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2010  WI  90
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                                                                    2008AP170
COMPLETE TITLE:
Walter  Tatera  deceased  and  Vicki  Tatera
individually  and  as  Special  Administrator  of  the
Estate  of  Walter  Tatera,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FMC  Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner,
United  Healthcare  and  American  Medical  Security,
Subrogated  Defendants,
Kelsey-Hayes  Company  p/k/a  K  H  Corporation,
Defendant.
REVIEW  OF  A  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS
2009  WI  App  80
Reported  at:  319  Wis.  2d  688,  768  N.W.2d  198
(Ct.  App.  2009-Published)
OPINION FILED:                                                               July  20,  2010
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                                                               March  3,  2010
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:                                                                       Circuit
COUNTY:                                                                      Milwaukee
JUDGE:                                                                       Timothy  G.  Dugan
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:                                                                   CROOKS,  J.,  dissents  (opinion  filed).
ABRAHAMSON,  C.J.  and  BRADLEY,  J.,  join  the
dissent.
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For  the  defendant-respondent-petitioner  there  were  briefs
by  Mark  S.  Des  Rochers  and  Mark  Des  Rochers,  Attorney  at  Law,
LLC,  Appleton,  and  oral  argument  by  Mark  S.  Des  Rochers.
For  the  plaintiffs-appellants  there  was  a  brief  by  Jill  A.
Rakauski,  Steven  R.  Penn,  and  Penn  Rakauski,  Racine,  and  oral
argument  by  Jill  A.  Rakauski.
An  amicus  curiae  brief  was  filed  by  James  A.  Friedman,  Josh
Johanningmeier,   Bryan   J.   Cahill,   and   Godfrey   &   Kahn,   S.C.,




Madison,  on  behalf  of  the  Wisconsin  Insurance  Alliance,  and  oral
argument  by  Bryan  J.  Cahill.
2




2010  WI  90
NOTICE
This  opinion  is  subject  to  further
editing  and  modification.    The  final
version   will   appear   in   the   bound
volume of the official reports.
No.                                                                           2008AP170
(L.C.  No.                                                                    2004CV8167)
STATE  OF  WISCONSIN                                                          :             IN  SUPREME  COURT
Walter  Tatera  deceased  and  Vicki  Tatera
individually  and  as  Special  Administrator  of
the  Estate  of  Walter  Tatera,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FILED
FMC  Corporation,
JUL  20,  2010
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner,
A. John Voelker
Acting Clerk of
United  Healthcare  and  American  Medical
Supreme Court
Security,
Subrogated  Defendants,
Kelsey-Hayes  Company  p/k/a  K  H  Corporation,
Defendant.
REVIEW  of  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.    Reversed.
¶1    ANNETTE  KINGSLAND  ZIEGLER,  J.      This  is  a  review  of  a
published  decision  of  the  court  of  appeals1  that  affirmed  in  part
1  Tatera  v.  FMC  Corp.,  2009  WI  App  80,  319  Wis.  2d  688,  768
N.W.2d  198.




No.                                                                            2008AP170
and  reversed  in  part  an  order  of  the  Milwaukee  County  Circuit
Court,  Judge  Timothy  G.  Dugan  presiding,  which  granted  summary
judgment  to  FMC  Corporation                                                 (FMC)  on  the  negligence  and  strict
liability   claims   brought   by   Vicki   Tatera   and   the   Estate   of
Walter  Tatera,  her  late  husband                                            (collectively  Tatera).     Tatera
seeks   to   hold   FMC   liable   for   Walter   Tatera's2   death   from
malignant   mesothelioma,   a   cancerous   disease   which   allegedly
resulted  from  his  work  machining  asbestos-containing  products
supplied  by  FMC.     The  court  of  appeals  agreed  that  FMC  was
entitled  to  summary  judgment  on  Tatera's  strict  liability  claim
but  reversed  and  remanded  on  the  negligence  claim,  holding  that
Tatera   presented   a   prima   facie   case   of   negligence   under
Restatement                                                                    (Second)  of  Torts                       §  388                 (1965)  and  that  Wagner  v.
Continental   Casualty   Co.,                                                                                            143   Wis.  2d  379,                                   421   N.W.2d  835
(1988),  did  not  bar  the  claim  against  FMC.    FMC  petitioned  this
court  for  review,3  and  we  accepted.    We  now  reverse  the  decision
of  the  court  of  appeals.
2  For  clarity,  we  will  hereinafter  refer  to  Walter  Tatera  by
his  first  name  when  we  are  referring  to  him  individually.
3  Tatera  withdrew  her  cross  petition  for  review  of  the  court
of  appeals'  decision  to  affirm  the  order  granting  FMC  summary
judgment  on  the  strict  liability  claim.     Accordingly,  only  the
negligence  claim  is  at  issue  before  this  court.
2




No.                                                                         2008AP170
¶2    As  a  general  rule,  a  principal  employer4  is  not  liable
in  tort  for  injuries  sustained  by  an  independent  contractor's
employee  while  he  or  she  is  performing  the  contracted  work.
Wagner,                                                                     143   Wis.  2d   at                                            400-01.                                                                      There   are,   however,   two
exceptions  to  that  general  rule.     If  either  exception  is  met,
the  principal  employer  may  be  liable.     Consequently,  accepting
Tatera's   allegations   as   true,   we   must   analyze   the   two
exceptions.    Pursuant  to  the  first  exception,  we  must  determine
whether   the   principal   employer,   here,   FMC,   committed   an
affirmative  act  of  negligence  by  negligently  (1)  failing  to  warn
Walter  and  his  employer  of  the  health  hazards  associated  with
asbestos;                                                                   (2)  failing  to  warn  them  of  the  danger  and  harm  of
asbestos   after   the   products   were   supplied;                        (3)   failing   to
investigate  or  test  for  the  health  effects  of  asbestos  prior  to
supplying  the  products;                                                   (4)  failing  to  instruct  Walter  and  his
employer   in   the   use   of   precautionary   measures   relating   to
asbestos-containing  products;  or                                          (5)  supplying  unsafe  asbestos-
containing  products.    Pursuant  to  the  second  exception,  we  must
determine   whether   the   activity   of   machining   an   asbestos-
4  The  person  or  entity  that  hires  an  independent  contractor
is   variously   referred   to   as   the   "principal   employer,"   the
"general  contractor,"  or  the  "owner."      See,  e.g.,  Wagner  v.
Cont'l  Cas.  Co.,                                                                                                                         143  Wis.  2d  379,                                                          382,                            421  N.W.2d  835                          (1988)
(using                                                                      "principal                                                     employer"                                                                    and                             "general                                  contractor"
                                                                                                                                           interchangeably);  Snider  v.  N.  States  Power  Co.,  81  Wis.  2d  224,
228,                                                                        260  N.W.2d  260                                               (1977)                                                                                                       (using  "owner");  Estate  of  Thompson
                                                                            v.  Jump  River  Electric  Coop.,                                                                                                           225  Wis.  2d  588,             590  &  n.1.,                             593
N.W.2d  901                                                                 (Ct.   App.                                                    1999)                                                                                                        (using   "principal   employer"   and
"owner"  interchangeably).    To  remain  consistent,  we  will  use  the
term  "principal  employer."
3




