conducting  further
proceedings.    The  legislature  surely  did  not  intend  this  absurd
result.
¶23   In  addition,  under  Reimann's  interpretation  of  Wis.
Stat.                                                                          §  968.26,   a   circuit   court   judge   would   be   required   to
conduct   an   examination   of   the   complainant   and   his   or   her
witnesses   even   if:                                                         (1)   the   facts   alleged   in   the   John   Doe
petition  could  not  possibly  constitute  a  crime;                          (2)  prosecution
of  the  crime  alleged  in  the  petition  is  barred  by  the  statute  of
limitations;  or                                                               (3)  the  petition  is  patently  meritless  or  is
filed  merely  as  an  abuse  of  process.    Requiring  a  circuit  court
judge    to    conduct    examinations    in    such    cases    would    be
unreasonable  and  would  result  in  a  waste  of  limited  judicial
resources.
¶24   Applying    these    established    rules    of    statutory
construction,  we  conclude  that  Wis.  Stat.                                 §  968.26  imposes  a
threshold  requirement  on  persons  filing  petitions  for  John  Doe
proceedings.                                                                   Before   a   circuit   court   judge's   obligation   to
conduct  an  examination  under  Wis.  Stat.                                   §  968.26  is  triggered,
the  John  Doe  complainant  must  establish  that  he  or  she  has
14




No.  96-2361-W
"reason   to   believe"   a   crime   has   been   committed   within   that
judge's  jurisdiction.     Under  the  interpretation  of  Wis.  Stat.
§  968.26  we  apply  today,  a  John  Doe  complainant  must  do  more
than  merely  allege  that  a  crime  has  been  committed.     Before  a
circuit  court  judge  is  required  to  conduct  an  examination  of  a
complainant,   that   complainant,   in   his   or   her   petition,   must
allege  objective,  factual  assertions  sufficient  to  support  a
reasonable  belief  that  a  crime  has  been  committed.
¶25   We  do  not  equate  this  "reason  to  believe"  standard  of
Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  with  the  probable  cause  required  to  support
a  criminal  complaint.10     There  is  no  requirement  that  a  finding
of   probable   cause   be   made   before   a   John   Doe   proceeding   is
commenced.                                                                      To   the   contrary,   the   statute   prescribes   that   a
determination  of  probable  cause  is  to  be  made  after  subpoena  and
examination  of  the  witnesses.      We  reaffirm  our  statement  in
Washington:
The   John   Doe   complaint                                                    .   need   not   name   a
particular   accused;   nor   need   it   set   forth   facts
sufficient   to   show   that   a   crime   has   probably   been
committed.    The  John  Doe  is,  at  its  inception,  not  so
much  a  procedure  for  the  determination  of  probable
cause  as  it  is  an  inquest  for  the  discovery  of  crime  .
10  Unlike  a  petition  for  John  Doe  proceedings,  a  criminal
complaint   must   set   forth   certain   facts   which   would   lead   a
reasonable  person  to  conclude  that  a  crime  had  probably  been
committed  and  that  the  defendant  named  in  the  complaint  was
probably  the  culpable  party.     See  State  v.  Haugen,                     52  Wis.  2d
791,  793,  191  N.W.2d  12  (1971);  State  v.  White,  97  Wis.  2d  193,
203,  295  N.W.2d  346  (1980).
15




