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COURT OF APPEALS
NOTICE
DECISION
DATED AND FILED                                                                               This opinion is subject to further editing.   If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 26, 2003
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
                                                                                              Cornelia G. Clark                                                      petition to review an adverse decision by the
                                                                                              Clerk of Court of Appeals                                              Court of Appeals.   See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
                                                                                                                                                                     and RULE 809.62.
                                                                                                                                                                     Cir. Ct. No.   02-SC-62
Appeal No.                                                                                    02-3347
STATE OF WISCONSIN                                                                                                                                                   IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                                                                                     DISTRICT IV
WOOD COUNTY,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
GREGORY L. SWANK,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County:
JAMES M. MASON, Judge.  Affirmed.
¶1                                                                                            DYKMAN,  J.1    Gregory  L.  Swank  appeals  from  a  forfeiture  of
$500.00 plus costs.   He makes the following arguments:                                       (1) Wood County had no
legislative authority to adopt Wood County Private Sewage System Ordinance
1  This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(b) (2001-02).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.




No.   02-3347
(PSSO) 702.04(4)A.3.d.;                                                              (2) the  fee  constituted  an  unlawful  tax  or  special
assessment; (3) PSSO 702 violates equal protection principles; (4) Wood County’s
amendment  of  PSSO 702  violated  procedural  due  process;  (5) Wood  County
unlawfully delegated or bargained away its police power; (6) the fee takes private
property contrary to article X, section  2 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (7) PSSO 702
interferes with his right to contract; and  (8) he has already paid the fee PSSO
imposes.   We conclude Swank’s arguments have no merit and affirm.
FACTS
¶2                                                                                   The parties stipulated to the basic facts of this case.   Swank has a
holding tank for sewage on his property.   Wood County zoning requires him to
have a sanitary permit for this tank.    Accordingly, he signed a Holding Tank
Agreement that provided, among other things, that Swank would:
pay  charges  and  costs  incurred  by  the  municipality  or
county  for  inspection,  pumping,  hauling  or  otherwise
servicing and maintaining the holding tank in such manner
as to prevent or abate any nuisance or health hazard caused
by the holding tank .…   In the event the owner does not pay
the  costs  within  thirty  (30)  days,  the  owner  specifically
agrees that all the costs and charges may be placed on the
tax  roll  as  a  special  assessment  for  the  abatement  of  a
nuisance, and the tax shall be collected as provided by law.
The agreement provided further that:
The owner agrees to contract with a person licensed ... who
shall submit to the municipality and to the county a report
in accord with ILHR 83.18(4)(a)2., Wis. Admin. Code for
the servicing on a semi-annual basis.
¶3                                                                                   On  February  22,  2000,  the  Wood  County  Planning  and  Zoning
Committee (Committee) entered into a contract requiring Wood County to employ
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No.   02-3347
Carmody, Inc., which sells electric alarm systems.   The contract had a liquidated
damages clause that required Wood County to pay between 80% and 100% of all
the fees that would have been payable to Carmody during the original seven-year
term of the contract if Wood County breached the contract.   The contract required
Carmody to design, install, and maintain an alarm system that would report the
conditions of holding tanks.   Essentially, the alarm system would notify a septic
carrier  when  a  tank  was full.    The  carrier  would  notify the  database  once  it
emptied  the  tank.     This  would  relieve  Wood  County  from  recording  and
monitoring  the  levels  of  holding  tanks.    Wood  County  was  responsible  for
collecting from the holding tank owners the $36 fee Carmody charges for each
holding tank.
¶4                                                                                               The  Committee  held  a  public  hearing to receive  testimony on  a
proposal  to  establish  a  fee  and  collection  procedure  for  costs  related  to  the
Carmody reporting system.    Subsequently, the Committee amended PSSO 702
“for the purpose of promoting and protecting the public health, safety, general
welfare  and  natural resources of  Wood County  ….”    The  amendment,  PSSO
702.04(4)A.3.d,2 required tank owners to pay “an annual reporting service fee,”
which the Committee set at $36.
¶5                                                                                               Wood County prosecuted Swank in small claims court because he
did not pay his $36 fee.   The county sought a civil forfeiture of $500 pursuant to
2  PSSO 702.04(4)A.3.d provides:                                                                 “All owners of holding tank systems shall pay an
annual reporting service fee as set by Wood County and this ordinance.   All such payments are
due and owing for each holding tank system by August 31 of each year.”