No.                                                                              2008AP170
containing  friction  disk  is  extrahazardous.    If  we  conclude  that
either  exception  applies,  Tatera  has  here  presented  sufficient
facts  to  state  a  claim  for  negligence.
¶3    We  conclude  that  Tatera's  negligence  claim  against  FMC
falls  within  the  general  rule  that  a  principal  employer  is  not
liable   in   tort   for   injuries   sustained   by   an   independent
contractor's   employee   while   he   or   she   is   performing   the
contracted  work.    In  this  case,  neither  of  the  two  exceptions  to
that   general   rule   applies.                                                 First,   even   accepting   Tatera's
allegations  as  true,  we  conclude  that  FMC's  conduct  did  not
constitute  an  affirmative  act  of  negligence.     Rather,  Tatera's
allegations   of   negligence   are   grounded   in   FMC's   alleged
omissions.                                                                       By   definition,   the   negligent   failure   to   warn,
failure  to  investigate  or  test,  and  failure  to  instruct  are
omissions,  not  affirmative  acts  of  negligence.     Moreover,  the
act  of  supplying  asbestos-containing  friction  disks  does  not
itself   constitute   an   affirmative   act   of   negligence   because
liability  for  such  an  act  is  necessarily  premised  in  failing  to
warn,   an   omission.                                                           Second,   we   conclude   that   machining   an
asbestos-containing   friction   disk   does   not   qualify   as   an
extrahazardous  activity  because  steps  may  be  taken  to  minimize
the  risk  of  injury.    Because  we  hold  as  a  matter  of  law  that  FMC
is  not  liable  in  tort  to  Tatera,  Tatera's  negligence  claim  under
Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §  388  is  necessarily  barred.
I.  FACTUAL  BACKGROUND  AND  PROCEDURAL  POSTURE
                                                                                                                                             ¶4    Walter   Tatera   died   from   malignant   mesothelioma   on
September                                                                        20,                                                         2004.     Mesothelioma  is  a  rare  form  of  cancer  in
                                                                                                                                             4




                                                                                                                                                                                                                No.                              2008AP170
                                                                              which  malignant  cells  develop  in  the  mesothelium,  a  membrane
                                                                              that  covers  and  protects  most  of  the  body's  internal  organs.
                                                                              State   v.   Harenda   Enters.,   Inc.,                                   2008   WI                                               16,                              ¶79,              307
Wis.  2d  604,                                                                746   N.W.2d  25                                                          (Ziegler,   J.,   dissenting)                                                            (citing
                                                                              National  Cancer  Institute,  Mesothelioma:  Questions  and  Answers  1
(2002),                                                                                                                                                 http://www.cancer.gov/images/Documents/67e63bef-d6e0-
                                                                              4c0f-9c7a-e8aa56ed969c/Fs6_36.pdf).                                                                                               "Most   people   who   develop
                                                                              mesothelioma  have  worked  on  jobs  where  they  inhaled  asbestos
particles."                                                                   Harenda,                                                                  307   Wis.  2d  604,                                    ¶79                              (Ziegler,   J.,
dissenting)                                                                   (internal   quotations   omitted).                                                                                                                                 From   fall       1968
through                                                                       1993,   Walter   was   employed   full-time   by   B&M   Machine
Products  (B&M),  a  machining  shop  owned  by  his  father  and  located
in  Hales  Corners,  Wisconsin.5
¶5    In                                                                      1967,   FMC   purchased   Stearns   Electric   Company
(Stearns),  a  Milwaukee-based  manufacturer  of  industrial  electric
brakes  that  occasionally  outsourced  some  of  its  machining  work
to   B&M.6                                                                    Stearns'   brake   systems   were   comprised   of   several
component  parts,  many  of  which  were  metal.    One  of  the  few  non-
metal  component  parts  was  a  friction  disk,7  which  up  until  1986
5  Walter  also  worked  at  B&M  periodically  in  1963,  1964,  and
1967.
6  For  purposes  of  this  case,  our  various  references  to  FMC
and  Stearns  are  interchangeable.
7  In   the   record,   the   term   "friction   disk"   is   used
interchangeably   with   "friction   lining"   and   "friction   brake
lining,"   all   referring   to   the   same   component   part.              For
consistency,  we  will  use  the  term  "friction  disk."
5




No.                                                                            2008AP170
contained  some  form  of  asbestos.8     Asbestos-containing  friction
disks  were  among  the  component  parts  that  Stearns  supplied  to
B&M.     Walter  and  other  B&M  employees  machined9  the  asbestos-
containing  friction  disks  to  achieve  a  desired  size  and  shape.
The    friction    disks    were    then    returned    to    Stearns    for
incorporation  into  the  finished  brake  systems.    It  is  undisputed
that  every  asbestos-containing  friction  disk  supplied  to  B&M
from  Stearns  was  not  manufactured  by  Stearns.    Instead,  Stearns
purchased     the     friction     disks     from     several     different
manufacturers.
                                                                               ¶6    According  to  Richard  Hotchkiss                 (Hotchkiss),  who  was
employed  by  B&M  from                                                        1954   until  July                                      1972,   Stearns  did  not
instruct  B&M  on  how  to  machine  the  friction  disks;  instead,
Stearns   provided   B&M   with   a   drawing   illustrating   only   the
desired  result:
8  "Asbestos  is  the  name  given  to  a  number  of  naturally
occurring   fibrous   minerals   with   high   tensile   strength,   the
ability  to  be  woven,  and  resistance  to  heat  and  most  chemicals."
United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency                              (EPA),  Asbestos:
Basic    Information,    http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/help.html
(last   visited   July                                                         2,                                                      2010).                      Because   of   their   valuable
properties,    asbestos    fibers    have    been    widely    used    in
manufactured  goods,  including  roofing  shingles,  tiles,  paper  and
cement   products,   plastics,   textiles,   coatings,   and   friction
products   such   as   automobile   clutch   and   brake   parts.              Id.;
National  Cancer  Institute,  Asbestos  Exposure  and  Cancer  Risk            2
(2009),                                                                        http://www.cancer.gov/images/documents/5ac7d2fc-27df-
4ecc-839f-dc5bc1909e01/FS3_21.pdf.
9  The  verb  "machine"  is  defined  as  "[t]o  cut,  shape,  or
finish  by  machine."     The  American  Heritage  Dictionary  of  the
English  Language  1076  (3d  ed.  1992).
6




