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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                  This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 1, 2011
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
A. John Voelker                                                                                                                                       petition to review an adverse decision by the
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals                                                                                                                      Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                      and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                      Cir. Ct. No.   2010CV61
Appeal No.                                                                       2010AP2900
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                    IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
WISCONSIN DOLLS, LLC,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
V.
TOWN OF DELL PRAIRIE AND TOWN OF DELL PRAIRIE TOWN BOARD,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL  from an  order  of  the  circuit  court  for  Adams  County:
CHARLES A. POLLEX, Judge.   Affirmed.
Before Vergeront, Higginbotham and Blanchard, JJ.
¶1                                                                               VERGERONT, J.    This case arises out of the 2009-2010 license for
the retail sale of alcohol issued to Wisconsin Dolls, LLC, by the Town of Dell




No. 2010AP2900
Prairie   Town   Board.1                                                                  This  license   identified   the   premises   as                        “Main
Bar/Entertainment  Building.”    However,  previous  alcohol  licenses  issued  to
Wisconsin Dolls by the Town listed the premises as including all eight acres of
Wisconsin Dolls’ property.   Wisconsin Dolls filed this certiorari action, seeking
reversal of the Town’s decision and a remand with directions to the Town to issue
a license covering all eight acres of Wisconsin Dolls’ property or to hold a hearing
as set forth by WIS. STAT. § 125.12(3) (2009-10)2 (identifying the procedure for
nonrenewal of an alcohol license).   The circuit court affirmed the Town’s decision,
dismissing the complaint, and Wisconsin Dolls appeals.
¶2                                                                                        The primary issue on appeal is whether the issuance of a license for
all eight acres of Wisconsin Dolls’ property violated any provision in WIS. STAT.
ch. 125, which governs alcohol beverages.   We conclude it did and that the license
covering all eight acres is therefore void.   We further conclude that, because the
2008-2009 license was void, Wisconsin Dolls was not entitled to the statutory
protections for license renewal under § 125.12(3) nor to procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   Accordingly,
we affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint.
BACKGROUND
¶3                                                                                        The  relevant  facts  are  undisputed.    Wisconsin  Dolls  owns  and
operates an adult-oriented resort facility in Wisconsin Dells.   In December 2004,
1  The Town of Dell Prairie and the Town of Dell Prairie Town Board are defendants.
For ease of reference, we refer to them collectively as “the Town.”
2  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No. 2010AP2900
Wisconsin Dolls applied for a combination Class “B” license for fermented malt
beverages and “Class B” license for intoxicating liquor.   On the application for the
license, next to “Premises description,” Wisconsin Dolls filled in “all 8 acres of
resort.”   The application was approved and the Town issued a license to Wisconsin
Dolls that identified the premises as “Wisconsin Dolls Resort, 4179 State Highway
13, All 8 acres of the resort.”   The license was to expire on June 30, 2005.
¶4                                                                                                In May 2005 and in each of the three years following, Wisconsin
Dolls filed an application to renew its license for another year, and each year the
Town granted the renewal.   Each of these applications included “all 8 acres of the
resort” in the  “Premises description.”3    The licenses issued for  2005-2006 and
2006-2007  identified  the  premises  as                                                          “Wisconsin  Dolls  Resort,                                           4179  State
Highway 13, Wisc. Dells, WI, All 8 acres of the resort”; there is no license for
2007-2008 in the record.    The  2008-2009 license, the license issued the  year
before  this  dispute  arose,  identified  the  premises  only  by  Wisconsin  Dolls’
address.
¶5                                                                                                In May  2009, Wisconsin Dolls again filed a renewal application,
which described the premises as “All buildings & property comprising approx. 8
acres.”   At this time, a new Town clerk began to review all alcohol licenses and
applications.   Upon review of Wisconsin Dolls’ application, the clerk concluded
that it contained an inadequate description of the premises.
3  The renewal applications filed in 2005, 2006, and 2007 each listed specific areas in
addition to “all 8 acres of resort”:                                                              “Bar, cooler, lg room in office, all 8 acres of resort.”  The 2008
renewal application listed the premises as “All buildings and property comprising approximately
8 acres.”
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No. 2010AP2900
¶6                                                                                       The  Town  Board  convened  to  discuss  various  alcohol  license
applications, including Wisconsin Dolls’.   The Town Board Chairman explained
that he believed the description of the premises as  “8 acres of the resort” on
Wisconsin Dolls’ application was too vague and needed to be amended.   He noted
that the application required the applicant to identify “where you keep the alcohol,
where  you  serve  the  alcohol  and  where  you  keep  your  records…”  and  that
Wisconsin Dolls had failed to include this information.   The Board postponed the
vote on Wisconsin Dolls’ license to allow the application to be amended.
