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COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.:                                                            98-3195
Complete Title
of Case:
VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
PAUL G. MEYER,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Opinion Filed:                                                       August 4, 1999
Submitted on Briefs:                                                 June 14, 1999
JUDGES:                                                              Nettesheim, Anderson and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYS:                                                           On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of  Rex R. Anderegg of Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP of
Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS:                                                           On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of Timothy W. Feeley of von Briesen, Purtell, & Roper, SC of
Milwaukee.




COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
NOTICE
DATED AND FILED
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in the
                                                                                        AUGUST 4, 1999            bound volume of the Official Reports.
                                                                                                                  A party may file with the Supreme Court a
                                                                                        Marilyn L. Graves         petition  to  review  an  adverse  decision  by  the
                                                                                        Clerk, Court of Appeals   Court of Appeals.  See § 808.10 and RULE 809.62,
                                                                                        of Wisconsin              STATS.
No.                                                                                     98-3195
                                                                                        STATE OF WISCONSIN        IN COURT OF APPEALS
VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
PAUL G. MEYER,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
ROBERT G. MAWDSLEY, Judge.  Reversed.
Before Nettesheim, Anderson and Snyder, JJ.
ANDERSON, J.     The issue in this appeal is whether § 800.14(4),
STATS., permits a new trial in the circuit court when the case  was judicially
resolved, but its merits were not fully litigated, before the municipal court.   We
conclude that the legislature modified § 800.14(4) to reduce the number of circuit
court  jury  trials  resulting  from  municipal  court  appeals.     Considering  the
legislature’s intent for § 800.14(4), we determine that without a trial on the merits




No. 98-3195
in the municipal court, a party cannot request a new trial in the circuit court.
Because the Village of Menomonee Falls made such a request in this case, we
reverse.1
Paul G. Meyer was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated                                                                                (OMVWI),  operating  a  motor  vehicle  with  a  prohibited  alcohol
concentration                                                                              (PAC),  and  possession  of  a  controlled  substance  and  drug
paraphernalia in violation of WAUKESHA COUNTY, WIS., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
§§ 6.01 (adopting § 346.63(1)(a) and (b), STATS.), 10.07(1)(k)6 and 10.03(1)(q).
A Village of Menomonee Falls Municipal Court trial was set.   Meyer’s defense
counsel made a discovery request that specifically asked for the narrative police
report about Meyer’s arrest.    The Village failed to produce the police report,
despite defense counsel’s numerous requests.   The Village informed Meyer that
the report did not exist.
Immediately  before  the  trial,  the  Village  discovered  the  missing
police report.   Meyer made a motion in limine to prohibit use of the police report
at trial.   The municipal court granted the motion.   Without the police report as
evidence, the Village stated that it was unable to proceed.   After a motion from
Meyer, the court dismissed the charges against him.
The  Village  requested  a  new  trial  before  the  circuit  court  in
accordance with § 800.14(4), STATS.   Meyer responded with a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the Village could not request a new trial before the circuit court when
1 This appeal was originally a one-judge appeal; it was converted to a three-judge panel
by order of June 21, 1999.  See RULE 809.41(3), STATS.
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No. 98-3195
the merits of the case had not been determined before the municipal court.   After a
hearing on the motion, the circuit court agreed with the Village that § 800.14(4)
permitted a new trial before it.   A new trial was held.   Meyer was found guilty of
OMVWI, PAC and possession of a controlled substance2 and was ordered to pay a
forfeiture judgment of $859.75.   Meyer appeals.
Whether § 800.14(4), STATS., permits a new trial in the circuit court
when a case was resolved but not fully litigated on the merits before the municipal
court presents a matter of statutory construction which we review de novo.   See
State v. C.A.J., 148 Wis.2d 137, 139, 434 N.W.2d 800, 800 (Ct. App. 1988).   We
begin by reading the statute’s language, and, if the language is unambiguous, we
apply it to the facts at hand.   See State v. Williams, 198 Wis.2d 516, 525, 544
N.W.2d  406,  410  (1996).    If the statute is ambiguous, or reasonably may be
understood in more than one way, we will examine the scope, history, context,
subject matter and object of the statute to ascertain the legislature’s intent when
drafting it.   See id.
Section 800.14, STATS., grants the right to appeal from judgments of
municipal courts, and subsec. (4) provides the following option to an appellant:
Upon request of either party … the circuit court shall order
that a new trial be held in circuit court.   The new trial shall
be  conducted  by  the  court  without  a  jury  unless  the
appellant requests a jury trial….
This  subsection  allows  a  party  appealing  from  an  adverse  municipal  court
judgment to retry the case to either the judge or a jury.
2   The Village’s motion to dismiss the citation for possession of drug paraphernalia was
granted by the circuit court.
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No. 98-3195
The Village contends that § 800.14(4), STATS., permits either party
to request a new trial if the municipal court has addressed and disposed of the
case.   In contrast, Meyer argues that a municipal court trial that includes a full
litigation of the merits of the parties’ issues must occur before either party may
appeal  to  the  circuit  court  for  a  new  trial.    Both  parties  present  reasonable
interpretations of this statute.   Because § 800.14(4) is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation, we conclude that it is ambiguous.