No.                                                                          2008AP170
Q  [Attorney                                                                 DesRochers,   counsel   for
FMC]:  .  .  .  Before   you   needed   to   machine   something,
you  needed  to  know  how  to  do  it;  right?
A  [Hotchkiss]:  Yeah.
Q:  Okay.    And  is  it  your  recollection  that  there
would   have   been   a   drawing   that   showed   you   how   to
machine  these  spacers10  the  very  first  time  that  you
did  it?
A:  No.
Q:  Okay.
A:  There  would  be  a  drawing  there  to  show  you
what  it  looked  like  and  what  the  sizes  were,  and  you
made  it  that  way.
Q:  Okay.     There  was  a  drawing  that  you  followed
for   purposes   of   machining   these   spacers;   is   that
right?
A:  Yeah.      It  didn't  tell  you  how  to  make  it,
though.
Q:  Okay.
A:  You  could  do  it  anyway  you  wanted,  as  long  as
it  turned  out  like  the  picture  on  the——on  the  drawing.
10  Hotchkiss   equated   "spacers"   with   the   friction   brake
linings  (or  for  our  purposes,  friction  disks)  supplied  to  B&M  by
Stearns:
Q:  The  spacer  work,  was  that  what  you're  calling
brake——brake  lining  work?
A:  That  was  brake  lining,  too,  material.
Q:  Machining   these   what   you   referred   to   as
spacers,   is   that   what   you   have   a   recollection   of
seeing  [Walter]  Tatera  do?
A:  Yeah.
7




No.                                                                             2008AP170
Q:  Ste[a]rns                                                                   []  did  not  tell  you  how  to  machine
these  spacers?
A:  No.
Q:  They  just  had  a  drawing  in  there  that  some
draftsman  had  done  to  show  dimensions?
A:  Right.
¶7    At  the  time,  Hotchkiss  was  unaware  that  the  friction
disks  contained  asbestos:  "I  didn't  know  if  they  had  asbestos  in
them.     At  the  time,  there  was  no  big  thing  about  asbestos."
However,  he  acknowledged  the  dust  caused  by  the  machining  and
testified   that   Walter's   father   installed   a   vacuum   system   to
collect  the  dust  in  the  shop.     Hotchkiss  wore  a  surgical  mask
only  "[o]nce  in  a  while"  and  did  not  train  Walter  to  wear  a  mask
while  machining  the  friction  disks:
Q:  .  .  .  And  when  you  trained  [Walter]  Tatera  how
to  machine  brake  linings,  did  you  wear  a  mask?
A:  No.
Q:  Did  you  instruct  him  to  wear  a  mask?
A:  No.
Nevertheless,  Hotchkiss  reported  that  Walter  wore  a  surgical
mask  while  machining:  "Well,  I  had  a  hard  time  breathing  when  I
wore  that  mask,  so  I  didn't  wear  it,  probably  not  as  often  as  I—
—but  [Walter]  did  wear  it."
¶8    Walter  died  from  malignant  mesothelioma  on  September
20,                                                                             2004.                                       According  to  his  death  certificate,  he  had  been
diagnosed  with  the  disease  three  months  earlier.
8




                                                                                                              No.                                      2008AP170
¶9    On   September                                                       17,                                2004,   Tatera   filed   a   complaint
against  FMC  and  several  other  defendants,11  alleging  negligence
and  strict  products  liability.12     As  to  the  negligence  claim,
Tatera  alleged  that  FMC  had  a  duty  to  exercise  reasonable  care
for  the  safety  of  Walter  and  those  who  worked  with  or  were
exposed  to  FMC's  asbestos-containing  products  and  that  FMC  knew
or  should  have  known  that  exposure  to  those  products  caused
disease  or  death.     In  particular,  Tatera  claimed  that  FMC  was
negligent  by  committing  "the  following  acts  or  omissions"  that
allegedly  caused  Walter's  injuries:
a.  Failed  to  adequately  warn  [Walter]  or  others  of  the
health  hazards  of  asbestos;
b.  Failed  to  warn  [Walter]  or  others  of  the  danger  and
harm   of   the   asbestos   after   the   products   or
equipment  were  installed  at  the  premises;
c.  Failed   to   investigate   or   test   for   the   health
effects  of  asbestos  prior  to  distribution  and  sale;
d.  Failed   to   instruct                                                 [Walter],   his   employers   or
others   in   the   use   of   precautionary   measures
relating  to  asbestos-containing  products  and/or
e.  Manufactured,    supplied,    installed,    or    removed
unsafe  asbestos-containing  products.
¶10   In  its  answer,  FMC  denied  the  allegations  and  asserted
that  it  otherwise  had  no  duty  to  Walter  and  was  immune  from
11  Of  those  defendants,  only  FMC  and  Kelsey-Hayes  Company
remain.    Kelsey-Hayes  Company  is  not  a  party  to  this  appeal.
12  Following  Walter's  death,  Tatera  amended  her  complaint  to
include  a  wrongful  death  claim.     She  subsequently  amended  her
complaint  two  more  times,  the  most  recent  of  which  occurred  on
October                                                                    2,                                 2006.                                    Her  negligence  claim  against  FMC  remained
unchanged  throughout.
9