¶7                                                                                       Subsequently  the  Town  Board  voted  to  issue  the  license  if  the
application was amended to restrict the premises to the main bar building and
storage  area.    It  appears  undisputed  that  Wisconsin  Dolls  never  amended  its
application.   Nevertheless, the clerk issued a license to Wisconsin Dolls on June
30, 2009.   The license described the premises as “Wisconsin Dolls, LLC, 4179
State Road 13, Wisconsin Dells, WI 53965 (Main Bar/Entertainment Building).”
¶8                                                                                       Wisconsin  Dolls  sought  circuit  court  review  by certiorari  of  the
Town’s decision, asserting that the Town’s action constituted a nonrenewal of
Wisconsin Dolls’ license.    Therefore, Wisconsin Dolls argued, the Town was
required to follow the notice and hearing procedures in WIS. STAT. § 125.12(3)
and could deny renewal only for statutorily prescribed reasons.   The circuit court
concluded  that  the  Town’s  action  was  not  a  nonrenewal  and  dismissed  the
complaint.
DISCUSSION
¶9                                                                                       Wisconsin  Dolls  contends  that  the  Town’s  act  of  limiting  the
premises  description  in  its                                                           2009-2010  license  to                                                     “Main  Bar/Entertainment
Building” is the equivalent of a nonrenewal of its 2008-2009 license, or at least a
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No. 2010AP2900
partial nonrenewal.   According to Wisconsin Dolls, this triggers the procedural
requirements  of  WIS.  STAT.                                                                             § 125.12(3)  and  the  procedural  due  process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶10    The Town responds that it has the authority to modify an alcohol
license and  it exercised that power in this case.    The Town also argues that
Wisconsin Dolls has no property interest in an alcohol license.
¶11    We frame the issues differently than do the parties.   We identify the
primary issue as whether the issuance of a license for 2008-2009 for all eight acres
of Wisconsin Dolls’ property violated any provisions in WIS. STAT. ch. 125.4   We
conclude that it did and that the license covering all eight acres was therefore void.
Based on this conclusion, for the reasons we explain, Wisconsin Dolls did not
have a right to the statutory procedures relating to license renewal in § 125.12(3)
before the Town limited the premises description to  “Main Bar/Entertainment
Building.”    For  similar  reasons,  Wisconsin  Dolls  did  not  have  the  right  to
procedural protections under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
before the Town limited the premises description.
4  Wisconsin Dolls’ position is that the use of its address alone to identify the premises in
the 2008-2009 license means that the licensed premises were all eight acres of the resort, as was
explicitly stated on the licenses issued prior to the 2008-2009 license.  The Town does not appear
to dispute this.  Rather, its argument focuses on its authority to modify the licensed premises.  We
therefore assume without deciding, for purposes of this opinion only, that use of Wisconsin Dolls’
address alone as a premises description on the 2008-2009 license means all eight acres of the
resort.   The real estate of the resort consists of eight acres.   We therefore use “all eight acres of
the resort” and “all eight acres of Wisconsin Dolls’ property” interchangeably.
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No. 2010AP2900
I.                                                                                           Standard of Review
¶12    Both  parties  agree  that  we  review  the  Town’s  decision  to  issue
Wisconsin  Dolls  a                                                                          2009-2010  license  only  for  its   “Main  Bar/Entertainment
Building” by certiorari.5   On certiorari review, our inquiry, like that of the circuit
court, is limited to the following questions: “(1) whether the [Town] stayed within
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was
arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, representing its will instead of its judgment;
and  (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably have made the
determination under review.”    State ex rel. Smith v. City of Oak Creek,  131
Wis. 2d 451, 455, 389 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted).
¶13    Only the second question is implicated on this appeal: whether the
Town acted according to law—both statutory and constitutional law—in issuing
Wisconsin Dolls a license for 2009-2010 only for the main bar and entertainment
building.   Because this presents a question of law, our review is de novo.   See
Town of Avon v. Oliver, 2002 WI App 97, ¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 647, 644 N.W.2d 260
(interpretation and application of a statute presents a question of law); Tateoka v.