No.  96-2361-W
Washington,                                                                    83   Wis.  2d   at          822.   Although   the   line   dividing
"reason  to  believe"  from  probable  cause  may  appear  slight,  its
position  in  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  must  remain  secure.
¶26   The  John  Doe  procedure  we  adopt  today  gives  citizens
access  to  an  impartial  and  neutral  jurist  for  review  of  their
criminal  complaints.    It  does  not,  however,  require  the  judge  to
conduct  a  time-consuming  hearing  of  petitions  that  are  spurious,
frivolous,  or  groundless.     The  circuit  court  judge  to  whom  a
John   Doe   petition   has   been   presented,   therefore,   must   first
determine  from  the  face  of  the  petition  whether  the  complainant
has  shown  that  he  or  she  has  reason  to  believe  that  a  crime  has
been  committed.     If  the  judge  finds  that  the  complainant  has
made  such  a  showing,  the  judge  has  no  choice  but  to  examine  the
complainant  under  oath.     If,  however,  the  judge  finds  that  the
complainant  has  failed  to  establish  "reason  to  believe,"  that
judge   may   deny   the   John   Doe   petition   without   conducting   an
examination.
¶27   This,   of   course,   is   not   to   say   that   the   judge's
decision  may  rest  upon  prejudice  or  caprice.     In  determining
whether  the  petition  is  worthy  of  further  treatment,  a  circuit
court  judge  must  act  as  a  neutral  and  detached  magistrate.     In
making  this  decision,  the  judge  should  not  weigh  the  credibility
of   the   complainant   or   choose   between   conflicting   facts   and
inferences.     See  State  v.  Schober,                                       167  Wis.  2d               371,   381,                               481
N.W.2d  689  (Ct.  App.  1992).    For  some  complainants,  the  John  Doe
procedures  available  under  Wis.  Stat.                                      §  968.26  provide  their
only  entrance  to  the  state  courts.     Although  we  believe  that
16




No.  96-2361-W
circuit  court  judges  must  perform  some  gate-keeping  functions
under  Wis.  Stat.                                                             §  968.26,  we  do  not  here  intend  to  close  the
doors  of  the  courtroom  to  those  persons  who  may  have  reason  to
believe  a  crime  has  been  committed.    In  addition,  the  judge  must
recognize  that  many  John  Doe  petitions  are  filed  pro  se  by
complainants  not  trained  in  the  complexities  of  criminal  law  and
procedure.     Where  a  mere  technical  error  on  the  face  of  the
petition,  or  an  inadequacy  in  the  facts  alleged  therein,  can  be
cured  by  a  simple  request  for  additional  information,  justice
may  be  best  served  under  Wis.  Stat.  §  968.26  by  the  judge  simply
making  such  request  or  examining  the  complainant.
¶28   Discretion  of  a  limited  nature  is  conferred  upon  the
judge  by  Wis.  Stat.                                                         §  968.26,  and  there  must  be  evidence  that
discretion  was  in  fact  exercised.     If  a  circuit  court  judge
denies  a  petition  for  further  proceedings  without  examining  the
complainant,   that   decision   is   subject   to   review   under   the
provisions  of  Wis.  Stat.                                                    §  809.51,  by  which  a  writ  of  mandamus
may  be  sought  to  compel  the  judge  to  conduct  under  oath  an
examination  of  the  complainant  and  any  witnesses  he  or  she  might
produce.
¶29   Based  on  the  foregoing,  we  modify  the  decision  of  the
court  of  appeals.    The  court  of  appeals  erred  in  concluding  that
Judge  Torphy  was  required  to  examine  Reimann  without  considering
whether  Reimann  satisfied  the  threshold  requirement  Wis.  Stat.
§  968.26   places   on   John   Doe   complainants.                           Since   we   also
conclude  that  Judge  Torphy  applied  the  wrong  rule  of  law,  we
affirm   the   decision   of   the   court   of   appeals   granting   a
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No.  96-2361-W
supervisory  writ.     We  direct  Judge  Torphy  to  conduct  further
proceedings,  consistent  with  this  opinion,  to  determine  whether
Reimann,  in  his  John  Doe  petition,  has  established  that  he  has
reason  to  believe  that  a  punishable  crime  has  been  committed
within  Judge  Torphy's  jurisdiction.    If  Judge  Torphy  determines
that  the  crimes  alleged  in  Reimann's  petition  are  beyond  the
applicable  statute  of  limitations,11  he  may  deny  the  petition
without  conducting  an  examination  of  Reimann.
By   the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of   appeals   is
modified  and  as  modified,  affirmed.
11  In  determining  whether  the  crimes  alleged  by  Reimann  are
beyond  the  appropriate  statute  of  limitations,  Judge  Torphy,
like  any  judge  applying  a  statute  of  limitations,  must  consider
not   only   the   time   having   passed   since   the   alleged   crime
occurred,  but  also  the  occurrence  of  events  and  the  existence  of
factors  that  may  have  tolled  the  running  of  the  statute  of
limitations.
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