No.                                                                             2008AP170
Tatera's  claims.    On  that  basis,  FMC  moved  for  summary  judgment
on  May                                                                         12,                                                            2006,  citing  the  general  rule  under  Wagner  that  a
principal  employer                                                             (in  this  case,  FMC  on  Stearns'  behalf)  is
afforded  immunity  from  tort  claims  asserted  by  employees  of  the
principal's  independent  contractor  (here,  B&M).    FMC  argued  that
neither  of  the  narrow  exceptions  applied:  namely,  Tatera  alleged
no   affirmative   acts   of   negligence   on   the   part   of   FMC,   and
Walter's  work  of  machining  asbestos-containing  friction  disks
was  not  extrahazardous.
¶11   In    response,    Tatera    maintained    that    Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts                                                             §  388,13  adopted  by  this  court  in  Strasser  v.
                                                                                Transtech   Mobile   Fleet   Service,   Inc.,                  2000    WI                                                  87,                  236
Wis.  2d  435,                                                                  613   N.W.2d  142,   provides   her   with   a   method   of
13  Restatement                                                                 (Second)   of   Torts                                          §  388                                                      (1965),   "Chattel
Known  to  be  Dangerous  for  Intended  Use,"  provides:
One   who   supplies   directly   or   through   a   third
person  a  chattel  for  another  to  use  is  subject  to
liability  to  those  whom  the  supplier  should  expect  to
use  the  chattel  with  the  consent  of  the  other  or  to  be
endangered   by   its   probable   use,   for   physical   harm
caused  by  the  use  of  the  chattel  in  the  manner  for
which  and  by  a  person  for  whose  use  it  is  supplied,  if
the  supplier
(a)  knows  or  has  reason  to  know  that  the  chattel
is  or  is  likely  to  be  dangerous  for  the  use  for  which
it  is  supplied,  and
(b)  has  no  reason  to  believe  that  those  for  whose
use  the  chattel  is  supplied  will  realize  its  dangerous
condition,  and
(c)  fails  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to  inform
them  of  its  dangerous  condition  or  of  the  facts  which
make  it  likely  to  be  dangerous.
10




No.                                                                          2008AP170
recovery  in  tort.     Tatera  further  argued  that  Wagner  does  not
bar   her   negligence   claim   against   FMC   because   her   complaint
alleged  that  FMC  committed  an  affirmative  act  of  negligence  by
"[m]anufactur[ing],   suppl[ying],   install[ing],   or   remov[ing]
unsafe   asbestos-containing   products."                                    In   the   alternative,
Tatera  argued  that  Wagner  is  inapplicable  "because  working  with
asbestos-containing    products    is    an    abnormally    dangerous
activity."
¶12   Initially,   on   September                                            6,                                                                      2006,   Judge   Clare   L.
Fiorenza  denied  FMC's  motion  for  summary  judgment.    However,  on
August  1,  2007,  due  to  judicial  rotation,  Judge  Timothy  G.  Dugan
replaced  Judge  Fiorenza  as  the  presiding  judge  in  this  case.
FMC  subsequently  renewed  its  motion,  and  Judge  Dugan  agreed  to
hear  it  over  Tatera's  objection.     On  November                        27,                                                                     2007,  Judge
Dugan  granted  FMC's  motion  for  summary  judgment.     The  circuit
court  first  determined  that  the  duty  to  warn  under  Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts  §  388  is  inapplicable  in  this  case,  reasoning
that                                                                         §  388   applies   only   to   manufacturers,   and   FMC   did   not
manufacture  the  asbestos-containing  friction  disks.    Second,  the
circuit   court   agreed   with   FMC   that   Wagner   barred   Tatera's
negligence   claim.                                                          According   to   the   circuit   court,   Tatera
alleged  FMC's  failure  to  warn,  which  does  not  constitute  an
affirmative  act  of  negligence.      In  addition,  relying  on  the
Seventh   Circuit   Court   of   Appeals   decision   in   Anderson   v.
Marathon  Petroleum  Co.,  801  F.2d  936  (7th  Cir.  1986),  the  court
concluded   that   the   activity   of   working   with   asbestos   "is
inherently  dangerous  and  not  extrahazardous."     Accordingly,  the
11




No.                                                                            2008AP170
circuit   court   determined   that   neither   of   the   exceptions   to
Wagner  applied.
¶13   On  May                                                                  12,                                                                2009,  the  court  of  appeals  reversed  the
circuit  court's  order  granting  summary  judgment  to  FMC  on  the
negligence  claim.    Tatera  v.  FMC  Corp.,  2009  WI  App  80,  ¶32,  319
Wis.  2d  688,                                                                 768  N.W.2d  198.     The  court  of  appeals  concluded
that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  determining  that  Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts                                                            §  388  is  inapplicable  to  suppliers  like  FMC:
"Nothing   in   Restatement                                                    (Second)   of   Torts                                              §  388   itself   or
Wisconsin  case  law  limits  the  applicability  of  the  rule  only  to
those  who  manufacture  the  property."     Id.,                              ¶37.     According  to
the  court  of  appeals,  Tatera  put  forth  sufficient  proof  to  allow
the                                                                            §  388  claim  to  go  forward,  see  id.,                         ¶¶41-44,  and  in  the
least,   genuine   issues   of   material   fact   precluded   summary
judgment  in  FMC's  favor,  including  whether  FMC  warned  B&M  that
the   friction   disks   contained   asbestos   and   that   asbestos   was
dangerous,  id.,                                                               ¶47.     Finally,  assuming  without  deciding  that
B&M  was  an  independent  contractor,  the  court  of  appeals  held
that  Wagner's  general  rule  of  immunity  did  not  bar  Tatera's
negligence  claim  against  FMC  because  the  two  exceptions  applied.
Id.,                                                                           ¶49.     First,  the  court  concluded  that  FMC  committed  an
affirmative   act   of   negligence   by   supplying   the   asbestos-
containing  friction  disks  to  B&M.    Id.,  ¶51.    Second,  the  court
determined    that    the    "ultra-hazardous    material    exception
applie[d]"   because   asbestos   is   recognized   as   a   dangerous
material.                                                                      Id.,                                                               ¶¶52-53                                         (citing   Wausau   Tile,   Inc.   v.   Cnty.
Concrete  Corp.,  226  Wis.  2d  235,  261,  593  N.W.2d  445  (1999)).
12