City of Waukesha Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 220 Wis. 2d 656, 668-69, 583 N.W.2d
871  (Ct.  App.  1998)  (whether  there  is  a  violation  of  due  process  presents  a
question of law, which we review de novo).
5  Because both parties agree that certiorari review of the Town’s decision properly
defines our scope of review, we accept that premise and do not discuss the judicial review
provision in WIS. STAT. § 125.12(2)(d).
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No. 2010AP2900
II.                                                                                           Validity of 2008-2009 License for All Eight Acres
¶14    WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 125 governs the issuance of alcohol licenses
by municipalities.   No license “may be issued to any person except as provided in
this chapter,” and  “[a]ny license … issued in violation of this chapter is void.”
§ 125.04(2).   Thus, the starting point of our analysis is to determine whether the
2008-2009 license for all eight acres of the resort was issued  “as provided in
[chapter 125].”
¶15    The  license  issued  to  Wisconsin  Dolls  in                                         2008-2009  and  each
preceding  year  was  a  combination  Class                                                   “B”  and  “Class  B”  license,  which
authorizes the retail sale of fermented malt beverages and intoxicating liquor.
WIS.  STAT.  §§ 125.26,  125.51.    Both Class  “B” and  “Class B” licenses must
“particularly describe the premises for which issued.”                                        § 125.26(3)  (Class  “B”
licenses); § 125.51(3)(d) (“Class B” licenses).   The parties dispute the meaning of
“particularly describe the premises.”   Wisconsin Dolls contends that the phrase
“all 8 acres of the resort” does particularly describe the premises for which the
license  is  issued.    The  Town,  in  contrast,  contends  that  this  phrase  is  not  a
particular description of the premises for which the license is issued.
¶16    When we interpret a  statute, we  begin with the language of  the
statute  and  give  it  its  common,  ordinary,  and  accepted  meaning,  except  that
technical or specially defined words are given their technical or special definitions.
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County,  2004 WI  58,  ¶45,  271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   We interpret statutory language in the context in
which it is used, not in isolation but as part of a whole, in relation to the language
of surrounding or closely related statutes, and we interpret it reasonably to avoid
absurd or unreasonable results.   Id., ¶46.   We also consider the scope, context, and
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No. 2010AP2900
purpose of the statute insofar as they are ascertainable from the text and structure
of the statute itself.   Id., ¶48.   If, employing these principles, we conclude the
statutory language has a plain meaning, then we apply the statute according to that
plain meaning.  Id., ¶46.
¶17    We begin by discussing the meaning of the word “premises” as used
in WIS. STAT. §§ 125.26(3) and 125.51(3)(d).   WISCONSIN STAT. § 125.02(14m)
defines “premises” as “the area described in a license or permit.”   This definition
does  not  tell  us  how                                                                “the  area  described  in  a  license”  is  to  be  determined.
However,                                                                                § 125.04(3),  which  governs  applications  for  licenses,  provides
additional aid in understanding the meaning of “premises.”   This section provides
that the Department of Revenue (DOR) shall prepare an application form for each
type  of  license  issued  under  ch. 125  and  that each form shall require  certain
information, including  “[t]he premises where alcohol beverages will be sold or
stored   or   both.”                                                                    § 125.04(3)(a)3.                                                         The   only   reasonable   reading   of
§ 125.04(3)(a)3.,  when  read  together  with                                                                                                                    §§ 125.02(14m),                          125.26(3),  and
125.51(3)                                                                               (d), is that “premises” means the area where alcohol beverages will be
sold or stored or both.
¶18    Turning to the word “describe” in the phrase “particularly describe
the premises,” we see that this word is not defined in WIS. STAT. ch. 125.   We may
therefore consult a standard dictionary to establish the common meaning.   See
Swatek v. County of Dane,  192 Wis. 2d  47,  61,  531 N.W.2d  45  (1995).    To
“describe” means to  “present distinctly by means of properties and qualities.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 610 (1993).   “Distinct,” in
turn, means “characterized by qualities individualizing or distinguishing as apart
from, unlike, or not identical with another or others.”   Id. at 659.
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No. 2010AP2900
¶19    The word “particularly” is also not defined in WIS. STAT. ch. 125.   A
standard dictionary definition of  “particular” is  “concerned with or attentive to
details.”   Id. at 1647.
¶20    When  the  meanings  of  these  words  are  considered  together,
“particularly describe the premises” means that the license must contain sufficient
detail to identify the specific areas where the alcohol beverages will be sold or
stored or both.   We conclude that merely identifying the total amount of acreage of
the licensee’s property does not fulfill this definition.    It does not identify the
specific area or areas in the total acreage where the licensed activity will occur.
