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2003  WI  App  66
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.:                                        02-2546
Complete Title of Case:
                                                 WALTER MILLS AND THE MILLS FAMILY LIMITED
                                                 LIABILITY COMPANY,
                                                 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
                                                 V.
VILAS COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
WALTER MILLS AND THE MILLS FAMILY LIMITED
LIABILILTY COMPANY,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
VILAS COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA
INDIANS,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JOHN ANDERSON, VILAS COUNTY ZONING
ADMINISTRATOR, AND VILAS COUNTY ZONING
COMMITTEE,




DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Opinion Filed:                                                 February 25, 2003
Submitted on Briefs:     February 6, 2003
JUDGES:                                                        Cane, C.J., Hoover, P.J., and Peterson, J.
Appellant
ATTORNEYS:                                                     On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the
                                                               briefs of Gregory B. Conway of Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry
of Green Bay.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS:                                                     On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of Carol J. Brown of Brown & LaCounte, LLP of Madison.




COURT OF APPEALS                                 2003  WI  App  66
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                  NOTICE
                                                 This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
                                                 published, the official version will appear in
February 25, 2003                                the bound volume of the Official Reports.
Cornelia G. Clark                                A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Clerk of Court of Appeals                        petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Cir. Ct. Nos.   96-CV-37
Appeal No.                                       02-2546
96-CV-139
96-CV-148
STATE OF WISCONSIN                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
WALTER MILLS AND THE MILLS FAMILY LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
VILAS COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
WALTER MILLS AND THE MILLS FAMILY LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
V.
VILAS COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA
INDIANS,




No.   02-2546
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
JOHN ANDERSON, VILAS COUNTY ZONING
ADMINISTRATOR, AND VILAS COUNTY ZONING
COMMITTEE,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL  from  judgments  of  the  circuit  court  for  Vilas  County:
ROBERT E. KINNEY, Judge.  Affirmed.
Before Cane, C.J., Hoover, P.J., and Peterson, J.
¶1                                                                                       CANE, C.J.    Walter Mills appeals judgments upholding a building
permit denial by the Vilas County Board of Adjustment and refusing to enforce a
mediation  agreement  between  Mills  and  the  Lac  du  Flambeau  Band  of  Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians  (Tribe).    He contends the circuit court incorrectly
concluded that the Vilas County zoning administrator could not issue a permit
while the certiorari appeal of a previous denial of the same permit was pending.   In
addition, he contends the court erred when it refused to enforce the mediation
agreement based on the political question doctrine and comity.
¶2                                                                                       We conclude the trial court correctly determined that the certiorari
appeal prevented the zoning administrator from issuing another permit and also
that  the  court  properly  refused  to  enforce  the  mediation  agreement  based  on
principles of comity.   Therefore, we affirm the judgments. We reject, however, the
Tribe’s request that we determine Mills’s appeal is frivolous.
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No.   02-2546
BACKGROUND
¶3                                                                                         Strawberry  Island  is  a  twenty-six-acre  island  in  Flambeau  Lake,
which is located within the Lac du Flambeau reservation.   The Mills family has
owned  the  island  since                                                                  1910.    The  island  has  great  historical  and  cultural
significance for the Tribe.   It is also listed on the National Register of Historic
Places and is considered a likely burial site by the Wisconsin State Historical
Society  under  the  Burial  Sites  Preservation  Law.                                     The  island  has  not  been
developed in any substantial way.
¶4                                                                                         In 1976, Mills received approval for a subdivision plat on the island
and in 1995 he applied for a permit to build a single-family home and garage on
one of the lots.     Vilas County zoning administrator David Anderson denied the
permit  and  gave  Mills  a  list  of  five  concerns  he  had  with  the  proposed
development.    Mills appealed to the board of adjustment, which affirmed the
denial.   Mills then filed for a writ of certiorari with the circuit court.
¶5                                                                                         While  certiorari  review  was  pending,  Mills  gave  Anderson
information to address the concerns.   Anderson issued the building permit.   The
Tribe  intervened  as  an  interested  party  and  appealed.    The  board  concluded
Anderson’s  decision  was  improper  because  of  the  pending  certiorari  review.
Mills then sought certiorari review of the board’s decision.   In addition, the Tribe
sought injunctive relief to prevent Anderson from issuing further permits until the
court could resolve both certiorari reviews.
¶6                                                                                         The  circuit  court  consolidated  the  three  cases  and  affirmed  the
board’s  decision  to  uphold  the  administrator’s  original  denial  of  the  building
permit.    The  court also  determined the  board was correct when  it concluded
Anderson improperly issued a new permit while certiorari review was pending.