No.                                                                            2008AP170
¶14   FMC  petitioned  this  court  for  review,  and  we  accepted
on  November  3,  2009.    We  now  reverse  the  decision  of  the  court
of  appeals.
II.  STANDARD  OF  REVIEW
¶15   Whether   the   circuit   court   properly   granted   summary
judgment   to   FMC   is   a   question   of   law   that   we   review
independently,  applying  the  same  standards  used  by  the  circuit
court.     See  Racine  Cnty.  v.  Oracular  Milwaukee,  Inc.,                 2010  WI
25,                                                                            ¶24,                                                           323   Wis.  2d  682,                              781   N.W.2d  88.   Summary   judgment
"shall  be  rendered  if  the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to
interrogatories,   and   admissions   on   file,   together   with   the
affidavits,  if  any,  show  that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to
any  material  fact  and  that  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  a
judgment  as  a  matter  of  law."     Wis.  Stat.                             §  802.08(2)                                                   (2007-
08).14                                                                         In  this  case,  we  are  concerned  with  the  scope  of  a
principal   employer's   duty   to   an   independent   contractor's
employee,   which   presents   an   issue   of   law   that   we   evaluate
de  novo.     Wagner,                                                          143  Wis.  2d  at                                              384-85.     A  principal  employer
is   liable   in   tort   for   injuries   sustained   by   an   independent
contractor's   employee   in   only   two   circumstances:   if   the
principal  employer  committed  an  affirmative  act  of  negligence,
id.  at  388,  or  if  the  employee  was  injured  while  engaged  in  an
extrahazardous  activity,  id.  at  401.    Both  present  questions  of
law.                                                                           See   id.   at                                                 402;   Snider   v.   N.   States   Power   Co.,   81
14  All  subsequent  references  to  the  Wisconsin  Statutes  are
to  the  2007-08  version  unless  otherwise  indicated.
13




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    No.                                2008AP170
Wis.  2d  224,                                                               233,                                                         260  N.W.2d  260                                                                                                          (1977);  Danks  v.  Stock  Bldg.
Supply,   Inc.,                                                                                                                           2007   WI   App                                                8,                                            ¶16,         298   Wis.  2d  348,               727
N.W.2d  846.
                                                                                                                                                                                                         III.  ANALYSIS
¶16   In  Wagner,  this  court  joined  the  majority  of  other
jurisdictions  in  holding  that  a  principal  employer  is  generally
not  liable  in  tort  for  injuries  sustained  by  an  independent
contractor's   employee   while   he   or   she   is   performing   the
contracted  work.                                                            143  Wis.  2d  at  400-01.    We  were  persuaded  that
"[a]ny  other  holding  would  circumvent  the  bedrock  principles  of
Wisconsin  worker's  compensation  law."     Id.  at                         401.     An  injured
employee's   right   to   recover   worker's   compensation   benefits
"shall  be"  the  employee's  "exclusive  remedy"  against  his  or  her
employer.                                                                    Wis.   Stat.                                                 §  102.03(2).                                                  We   recognize   that   for
purposes  of  §  102.03(2),  a  principal  employer  is  not  considered
the  direct  "employer"  of  an  independent  contractor's  employee,
and  pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  102.29(1),  the  injured  employee  is
entitled  to  bring  a  tort  action  against  "any  other  party."    See
Wagner,                                                                      143  Wis.  2d  at                                                                                                           385;  Estate  of  Thompson  v.  Jump  River
Electric  Coop.,                                                             225  Wis.  2d  588,                                          593,                                                           593  N.W.2d  901                              (Ct.  App.
1999).                                                                                                                                    Nevertheless,  we  concluded  in  Wagner  that  a  principal
employer  should  be  generally  protected  from  such  tort  liability
because   it   has   already   assumed   financial   responsibility   for
injuries   to   the   independent   contractor's   employees.                143
Wis.  2d  at                                                                 399-400.     That  is,  the  contract  price  between  the
principal  employer  and  the  independent  contractor  is  presumed  to
include  payment  for  worker's  compensation  coverage;  thus,  "[t]he
14




No.                                                                           2008AP170
employee  has  a  remedy  for  the  injury——worker's  compensation——for
which  the  principal  employer  has  indirectly  paid."    Id.  at  399.15
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the  injured  employee  is  not
without  a  claim;  rather,  his  or  her  claim  sounds  in  worker's
compensation,   not   tort.                                                   In   Wagner,   we   favorably   cited   the
Seventh  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  decision  in  Anderson,  in  which
the  court  similarly  held  that  a  principal  employer  is  not  liable
for  injuries  sustained  by  an  independent  contractor's  employee
because  the  injured  employee  is  compensated  for  the  risks  of
employment  by  a  combination  of  wages,  benefits,  and  entitlement
to  worker's  compensation,  a  compensation  package  for  which  the
principal  employer  paid  in  the  contract  price.      Id.  at             400
(citing  Anderson,  801  F.2d  at  941).    "Since  the  principal  is  the
indirect  employer  of  its  contractor's  employees,  to  make  the
principal  liable  in  common  law  tort  for  the  accidents  befalling
those  employees  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  bedrock  principle
that  workers'  compensation  rights  are  exclusive  of  common  law
tort  rights."     Anderson,                                                  801  F.2d  at                                 941.     Today,  we  reaffirm
that  policy  consideration  first  adopted  in  Wagner.
¶17   Moreover,  imposing  liability  on  a  principal  employer
for  injuries  sustained  by  an  independent  contractor's  employee
15  Here,  the  record  is  void  as  to  whether  Walter  sought  or
received  worker's  compensation  benefits  from  his  employer,  B&M.
Pursuant  to  Wis.  Stat.  §  102.06,  if  an  injured  employee's  direct
employer  fails  to  carry  worker's  compensation,  the  principal
employer  may  be  liable  for  paying  worker's  compensation  to  the
employee.                                                                     Tatera   has   not   raised                   §  102.06   as   a   method   of
recovery  against  FMC,  and  we  therefore  assume  that  Tatera  had
the  opportunity  to  seek  worker's  compensation  from  B&M.
15