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No.   02-3347
PSSO  702.09(2).3    The  circuit  court  ordered  a  forfeiture  of  $500  plus  costs.
Swank appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6                                                                                                      This appeal requires us to interpret and apply statutes and municipal
ordinances to undisputed facts.   The application of the law to a particular set of
facts is a question of law.   Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. DIHLR, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280
N.W.2d 142 (1979).   We review questions of law de novo.   First Nat’l Leasing
Corp. v. Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 208, 260 N.W.2d 251 (1977).
DISCUSSION
1.   Wood County May Adopt PSSO 702.04(4)A.3.d.
¶4                                                                                                      Swank asserts that no statute empowers the county to impose the $36
fee.   Wood County claims it imposed the fee pursuant to its general police power
to promote public health and safety.4   We conclude that WIS. STAT. § 145.20(4)5
authorizes a governmental unit to assess tank owners  “for costs relating to the
pumping of a septic or holding tank.”   Swank interprets this statute to mean that
3  PSSO 702.09(2) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who fails to comply ... shall,
upon  conviction thereof, forfeit  not less than                                                        $25.00  nor more  than  $200.00  and costs of
prosecution for each violation.  Each day a violation exists or continues shall constitute a separate
offense.”
4  We note that Swank’s reply brief does not contest Wood County’s assertion that its
police power authorized it to adopt PSSO 702.
5  WISCONSIN STAT. § 145.20(4) provides:                                                                “SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR HOLDING AND
SEPTIC TANK PUMPING.   A governmental unit may assess the owner of a private sewage system
for costs related to the pumping of a septic or holding tank.   The governmental unit shall make
any assessment in the same manner that a city, village or town makes an assessment under
s. 66.0703.”
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No.   02-3347
Wood County may only assess a fee if it actually pumps the tank.   We disagree.
Nothing in the statute limits fee assessment to situations where the government
pumps the tank.   The phrase  “costs related to the pumping” has much broader
implications.    Recordkeeping is a cost related to pumping.    Section  145.20(4)
allows Wood County to assess that cost against tank owners.   Wood County had
authority to adopt PSSO 702.04(4)A.3.d.
2.                                                                                                $36 Is A Fee, Not A Special Assessment or Tax
¶7                                                                                                Swank  contends  the  $36  fee  constitutes  an  impermissible  tax  or
special assessment because the tank owners do not receive a unique benefit from
the new recordkeeping system.   He claims that WIS. STAT. § 145.20(4) “strongly
suggests that any special assessment” imposed must conform with “the rigors of”
WIS. STAT.  § 66.60.6    We disagree.    WISCONSIN  STAT.  § 145.20(4) authorizes
Wood County to assess charges for costs related to holding tanks and specifies that
the  government  may  collect  those  charges  as  it  would  under  WIS.  STAT.
§ 66.0703.   Section  66.0703 provides for the collection of special assessments.
However, the legislature has not required the county to conform with § 66.0703 in
order to collect fees under § 145.20(4).   We addressed a similar situation in State
ex  rel.  Robinson  v.  Town  of  Bristol,                                                        2003  WI  App  97,  264  Wis.  2d  318,
667 N.W.2d 14.   In that case, we discussed the interplay of WIS. STAT. § 88.90
and § 66.0703.   Id., ¶13.   Section 88.90 allowed the government to collect a fee
6  WISCONSIN STAT. § 66.0703(1) governs special assessments generally and provides in
pertinent part that a governmental unit may  “collect special assessments upon property in a
limited and determinable area for special benefits conferred upon the property by any municipal
work or improvement  ....”    The statute also provides a procedure for imposing the special
assessments and addresses assessment made pursuant to police power.  See § 66.0703(2)-(14).
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No.   02-3347
“as other special assessments are collected.”   We concluded that this reference to
special assessments did not render the charges under § 88.90 special assessments:
The intent of the legislature is plainly conveyed by
the language of these statutes.   If a municipality charges
and assesses costs that are authorized under WIS. STAT.
§ 88.90, it may collect them in the same manner it collects
special   assessments   under                                                              [WIS.   STAT.                                                        § 66.0703].