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No.   02-2546
Finally, based on these two decisions, the court concluded the Tribe’s request for
injunctive relief was moot.
¶7                                                                                        At the court’s suggestion, the parties began mediation in December
1997 to discuss the Tribe’s purchase of the island.   Mills agreed to mediation on
the  conditions  that  the  Tribe  waive  its  sovereign  immunity  and  that  its
representatives have the authority to bind the Tribe.   The Tribe agreed to waive its
immunity. It further agreed that at least a majority of its council, which would
have to approve any proposal, would participate directly in the mediation to avoid
unnecessary delays.
¶8                                                                                        In June 1998, the parties agreed that the Tribe would purchase the
island  for                                                                               $1.5  million.    After  Mills  accepted  the  Tribe’s  offer,  the  council
members noted the Tribe’s constitution might require a referendum to approve the
expenditure.   The parties’ written agreement states the Tribe will pay Mills $1.5
million for the island “subject to the approval of Tribe membership, if needed.”   In
July 1999, the Tribe informed Mills that it intended to hold a referendum because
of a clause in the Tribe’s constitution requiring a referendum for expenditures of
more than $10,000 of the Tribe’s funds held in trust by the Department of the
Interior.   The Tribe said the use of trust funds was necessary because its gaming
funds alone were insufficient.
¶9                                                                                        The referendum, held in August 1999, failed.   The parties agreed to
reenter mediation, but their attempt at resolution failed after one brief session.1
Mills then moved to enforce the original mediation agreement, arguing the Tribe’s
constitution  did  not  require  a  referendum.     The  court  denied  the  motion,
1 The Tribe opened with an offer of $800,000.   Each party accuses the other of walking
out shortly thereafter.
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No.   02-2546
concluding Mills should have challenged the decision to hold the referendum prior
to the vote and may have waived any objection to the result by failing to do so.   In
addition, the court noted Mills was asking the court to overturn the results of an
election.    The  court  concluded  the  referendum  was  a  political  question  and
declined to address the dispute.   In addition, the court said respect for the Tribe’s
sovereignty and the doctrine of comity weighed against enforcing the agreement.
Mills appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶10    We  first  address  Mills’s  claim  the  zoning  administrator  had  the
authority  to  grant  the  building  permit.    He  argues  the  administrator’s  initial
rejection of the permit was conditional and, after Mills satisfied the conditions, the
administrator could properly issue the permit.   Mills further contends the board
erred when it reversed because of the pending certiorari appeal.   We disagree.
¶11    On certiorari review of a board of adjustment determination, we
inquire (1) whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether the board
proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) whether the board's action was arbitrary,
oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and
(4) whether  the  board  might  reasonably  make  the  order  or  determination  in
question, based on the evidence.   Fabyan v. Waukesha County Board of Adj.,
2001 WI App 162, ¶11, 246 Wis. 2d 851, 632 N.W.2d 116.   Mills’s challenge to
the board’s conclusion that the administrator could not issue a new permit when
the prior denial was on appeal presents a jurisdictional issue, which is a question
of law we review de novo.   See State ex rel. V.J.H. v. C.A.B., 163 Wis. 2d 833,
840, 472 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1991).
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No.   02-2546
¶12    The  board’s  authority  is  governed  by  Vilas  County’s  zoning
regulations.   Article IX, § 9.3(c), of Vilas County’s zoning ordinance reads in part:
“The Zoning Administrator may also require any additional information necessary
to decide upon the issuance of a Zoning permit.”   Article X, § 10.4(B), states:   “An
appeal shall stay all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from.”
Finally, article X, § 10.4(D) reads:                                                      “All decisions and findings of the Board of
Adjustment on appeal shall in all instances be final administrative determinations
and shall thereafter be only subject to review by a court of law upon the filing of a
writ of certiorari within 30 days of the board’s decision.”
¶13    Mills argues that the provision allowing the administrator to request
additional  information  allows  the  grant  of  conditional  permits  and,  therefore,
Anderson properly issued the permit.    We disagree.    The interpretation of an
ordinance is a question of law we review de novo.    See Hansman v. Oneida
County, 123 Wis. 2d 511, 514, 366 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1985).   The ordinance
says the administrator may request additional information  “necessary to decide
upon the issuance of a Zoning permit.”   We read the ordinance to require that the
administrator request the information before making the decision, not after, as was
the case here.