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      No.                   2008AP170
                                                                                                                                            runs   counter   to   the   notion   that   the   principal   employer   has
                                                                                                                                            relinquished  control  to  the  independent  contractor.    See  Kerl  v.
Dennis  Rasmussen,  Inc.,                                                     2004  WI                                                      86,                                                                            ¶24,                                                       273  Wis.  2d  106,   682
N.W.2d  328.                                                                                                                                                                                                               Therefore,   the   independent   contractor,   not   the
principal  employer,  is  in  the  best  position  to  guard  against
injuries  to  employees  while  performing  the  contracted  work.    See
id.,  ¶27  ("If  a  principal  does  not  control  or  have  the  right  to
control  the  day-to-day  physical  conduct  of  the  agent,  then  the
opportunity  and  incentive  to  promote  safety  and  the  exercise  of
due  care  are  not  present,  and  imposing  liability  without  fault
becomes  difficult  to  justify  on  fairness  grounds.").
¶18   At   the   same   time,   our   case   law   recognizes   two
exceptions  to  the  general  rule  that  a  principal  employer  is  not
liable   in   tort   for   injuries   sustained   by   an   independent
contractor's   employee   while   he   or   she   is   performing   the
contracted  work.    The  first  exception  was  recognized  over  three
                                                                              decades  ago  in  Barth  v.  Downey  Co.,                     71  Wis.  2d  775,                                                             783,                                                       239
N.W.2d  92                                                                    (1976),   and   pertains   to   an   affirmative   act   of
negligence  committed  by  the  principal  employer.     That  is,  an
independent   contractor's   employee   may   recover   for   injuries
caused  by  a  principal  employer's  affirmative  act  of  negligence.
Wagner,                                                                       143  Wis.  2d  at                                             388                                                                            (citing  Barth,                                            71  Wis.  2d  at      783);
see  also  Danks,  298  Wis.  2d  348,  ¶17.    The  second  exception  was
articulated  over  two  decades  ago  in  Wagner  and  imposes  liability
on  a  principal  employer  for  contracted  work  that  qualifies  as
extrahazardous.                                                               143  Wis.  2d  at                                             401.     Accordingly,  a  principal
employer  may  be  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by  an  independent
16




No.                                                                            2008AP170
contractor's   employee   while   he   or   she   is   engaged   in   an
extrahazardous  activity.    Id.;  see  also  Estate  of  Thompson,  225
Wis.  2d  at  595-96.
¶19   Tatera   argues   that   we   need   not   reach   these   two
exceptions  because  in  this  case,  the  general  non-liability  rule
protecting   principal   employers   does   not   apply   in   the   first
instance.     This  is  so,  she  asserts,  because  the  relationship
between   FMC   and   B&M   is   not   one   of   principal   employer   and
independent  contractor  but  instead  one  of  bailor  and  bailee.16
16  "Bailment"   in   the   legal   sense   "signifies   a   contract
resulting  from  delivery  of  a  thing  by  the  bailor  to  the  bailee
on  condition  that  it  be  restored  to  the  bailor  in  accordance
with  his  or  her  directions  as  soon  as  the  purpose  for  which  it
was   bailed   is   satisfied."                                                8   C.J.S.   Bailments                                           §  1             (2005).
Traditional  bailment  transactions  consist  of  the  delivery  of
goods  that  are  returned  to  the  bailor  in  the  same  form  in  which
they  were  delivered.    Collins  v.  Click  Camera  &  Video,  Inc.,  621
N.E.2d  1294,  1296  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  1993);  see,  e.g.,  Henricksen  v.
McCarroll,                                                                     45                                                               Wis.  2d  368,   373,      173   N.W.2d  153   (1970)
(recognizing  the  parties'  relationship  as  one  of  bailment  when
the  bailor  delivered  his  horse  to  the  bailee  for  purposes  of
transporting   it   to   and   from   Indianapolis   for   a   parade).
However,    given    the    increasing    complexity    of    commercial
relationships,  bailment  law  has  expanded  to  include  many  new  and
varied  transactions,  including  the  "bailment  of  incomplete  goods
for  the  purpose  of  having  the  bailee  manufacture,  repair,  or
otherwise  improve  them."    Collins,  621  N.E.2d  at  1296;  8  C.J.S.
Bailments                                                                      §  4.     It  is  this  latter  transaction  to  which  Tatera
evidently  refers  when  characterizing  FMC's  relationship  with  B&M
as  one  of  bailment.
17