¶21    The statutory provision requiring posting of the license supports our
interpretation.    WISCONSIN  STAT.  § 125.04(1)(a) and  (b) require that a license
issued  for  the  sale  of  alcohol  must  be                                             “conspicuously  displayed  for  public
inspection  at  all  times  in  the  room  or  place  where  the  activity  subject  to
the … licensure is carried on” (emphasis added).   This provision indicates that the
activity subject to licensure occurs in a specific place.   This provision cannot be
reconciled with Wisconsin Dolls’ view that a license may give it the authority to
carry on licensed activity anywhere on the eight acres of its property.
¶22    Our interpretation is also supported by our reasoning in Alberti v.
City of Whitewater, 109 Wis. 2d 592, 327 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1982).   The issue
presented there was whether a licensee, during the license year, could unilaterally
expand  the  size  of  the  licensed  premises  as  long  as  the  expanded  area  was
connected to the premises on which the license permitted the sale of alcohol.   Id.
at 597-98.   In resolving this issue against the licensee, we construed WIS. STAT.
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No. 2010AP2900
§ 125.04(3)(h), which requires licensees to notify the issuing authority of a change
in any fact set out in the application for a license within ten days of the change.6
We viewed this provision in the context of the entire statutory scheme, which
gives the municipality the power to control the grant, transfer, revocation, and
renewal of licenses, and provides for notification to the public at certain points in
the process.   Id. at 599-600.   We concluded that, in light of the statutory scheme
and the broad power of the government to regulate the liquor traffic industry, the
purpose of WIS. STAT.  § 125.04(3)(h) was to  “facilitate monitoring of ongoing
liquor  sales  by  the  government  and  the  public.”    Id.  at                         599.    It  would  be
inconsistent with that purpose and unreasonable, we held, to confer unilateral
power on the licensee to expand the size of the licensed premises during the
license year.   Id. at 601.
¶23    Similarly, interpreting WIS. STAT. §§ 125.26(3) and 125.51(3)(d) to
authorize the issuance of a license for the entire acreage of a licensee’s property
would allow the licensee to unilaterally expand the areas within that acreage where
the licensed activity takes place, without any oversight by the issuing authority.
This is not consistent with the legislative intent to give municipalities the power to
control the grant and renewal of licenses to sell alcohol.
¶24    Finally, our interpretation of the phrase  “particularly describe the
premises” is consistent with DOR’s interpretation of  this phrase.    As already
noted, DOR has been charged with creating the application forms for alcohol
licenses.   WIS. STAT. § 125.04(3)(a); see also § 125.04(3)(b) (relating to renewal
6                                                                                         WISCONSIN STAT. § 125.04(3)(h) was numbered §176.14 (1979-80) at the time we
decided Alberti v. City of Whitewater, 109 Wis. 2d 592, 327 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1982).
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No. 2010AP2900
forms).    Both  the  original application form and the  renewal application form
prepared by DOR provide the following instructions with respect to the “Premises
description”:
Premises description:   Describe building or buildings where
alcohol beverages are to be sold and stored.   The applicant
must include all rooms including living quarters, if used,
for the sales, service, and/or storage of alcohol beverages
and records.                                                                                          (Alcohol beverages may be sold and stored
only on the premises described.)
DOR  AT-106  (R.9-03);  DOR  AT-115(R.3-09).    Thus,  these  forms  expressly
require identification of the specific places in which alcohol is sold, served, and
stored or records kept.7
¶25    In summary,  the license the Town issued to Wisconsin Dolls in
2008-2009 did not “particularly describe the premises” as required by WIS. STAT.
§§ 125.26(3) and 125.51(3)(d).   Thus, that license was issued in violation of these
sections.
¶26    Because a license issued in violation of WIS. STAT. ch 125 is void,
see  § 125.04(2), the question arises whether Wisconsin Dolls had a license to
7  Neither party addresses whether these forms or the  “Premises description” item in
particular is an administrative rule.   See WIS. STAT.  § 227.01(13) (defining “rule”); cf. Racine
Educ. Ass’n v. ERC, 2000 WI App 149, ¶¶34-35, 238 Wis. 2d 33, 616 N.W.2d 504 (concluding
that two forms promulgated by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) were
“a product of WERC’s rule-making authority”).    Nor does either party address whether, in
interpreting §§ 125.26(3) and 125.51(3)(d), we must accord deference to the meaning DOR gives
to                                                                                                    “Premises description” in the forms.    See Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Division of
Hearings  &  Appeals,                                                                                 2006  WI  86,                                                                             ¶16,   292  Wis. 2d   549,   717  N.W.2d  184   (although
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo, in certain situations we
give deference to agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering).   We
therefore do not address these issues but simply consider the “Premises description” item in the
DOR forms as support for our interpretation of the disputed statutory phrase,  “particularly
describe the premises.”  See §§ 125.26(3), 125.51(3)(d).