To  resolve  this  controversy,  we  examine  the  legislature’s  intent
when creating the statute.   To do so, we must interpret the statute’s subsections in
a manner consistent with the entire statute’s purpose.   See Williams, 198 Wis.2d at
527,  544 N.W.2d at  410.                                                                    “A statute should be construed to give effect to its
leading  idea,  and  the  entire  statute  should  be  brought  into harmony with  the
statute’s purpose.”   Id. at 527, 544 N.W.2d 410-11 (quoted source omitted).
Section 800.14(4), STATS., was modified in 1987.   The legislative
history indicates that the legislature was modifying this subsection to reduce the
number of circuit court jury trial requests from municipal ordinance violation
appeals.
The  legislative  history  of  secs.                                                         800.04(1)                                              (d)  and
800.14(4), STATS., indicates that they were revised in 1987
in order to encourage municipal ordinance defendants to
have their cases heard in municipal court and thus cut down
on what were believed to be “excessive requests” for circuit
court jury trials in civil forfeiture and ordinance violation
cases.                                                                                       [See]  1987 Bill Draft Request Form from Cheryl
Wittke to Senator Adelman, Dec. 4, 1986.
Village of Oregon v. Waldofsky, 177 Wis.2d 412, 419, 501 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Ct.
App. 1993).
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No. 98-3195
The Village’s motivation for requesting a new trial before the circuit
court  is  readily apparent.    The  charges  against  Meyer  were  dismissed  in  the
municipal  court  because  after  failing  to  produce  the  police  report  through
discovery and  then  not being able  to present it as evidence,  the  Village  was
unprepared to proceed with the trial.   Because of the Village’s error, it was unable
to get a conviction against Meyer.   With the new circuit court trial, the Village
started the case with a clean slate.   It now had the opportunity to use the police
report as evidence.   Such leaping from an adverse municipal court determination
in search of a more favorable outcome in the circuit court is contrary to the
legislature’s intent for the statute—to reduce the number of new trial requests to
the circuit court from municipal ordinance violations.    Meyer, who was fully
prepared with his case at the time of the municipal court trial, succeeded before
the municipal court in getting the charges against him dismissed.    The result
sought  by  the  Village  is  unfair  to  those  who,  after  receiving  a  judicial
determination of their case by the municipal court, believe that their case has been
resolved.
The  1987 revision to  §  800.14, STATS., shows that the legislature
sought to reduce the number of municipal court appeals to the circuit court from
municipal ordinance violations.   Considering the legislative intent and principles
of justice and fairness, we cannot agree with the Village’s reading of the statute.
Such a broad construction permits parties to correct errors fatal to their municipal
court case by requesting a new trial before the circuit court.   We are obligated to
avoid construing this statute in a manner that produces an absurd result.    See
Jungbluth  v.  Hometown,  Inc.,  201  Wis.2d  320,  327,  548  N.W.2d  519,  522
(1996).
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No. 98-3195
Our conclusion that a full trial of the parties’ issues in the municipal
court is a condition precedent to a “new” trial in the circuit court finds support in
City of Middleton v. Hennen, 206 Wis.2d 347, 557 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1996).
The question in Hennen was whether a party is entitled to present a written or oral
argument in an appeal brought under § 800.14(5), STATS.   In discussing the option
to seek a “new” trial under § 800.14(4), we pointed out that “a party appealing
from an adverse municipal court judgment is given an opportunity to be heard in
the circuit court in a most meaningful manner:   by trying the case anew to either a
judge or jury.”   Hennen,  206 Wis.2d at  355,  557 N.W.2d at  821.                     “Anew” is
defined in WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 82 (1993) as “1 :
for an additional time … 2 : in a new form.”   Before a case can be tried “for an
additional time,” it must have been fully litigated at an earlier time.
Holding that the Village is barred from seeking a new trial in the
circuit court because there was no trial on the merits in the municipal court does
not  prohibit  the  Village  from  seeking  review  of  the  municipal  court  action
suppressing the errant police report.   Section 800.14(5), STATS., provides that if
there is no request for a new trial under § 800.14(4), an appeal to the circuit court
shall be based upon a review of a transcript of the municipal proceedings.   See
Village of Williams Bay v. Metzl, 124 Wis.2d 356, 361, 369 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Ct.
App.  1985).    When the circuit court conducts a review of the municipal court
judgment, it applies the same standard of review to the issue presented as an
appellate court applies in reviewing a trial court.   See id.   The Village had the
opportunity to seek a meaningful review of the municipal court judgment through
an appeal on the record under  §  800.14(5).   Because the Village forfeited this
opportunity, it cannot complain that it has been denied a meaningful review of the
municipal court’s judgment.   See Hennen, 206 Wis.2d at 355, 557 N.W.2d at 821.
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No. 98-3195
In  conclusion,  we  determine  that  §  800.14(4),  STATS.,  does  not
permit a new trial before the circuit court when the case was judicially resolved,
but not fully litigated on the merits, before the municipal court.   Accordingly, we
reverse.
By the Court.—Judgment reversed.
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