¶14    Further, we determine that even had the permit been conditional, the
other two quoted sections of the ordinances would have required the board to
reach the conclusion it did.   Mills’s certiorari appeal of the permit denial stayed
any further proceedings regarding that denial under article X, § 10.4(B).   Further,
the board’s decision was final under article X, § 10.4(D), and the only appeal was
to the circuit court.   Even if we were to construe the permit denial as conditional,
Mills gave up any opportunity to have the administrator revisit his decision by
requesting certiorari review.
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No.   02-2546
¶15    Mills argues that his compliance with the conditions rendered the
certiorari proceedings moot.   We disagree.   Not only would this contravene the
plain language of Vilas County’s ordinances, it would also, as the circuit court
noted, create “jurisdictional chaos.”   If a zoning ordinance provides for an appeal
to a board of adjustment from an adverse ruling of an administrative officer and
circuit court  review  of  the  board’s decision  is also provided by statute,  such
remedies are exclusive of all others.   Nodell Invest. Corp. v Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d
416, 423, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977) (citing Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis.
39,  63-64,  51  N.W.2d  518  (1952)).    As the circuit court noted, parties often
erroneously resort to court before exhausting their administrative remedies.   When
the party is properly before the court, however, the court has exclusive jurisdiction
over the dispute, and the administrative agencies cannot reevaluate their decision
until the court relinquishes that jurisdiction.    To allow otherwise would be to
encourage   conflicting   and   competing   decisions   of   courts   and   various
administrative agencies.
¶16    We next address the trial court’s refusal to enforce the mediation
agreement.    Mills  argues  the  court  incorrectly  applied  the  political  question
doctrine to the dispute and refused to decide the case on its merits.   Instead, Mills
claims,  the  court  should  have  enforced  the  agreement  because  the  Tribe’s
constitution did not require a referendum.   While we agree the political question
doctrine  does  not  apply to  this  case,  we  conclude  the  trial  court  nonetheless
correctly refused to address the merits of the dispute because of the doctrine of
comity.
¶17    The political question doctrine is invoked by courts declining to
address issues better left resolved by other branches of government.   See Vincent
v.  Voight,  2000  WI  93,  ¶192,  236  Wis.  2d  588,  614 N.W.2d  388  (Sykes J.,
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No.   02-2546
concurring in part, dissenting in part).     The doctrine is based upon separation of
powers principles and essentially states, “The judiciary should not be drawn into
deciding issues that are essentially political in nature, exclusively committed by
the constitution to another branch of government and not susceptible to judicial
management or resolution.”   Id.
¶18    The political question doctrine does not apply here.   Central to the
doctrine are notions of the separation of powers.   The court’s use of the doctrine
here focused on the Tribe’s decision to hold the referendum and its results.   This
does not strictly present a political question.   It does not involve two branches of
the same government, but rather two branches of two different governments.   It
would  not  be  for  Wisconsin  courts  to  determine  what  constitutes  a  political
question within the Lac du Flambeau Tribe.
¶19    Instead, the court’s invocation of the doctrine of comity correctly
addresses its role regarding the referendum.   Under this doctrine, courts will, as a
matter of discretion, rather than obligation, defer to the assertion of jurisdiction or
give effect to the judgments of other states or sovereigns out of mutual respect and
for the purpose of furthering the orderly administration of justice.   Teague v. Bad
River  Band  of  Chippewa  Indians,  2000  WI  79,  ¶35,  236  Wis.  2d  384,  612
N.W.2d 709.   The scope of comity is determinable as a matter of judicial policy,
and  we  review  the  circuit  court’s  decision  under  the  erroneous  exercise  of
discretion standard.   See id. (citing International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142
Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910)).   A court properly exercises discretion when it
considers the facts of record under the proper legal standard and reasons its way to
a rational conclusion.   Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis. 2d 585, 590, 478 N.W.2d 37 (Ct.
App. 1991).
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No.   02-2546
¶20    The circuit court’s justification for invoking comity was fostering
and   maintaining   the   relationship  between  state   and  tribal   governments.
Specifically, the court pointed to the problems resulting from overlaps in state and
tribal jurisdiction, the efforts the governments have made to resolve these concerns
and the admonishment state courts have received to respect tribal decisions.     The
court noted Mills was essentially asking the court to overturn the decision of a
sovereign nation.   We conclude these considerations reflect the court’s exercise of
discretion.
¶21    The  court’s  decision  focuses  primarily  on  the  outcome  of  the
referendum.   While we agree this was proper, we conclude the tribe’s decision to
hold the referendum should also be deferred to based upon principles of comity.
The  mediation  agreement  stated  the  purchase  was  subject  to  the  tribal
membership’s  agreement,  if  needed.    The  parties  agree  “if  needed”  means  if
required by the tribal constitution.   The record shows the tribal council determined
it would need to use trust funds, in part, to pay for the island, and under the Tribe’s
constitution, a referendum is required if more than $10,000 of these funds is to be
expended.   Comity does not allow Wisconsin courts to second guess that decision.