However, the municipality charges and assesses those costs
under the authority granted in § 88.90, not [66.0703].   It
therefore need not comply with the requirements for special
assessments contained in those subsections.
Id., ¶14.   Under Town of Bristol, the statute does not require Wood County to
comply with the requirements of § 66.0703.   Section 145.20(4) authorizes Wood
County to assess the $36 fee against Swank to recover the “costs related to the
pumping of a septic or holding tank.”   We conclude the charge is not a special
assessment.
¶8                                                                                         Swank also asserts that the  $36 charge is a tax because it raises
revenue that benefits the general public.   He claims Wood County employees no
longer need to monitor tank levels, which allows the workforce to do other things.
Likewise, protecting the groundwater from sewage contamination also protects the
general public.
¶9                                                                                         To ascertain whether a charge is a fee or a tax, we focus on the
substance  and  not  the  form  of  the  imposition.    River  Falls  v.  St.  Bridget’s
Catholic Church, 182 Wis. 2d 436, 442, 513 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1994).                     “[I]f
the primary purpose of a charge is to cover the expense of providing services,
supervision or regulation, the charge is a fee and not a tax.”   Id.   Wood County
charged Swank  $36, which was the cost of maintaining the reporting system.
Common sense tells us that this charge recovers costs rather than raises revenue; a
direct correlation exists between the cost of Carmody’s services and the amount of
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No.   02-3347
the  fee.    The  fee  does not serve  the  general benefit of  the  public  as Swank
contends; rather, it holds tank owners responsible for the costs of recordkeeping
related to monitoring tanks.
¶10    Finally,  Swank  urges  us  to  follow  River  Falls  v.  St.  Bridget’s
Catholic   Church,   where   we   distinguished   governmental   functions   from
proprietary functions  and  reasoned that a  municipality acting in  a  proprietary
capacity imposed a fee, not a tax.   Id. at 442-43.   Swank argues that monitoring
the tank levels is a government function because it promotes public welfare; thus,
the charge is a tax.   However, Swank focuses only on our distinction between
government and proprietor functions in River Falls.   The probative test remains
whether the charge raises revenue or recoups costs for “services, supervision or
regulation.”    Id. at  442.    We conclude that the  $36 charge recovers costs and
constitutes a fee.
3.   Ordinance Does Not Violate Equal Protection
¶11    Swank contends that selectively requiring holding tank owners to
finance an improvement to Wood County’s recordkeeping system violates equal
protection provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution
and article I, section  1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.    The parties agree that
PSSO 702 classifies people as either residents that own tanks or residents who do
not.    Swank  contends  that  tank  holders  receive  disparate  treatment  because
residents who do not own tanks pay nothing, yet benefit equally from the reduced
workload of county employees.
¶12    To comport with equal protection requirements, a “reasonable and
practical ground for the classification” must exist.   State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d
454, 470, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983).   “If a statutory classification does not involve a
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No.   02-3347
suspect class or a fundamental interest, it will be sustained if there is any rational
basis to support it.”   Id. at 468.
¶13    Wood  County  asserts  that  it  is  reasonable  to  require  only  tank
owners to pay the costs of keeping records related to tank reporting.   It argues that
PSSO 702 treats all tank owners the same.   We agree.   PSSO 702 appropriately
charges only tank owners $36 for the cost of Carmody’s services.   The very nature
of any fee is to charge persons who benefit from a service.   If a tank monitoring
fee violates equal protection, all fees would do so.   We find no merit in Swank’s
argument that the  purpose of  PSSO 702 is to benefit Wood  County residents
generally by alleviating the workload of county employees.
4.   Ordinance Does Not Violate Due Process
¶14    Swank contends that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to be
heard because Wood County contractually bound itself to pass PSSO 702 before it
held a hearing on the issue.   He concedes that he did not actually participate in the
hearing; nevertheless, he claims that he would have been deprived of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard because Wood County faced liquidated damages if it did
not amend PSSO 702.
¶15    We need not address Swank’s challenge to procedural due process
because he did not avail himself of the opportunity to be heard.   We refuse to
decide issues based on hypothetical facts.   Pension Mgmt, Inc. v. DuRose,  58
Wis. 2d 122, 128, 205 N.W.2d 553 (1973).