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No. 2010AP2900
renew in 2009.   In Williams v. City of Lake Geneva, 2002 WI App 95, ¶8, 253
Wis. 2d 618, 643 N.W.2d 864, we held that a violation of the requirement that a
notice of application be published, see § 125.04(3)(g), rendered the license issued
upon that application void under § 125.04(2).                                               “Void,” we concluded, meant “an
absolute  nullity[,] … of  no  legal  effect.”    Id.,                                      ¶9.    We  further  held  that  the
procedural protections for renewal in § 125.12(3) do not apply to a license that is
void, and the only way the holder of a void license may obtain a valid license is to
file an application for an original license.   Id., ¶¶12-14.
¶27    We conclude that Williams forecloses Wisconsin Dolls’ argument
that it is entitled to the procedures in WIS. STAT. § 125.12(3) before the Town can
decide not to renew its license for all eight acres of the resort.   Wisconsin Dolls
did  not  have  a  valid  license  for  all  eight  acres.    Therefore,  the  procedural
protections for renewal in § 125.12(3) do not apply.   See id., ¶¶13-14.
¶28    We recognize that Williams suggests there may be a question in this
case concerning the Town’s authority to issue Wisconsin Dolls a license for 2009-
2010  with a particular description of the premises as required by WIS.  STAT.
§§ 125.26(3)  and                                                                           125.51(3)                             (d),  without  requiring  Wisconsin  Dolls  to  file  an
original application.   However, we do not address this question.   In particular, we
do not address the Town’s argument that it has the authority to issue a modified
license  with  a  more  limited  premises  description.     Wisconsin  Dolls  is  not
challenging the Town’s issuance of a license with a more limited and specific
description of the premises, if, as we have already decided, it did not have a
license to conduct the licensed activity on all eight acres.   Nor does Wisconsin
Dolls   challenge   the   definition   of   premises   the   Town   chose,                  “Main
Bar/Entertainment Building,” on any ground other than the one we have already
rejected.
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No. 2010AP2900
III.                                                                                     Procedural Due Process
¶29    Wisconsin Dolls also asserts that it has a property interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the renewal of its 2008-2009 license covering all eight
acres of  the  resort.    Therefore,  it contends,  it was entitled to procedural due
process  before  the  Town  could  change  the  premises  description  to                “Main
Bar/Entertainment Building.”
¶30    Section  1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that  “[n]o State
shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law….”   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   The existence and scope of a property
interest for purposes of this constitutional provision is determined by state law.
See  Board  of  Regents  v.  Roth,  408  U.S.  564,  577  (1972);  Kraus  v.  City  of
Waukesha Police & Fire Comm’n,  2003 WI  51,  ¶55,  261  Wis. 2d  485,  662
N.W.2d 294.   Rather than analyze whether an alleged property interest is a “right”
or “privilege,” as the parties do, the proper inquiry is whether state law creates a
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to the alleged property interest.   See Roth, 408
U.S. at 577.
¶31    In this case we need not decide whether the holder of a valid license
under WIS. STAT. ch. 125 has a property interest in the renewal of the license such
that the holder is entitled to procedural protections under the due process clause
before the municipality can decide not to renew the license.   For the reasons we
have already discussed, Wisconsin Dolls did not have a valid 2008-2009 license
under ch. 125 for all eight acres of the resort.   That license is void because it was
issued in violation of §§ 125.26(3) and 125.51(3)(d).   See § 125.04(2); see also
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d  618, ¶¶8-9.   Wisconsin Dolls therefore does not have a
legitimate claim of entitlement under ch. 125 to the renewal of a license for all
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No. 2010AP2900
eight acres of the resort.   See Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 618, ¶¶12-14.   Accordingly, it
is not entitled to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment before
the Town may issue a license with a more limited description of the premises.
CONCLUSION
¶32    We  affirm  the  circuit  court’s  order  dismissing  Wisconsin  Dolls’
complaint.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
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