No.                                                                           2008AP170
We  reject  Tatera's  argument  and  conclude  that  B&M  is  properly
characterized  as  an  independent  contractor.
¶20   An  independent  contractor  is  a  person  or  entity  that
contracts   to   perform   services   for   another   but   "'is   not
controlled  by  the  other  nor  subject  to  the  other's  right  to
control  with  respect  to  his  physical  conduct  in  the  performance
We  note  that  Tatera  did  not  advance  her  bailment  argument
in  the  circuit  court  or  court  of  appeals  nor  did  she  raise  the
issue  in  her  response  to  FMC's  petition  for  review.     To  the
contrary,  up  until  she  filed  her  brief  to  this  court,  Tatera
appeared  to  concede  that  FMC  and  B&M's  relationship  was  one  of
principal  employer  and  independent  contractor.     In  FMC's  brief
in  support  of  its  motion  for  summary  judgment,  FMC  stated  that
"plaintiff  has  not  disputed  FMC's  assertion  that  Mr.  Tatera's
employer,  B&M  Machine,  was  the  independent  contractor  and  that
Stearns  was  its  principal."     In  her  brief  in  response,  Tatera
did  not  quarrel  with  that  statement.     Arguments  raised  for  the
first  time  on  appeal  are  generally  deemed  forfeited.    See  Marotz
v.  Hallman,                                                                  2007  WI                                           89,                                                         ¶16,        302  Wis.  2d  428,   734  N.W.2d  411.
Furthermore,  "unless  ordered  otherwise  by  the  supreme  court,"  a
petitioning  party  is  precluded  from  raising  or  arguing  an  issue
not  set  forth  in  the  petition.    Wis.  Stat.  (Rule)  §  809.62(6).
Moreover,  assuming  without  deciding  that  the  contract  to
machine  friction  disks  was  indeed  a  bailment  transaction,  Tatera
points   to   no   authority   for   her   apparent   belief   that   a
relationship   of   bailor   and   bailee   and   a   relationship   of
principal   employer   and   independent   contractor   are   mutually
                                                                              exclusive.     Contra  Rose  v.  Miller  &  Co.,   432  So.                                                    2d  1237,   1239
(Ala.                                                                         1983)                                              (recognizing  the  general  rule  that  the  owner  of  a
chattel  who  surrenders  entire  control  thereof  to  an  "independent
contractor  or  bailee"  is  not  liable  for  injuries  to  an  employee
of   that   independent   contractor).      The   fact   that   independent
contractor  cases  often  involve  a  contract  for  construction,  as
opposed  to  the  machining  of  goods,  does  not  mean  that  a  contract
for   construction   is   a   prerequisite   to   the   classification   of
independent  contractor.     Instead,  the  focus  of  the  inquiry  is
"factual  indicia  of  control  or  right  to  control."      Kerl  v.
Dennis  Rasmussen,  Inc.,                                                     2004  WI                                           86,                                                         ¶24,        273  Wis.  2d  106,   682
N.W.2d  328.
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               No.                        2008AP170
                                                                               of   the   undertaking.'"                             Kerl,                                                                        273   Wis.  2d  106,                                                         ¶24                        (quoting
                                                                                                                                     Restatement  (Second)  of  Agency,  §  2(3)  (1958));  see  also  Wis  JI—
—Civil                                                                         4060.                                                                                                                              Whether  the  parties  used  the  term  "independent
                                                                                                                                     contractor"  in  their  contract  is  not  dispositive;  rather,  "the
                                                                                                                                     test  looks  beyond  labels  to  factual  indicia  of  control  or  right
                                                                               to  control."     Kerl,                               273  Wis.  2d  106,                                                                                                                                       ¶24;  see  also  Snider,   81
Wis.  2d  at                                                                   232                                                                                                                                ("The   most   important   single   criterion   in
determining  whether  a  person  is  an  independent  contractor  is  the
degree   to   which   the   owner,   rather   than   the   independent
contractor,  retains  the  right  to  control  the  details  of  the
work.").     In  this  case,  B&M  is  properly  characterized  as  an
independent   contractor.                                                      B&M   contracted   to   machine   friction
disks  for  Stearns,  but  B&M  retained  control  with  respect  to
performing  the  machining.    The  machining  was  conducted  at  B&M's
shop,  and  according  to  Hotchkiss,  a  B&M  employee,  Stearns  did
not   instruct   the   B&M   employees   how   to   machine   the   friction
disks.     So  long  as  the  friction  disks  "turned  out  like  the
picture,"  B&M  was  free  to  machine  them  in  the  manner  it  chose.
See  Snider,                                                                                                                                                                                                      81  Wis.  2d  at                                                             232                        (concluding  that  the  plaintiff's
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  employer  was  "indisputably  an  independent  contractor"  because
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  the  principal  employer  made  no  attempt  to  control  the  details  of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  the  contracted  work  and  was  concerned  only  that  "the  completed
                                                                                                                                     work   conformed   with   the   contract   specifications").                                                                                                                                                                                    Kenneth
                                                                               Krommenacker,    a    Stearns'    employee    since                                                                                                                                                                                                                              1974,    similarly
testified  as  to  Stearns'  lack  of  control:
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No.                                                                            2008AP170
Q                                                                              [Attorney  Rakauski,  on  behalf  of  Tatera]:  Do
you  have  an  understanding  of  what  B&M  was  actually
doing  to  these  parts?
A  [Krommenacker]:  Other  than  machining  them,  no.
Accordingly,  contrary  to  Tatera's  argument  otherwise,  B&M  served
as  an  independent  contractor  to  FMC,  the  principal  employer.
¶21   Because  we  conclude  that  the  relationship  between  FMC
and  B&M  is  properly  characterized  as  one  of  principal  employer
and   independent   contractor,   Wagner's   general   rule   of   non-
liability  controls.     That  is,  unless  one  of  the  two  exceptions
applies,  FMC  is  not  liable  in  tort  for  injuries  sustained  by
Walter,   B&M's   employee,   while   he   was   machining   the   friction
disks.    We  address  each  of  the  exceptions  in  turn.
A.  Affirmative  Act  of  Negligence
¶22   A  principal  employer  may  be  liable  to  an  independent
contractor's   employee   for   injuries   caused   by   the   principal
employer's    affirmative    act    of    negligence.                          Wagner,                                              143
Wis.  2d  at  388.    This  exception  was  first  articulated  in  Barth,
in  which  this  court  concluded  that  "something  extra,"  meaning  an
affirmative  act  of  negligence  that  increased  the  risk  of  injury,
is  necessary  to  sustain  an  action  against  a  principal  employer
brought  by  an  independent  contractor's  employee.                          71  Wis.  2d  at
783;  see  also  Danks,  298  Wis.  2d  348,  ¶17.    The  relevant  inquiry
is  whether  the  alleged  negligent  act  "was  an  act  of  commission
constituting  an  affirmative  act  of  negligence  or  whether  it  was
an  act  of  omission  which  does  not  rise  to  the  level  of  an
affirmative  act."     Wagner,                                                 143  Wis.  2d  at                                    389.   Accordingly,
even  though  the  traditional  concept  of  negligence  would  impose