5.   Wood County May Contract With Private Businesses
¶16    Swank also generally contests Wood County’s decision to contract
with a private business for recordkeeping services.   He claims that Wood County
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No.   02-3347
has unlawfully bargained away its police power.   We are not persuaded.   Swank
has not shown that Wood County used its police power to serve a private purpose.
PSSO 702 clearly states that its purpose is   to “promote and protect public health,
safety, general welfare and natural resources.”   Whether Wood County or a private
business executes that purpose is immaterial.
¶17    Swank  also  contends  that  WIS.  STAT.                                        § 145.20  assigned  the
responsibility of regulating sewage systems to Wood County.   He argues that a
county employee must monitor when the holding tanks are pumped.   We disagree.
Section 145.20(1) allows the government to assign administration duties to “any
office, department, committee, board, commission, position or employee of that
governmental unit.”   The Wood County Board of Supervisors assigned the duty of
administering private sewage to the Wood County Department of Planning &
Zoning, which hired Carmody.   Nothing in § 145.20 prohibits the department from
relying on a private entity to collect the data on holding tanks.   The department
still has the responsibility of supervising the recordkeeping.   Wood County has not
unlawfully exercised, or delegated, its police power.
6.   Ordinance Not Unlawful Taking of Property
¶18    Swank  claims  that  the  fee  takes  private  property  contrary  to
article X, section  2 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution because it serves a private, non-
public purpose.   He does not develop the argument beyond this broad allegation.
Wood County notes that “Swank does not argue that the County has unlawfully
taken private property for a public use; he argues that the County has taken private
property for a private use.”   It argues that neither the United States Constitution
nor the Wisconsin Constitution safeguard against taking private funds for private
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No.   02-3347
purposes.   In Swank’s reply brief, he does not dispute Wood County or further
develop his argument that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional taking.   We will
not consider constitutional claims merely raised but not argued.   Dumas v. State,
90 Wis. 2d 518, 523, 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).   And issues to which no
response is made are deemed confessed.   State ex rel. Blank v. Gramling, 219
Wis. 196, 199, 262 N.W. 614 (1935).
7.   Ordinance Does Not Unconstitutionally Interfere With Swank’s Right To
Contract
¶19    Swank  claims  that  a  de  facto  contract  exists  between  him  and
Carmody.   He alleges that Wood County is merely a middleman in this contractual
relationship.   He contends the contract is invalid because he did not consent to the
contract terms.    Wood County asserts that Swank offers no evidence or legal
authority to support its claim.   It argues that Swank pays the fee to the county and
that  he  has  no  legal  obligations  to  Carmody.    We  agree.    By Swank’s  own
admission, he and Carmody never entered into a contract.   We will not conclude a
contract exists when no evidence supports such a conclusion.
¶20    Swank  also  claims  that  Wood  County  effectuated  a  de  facto
modification of the terms of his Holding Tank Agreement.   He argues that the
agreement identifies narrow circumstances under which the county may charge a
special  assessment  against  him.                                                      None  of  those  circumstances  include
recordkeeping costs.   Therefore, he claims that he never agreed to pay for such
costs.   Wood County asserts that PSSO 702 establishes the $36 fee, not Swank’s
Holding Tank Agreement.   It argues that the Holding Tank Agreement does not
exclusively  govern  the  regulation  of  Swank’s  tank;  rather,                       “many  provisions,
regulations,  ordinances and  statutes”  govern private  sewage systems in  Wood
10




No.   02-3347
County.   We agree.   Swank must comply with Wood County Ordinances as well
as  the  terms  of  the  Holding  Tank  Agreement.    Because  PSSO 702  does  not
contradict any of the terms of the Holding Tank Agreement, we need not address
which provision supercedes.  The fee does not constitute a de facto modification of
the Holding Tank Agreement.
8.   Swank Did Not Already Pay Fee
¶21    Swank contends that he paid $61 pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 145.19
for a   sanitary permit.   He claims the county cannot charge him $36 annually for
recordkeeping  costs  because  he  already  paid  for  his  sanitary  permit.    Wood
County asserts that the permit fee and recordkeeping fees are separate charges.
We  agree.    Section  145.19  authorizes  the  $61  fee  for  the  permit;  PSSO 702
imposes the  $36 fee annually for the costs of recordkeeping.    Swank has not
persuaded us that these fees are redundant.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.   See WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
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