¶22    Mills argues comity should not apply because the Tribe waived its
sovereign immunity and also agreed to allow the tribal council to bind the Tribe to
any  agreement  reached.     This  argument,  however,  is  undercut  by  Mills’s
acceptance of the agreement’s language.   The Tribe alerted Mills at mediation that
a referendum might be required.   Mills agreed to this condition, which affected the
council’s ability to bind the Tribe.   Further, the Tribe’s consent to suit in state
court is not a waiver of its sovereign right to interpret and apply its own laws.
9




No.   02-2546
¶23    Nor do we accept Mills’s claim that comity only applies when two
courts claim jurisdiction.   He relies on the specific facts of the supreme court’s
decision in Teague, which involved a state court and a tribal court disputing which
had jurisdiction over an employment dispute.   Teague, 2000 WI 79 at ¶1.   Comity,
however, encompasses more than just the competing jurisdiction of courts.   It is
the recognition that one state allows within its territory to legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another, having due regard to duty and convenience and to the
rights of its own citizens.   Estate of Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 203, 222 N.W.2d 628
(1974).
¶24    Additionally, Mills attacks the Tribe’s actions as incorrect under its
constitution and as a ruse to back out of the agreement.   He contends the Tribe
relied on different rationales to justify the referendum when it informed him of the
decision to hold the vote and before the circuit court.   In addition, he argues the
referendum’s wording and actions by the tribal council prior to the vote suggest
the referendum was merely advisory rather than required.   He attacks the Tribe’s
decision to use trust funds as merely an excuse to justify the referendum and
further claims the Tribe should not be allowed to use the trust funds because the
mediation agreement does not contemplate their use.
¶25     Principles of comity, however, lead us to conclude we should not
address Mills’s concerns.   The Tribe’s rationale for requiring the referendum is a
result of the council’s interpretation of the constitution.   Further, the referendum’s
wording and the decision to use trust funds to pay for the island are legislative
decisions by the council.   Comity requires Wisconsin courts to defer not only to
the council’s interpretation of the constitution, but also its budgetary and policy
decisions.    See id.                                                                     Further, the mediation agreement’s silence regarding the
source of the Tribe’s funding supports the argument we should defer to the Tribe’s
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No.   02-2546
decision.   The absence of a specified funding source suggests that the Tribe alone
would determine the purchase money’s source.   The council’s decision to use trust
funds is a legislative choice that, according to its interpretation of the constitution,
required a referendum.   Whether the Tribe is legally correct or had questionable
motives are not issues we should address.
¶26    Our decision hinges on the agreement’s use of the “subject to the
approval of tribe membership, if needed” language.   Without this language, the
court would likely have been able to hold the Tribe to the agreement because of its
sovereign immunity waiver.   The parties, however, conditioned their agreement on
obtaining the approval of the Tribe’s membership, if it was needed.   The Tribe,
interpreting its own law, determined it was.   Our reliance on comity defers to the
Tribe’s law and the council’s interpretation of it.
¶27    Mills  also  contends  he  did  not  waive  his  right  to  challenge  the
referendum by failing to prevent the vote from taking place.   We do not address
this  argument  because  of  our  conclusion  that  the  court  correctly  applied  the
doctrine of comity.   See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct.
App. 1983).
¶28    Finally,  the  Tribe  has  moved  for  costs  and  fees  for  a  frivolous
appeal, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 809.25(3).   The Tribe asserts Mills’s appeal lacks
good faith and is intended to harass the Tribe because it is a continuing step in his
attempt to prolong the legal dispute over the island.   Also, the Tribe argues Mills
should have known the portions of his appeal were without a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.    We disagree.
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No.   02-2546
¶29    In order to impose sanctions against a party for a frivolous appeal
under  WIS.  STAT.  § 809.25,  we  must  determine  whether  one  or  more  of  the
following exist:
1. The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or continued
in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously
injuring another.
2. The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have
known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any
reasonable  basis  in  law  or  equity  and  could  not  be
supported  by  a  good  faith  argument  for  an  extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.
¶30    We cannot conclude that Mills’s appeal was filed to harass the Tribe
or that he should have known the appeal was without any reasonable basis in the
law.    The scope of comity, as noted, is a question of judicial policy and we
determine Mills’s appeal presents a good faith argument why it should not have
applied in this situation.   Further, Mills correctly argued the court misapplied the
political question doctrine.  The appeal is not frivolous.
By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.
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