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No.                                                                           2008AP170
liability  for  a  negligent  omission,  in  addition  to  a  negligent
affirmative   act,   see   Wis   JI——Civil                                    1005,   Wisconsin   case   law
precedent  requires  more  than  an  omission  in  order  to  impose
liability  on  a  principal  employer  for  injuries  sustained  by  an
independent   contractor's   employee.                                        The   principal   employer's
alleged  negligent  act  must  be  affirmative.
¶23   For  example,  in  Wagner,  we  concluded  that  the  act  of
negligently    hiring    an    independent    contractor    to    perform
demolition   work   did   not   constitute   an   affirmative   act   of
negligence  but  rather  an  omission.                                        143  Wis.  2d  at                                              390.   The
defendants'   failure   to   check   the   independent   contractor's
credentials  could  not  be  viewed  as  active  misconduct;  instead,
it  was  "'passive  inaction  or  a  failure  to  take  steps  to  protect'
the  plaintiff  from  harm."     Id.                                          (quoting  W.  Page  Keeton  et  al.,
Prosser  and  Keeton  on  the  Law  of  Torts                                 §  56,  at                                                     373    (5th  ed.
1984));  see  also  Snider,  81  Wis.  2d  at  239  (concluding  that  the
plaintiffs'  argument  that  the  principal  employer's  failure  to
furnish   supervisory   control   over   its   independent   contractors
constituted   an   affirmative   act   of   negligence   "defie[d]   the
commonly  accepted  meaning  of  'affirmative'").
¶24   In  Estate  of  Thompson,  the  estate  of  an  independent
contractor's   employee   sought   to   hold   the   principal   employer
liable  for  the  employee's  death  on  account  of  the  principal
employer's   alleged   affirmative   acts   of   negligence.                  225
Wis.  2d  at                                                                  600-01.     In  that  case,  Thompson,  employed  by  Emblom
Brothers  Construction  Company  (Emblom),  was  fatally  electrocuted
while  removing  a  utility  pole  carrying  energized  lines.    Id.  at
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No.                                                                          2008AP170
591.    Emblom  had  a  contract  with  Jump  River  Electric  Cooperative
(Jump  River)  to  construct  an  overhead  electrical  distribution
line,  which  entailed  removing  old  utility  poles,  installing  new
ones,  and  transferring  the  electrical  lines.    Id.    Thompson  was
electrocuted   while   holding   a   support   wire   that   touched   an
energized  wire.     Id.     At  the  time,  Thompson  was  not  wearing
protective    rubber    gloves,    despite    Emblom's    instructions
otherwise.    Id.
¶25   Thompson's   estate   argued   that   it   was   permitted   to
bring   an   action   in   tort   against   Jump   River,   despite   the
principal  employer's  general  non-liability,  on  the  grounds  that
Jump  River  committed  affirmative  acts  of  negligence.     Id.  at
600.                                                                         In   particular,   the   estate   alleged   that   Jump   River
committed  various  safety  violations,  negligently  designed  the
new  electrical  distribution  line,  failed  to  incorporate  safety
precautions  into  the  design,  allowed  the  support  wire  to  hang
from  the  old  utility  pole  before  the  pole's  removal,  and  failed
to   remedy   and   take   precautions   against   the   danger   those
situations  presented.    Id.    The  estate  further  alleged  that  the
circuit   court   erroneously   granted   Jump   River's   motion   for
summary   judgment   because   a   genuine   issue   of   material   fact
existed  concerning  whether  Jump  River  knew  or  should  have  known
of  the  dangerous  safety  violations.    Id.
¶26   The   court   of   appeals   affirmed   the   circuit   court's
order  granting  summary  judgment  to  Jump  River,  concluding  that
Jump   River's   alleged   negligent   conduct   did   not   constitute
affirmative  acts  of  negligence  but  instead  "'passive  inaction  or
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No.                                                                              2008AP170
a  failure  to  protect  the  plaintiff  from  harm.'"     Id.  at               601
(quoting  Wagner,  143  Wis.  2d  at  390).    The  court  determined  that
Jump  River's  alleged  negligence  "lay  in  its  failure  to  discover
and  act  regarding  safety  violations,"  id.,  and  its  "fail[ure]  to
incorporate   safety   precautions   in   its   allegedly   dangerous
design,"  id.  at  602,  both  of  which  constituted  passive  inaction
for  which  Jump  River  could  not  be  held  liable.    Id.  at  601-02.
¶27   Similarly,  in  Danks,  the  court  of  appeals  held  as  a
matter  of  law  that  a  principal  employer  was  not  liable  for
injuries   sustained   by   the   independent   contractor's   employee
because   neither   the   principal   employer   nor   its   employee
committed  affirmative  acts  of  negligence.                                    298  Wis.  2d  348,  ¶2.
In  that  case,  Danks,  an  employee  of  C&R  Concrete                         (C&R),  was
injured  while  assisting  in  loading  a  truss  onto  a  truck  at  a
construction  site.      Id.,                                                    ¶4.      C&R  had  been  hired  by  Stock
Building  Supply,  Inc.                                                          (Stock)  to  load  trusses  by  crane  onto
Stock's  flatbed  truck.      Id.,                                               ¶1.      Stock's  employee,  Wagner,
drove  to  the  construction  site  in  the  truck  and  parked  it.    Id.,
¶¶11-12.    Wagner  then  stood  on  the  flatbed  and  used  hand  signals
to  direct  the  crane  operator,  C&R's  owner,  as  to  the  direction
the  truss  should  move  and  when  it  should  be  lowered.    Id.,  ¶12.
Danks  was  positioned  at  the  rear  of  the  flatbed,  using  a  two-by-
four  to  guide  the  truss  onto  the  truck.    Id.    When  the  truss  was
about  eight  feet  above  the  truck  bed,  it  fell,  and  Danks  was
discovered  laying  on  the  street  near  the  rear  of  the  truck.
Id.,                                                                             ¶13.                                          Danks   suffered   a   spinal   cord   injury   from   the
accident.    Id.,  ¶4.
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No.                                                                            2008AP170
¶28   The  circuit  court  dismissed  Danks'  tort  claims  against
Stock  and  Wagner,  and  Danks  appealed.     Id.,                            ¶1.     Danks  argued
that   Stock   was   not   protected   by   the   general   rule   of   non-
liability  because,  inter  alia,  Wagner  committed  an  affirmative
act  of  negligence:  he  was  in  a  position  to  see  that  the  truss
was  improperly  attached  to  the  crane  cable  but  failed  to  warn
Danks  or  C&R's  owner  that  the  truss  was  being  lifted  and  moved
in  an  improper  and  hazardous  manner.     Id.,                             ¶33.     The  court  of
appeals   rejected   Danks'   argument,   concluding   that   Wagner's
conduct  was  "at  most  'passive  misconduct,'"  "not  an  affirmative
act  of  negligence  that  increased  the  risk  of  harm  to  Danks  from
the  loading  operation."    Id.
¶29   Turning   to   the   facts   of   the   case   now   before   this
court,  we  conclude  that  FMC's  alleged  negligent  conduct  did  not
constitute  an  affirmative  act  of  negligence.    The  allegations  in
Tatera's   complaint   are   grounded   in   FMC's   alleged   omission,
namely,  the  failure  to  warn  Walter  and  B&M  of  the  health  hazards
associated   with   asbestos   and   asbestos-containing   products.
Specifically,  the  complaint  alleges  five  negligent  acts:  (1)  the
failure  to  adequately  warn  of  the  health  hazards  of  asbestos;
(2)  the  failure  to  warn  of  the  danger  and  harm  of  the  asbestos
after  the  products  or  equipment  were  installed  at  the  premises;
(3)  the  failure  to  investigate  or  test  for  the  health  effects  of
asbestos  prior  to  distribution  and  sale;                                  (4)  the  failure  to
instruct   in   the   use   of   precautionary   measures   relating   to
asbestos-containing  products;  and                                            (5)  the  manufacture,  supply,
installation,    or    removal    of    unsafe    asbestos-containing
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                                                                                                                                                                                                           No.          2008AP170
                                                                              products.17     The  first  four  alleged  negligent  acts  are  disposed
                                                                              of  with  dispatch.      By  definition,  the  failure  to  warn,  the
                                                                              failure  to  investigate  or  test,  and  the  failure  to  instruct  are
omissions,   not   affirmative   acts.        

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