Simms v. Oedekoven
1992 WY 124
839 P.2d 381
Case Number: 92-97
Decided: 09/28/1992
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert J. SIMMS, Petitioner,
v.
Byron
OEDEKOVEN, Sheriff of Campbell County, Respondent.
[1.] In an original
proceeding on accused's petition for writ of habeas corpus, accused challenged
denial of pretrial bail on grounds that he presented serious flight risk. The
Supreme Court, Thomas, J., held that rule providing that bail may be denied in
such circumstances violated State Constitution.
[2.] Order on writ
confirmed.
Wyoming Public Defender
Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Stephen R. Johnson, Sr. Asst.
Public Defender, for
petitioner.
Joseph
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Wolff,
Asst. Atty. Gen., for
respondent.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,
URBIGKIT*, and GOLDEN,
JJ.
* Chief Justice at time of oral
argument.
THOMAS, Justice.
[3.] The constitutional
question presented in this matter is whether a finding by a judicial officer,
pursuant to Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1, that no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant justifies a refusal to
set bail. The county court for Campbell County, Wyoming concluded that, in this
instance, the only sufficient surety to assure the appearance of the defendant,
Robert J. Simms (Simms), was detention and, therefore, the court refused to set
bail despite the language of Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the
State of Wyoming which provides, "[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great." We hold that the provisions of Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1 contravene
Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution, and there was no justification for
the court's refusal to set bail. The Constitution of the State of Wyoming must control over
the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Order on Writ of
Habeas Corpus entered June 12, 1992 in this matter is confirmed in every
respect.
[4.] We have a limited
record in this matter and, consequently, we rely primarily upon the allegations
of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus together with the documents attached
to that Petition. The underlying facts are not disputed by the State of
Wyoming. From
these documents, it appears that about 9:00 P.M. on January 22, 1992 Simms
accompanied a woman whom he had just met to her motel room in Gillette, Wyoming. After they entered the room, she left
Simms alone for a few minutes while she used the bathroom. Sometime that
evening, or early the next morning, Simms left. After he left, the victim
realized that she was missing some valuable jewelry and a substantial sum of
money.
[5.] On January 25, 1992,
Simms was arrested in South Dakota on the charge of grand larceny filed in
Wyoming pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 6-3-402(a), (c)(i) (1988).1 Simms did not consent to
extradition from South
Dakota and, after a contested extradition hearing, he
was ordered extradited about April 24, 1992. At his initial court appearance,
the prosecution requested, and received, a continuance pursuant to Wyo.
R.Crim.P. 46.1(f).2 Simms' initial appearance then was
pursued on April 28, 1992, and the judge of the county court found that Simms
was "a serious flight risk" who would not likely appear voluntarily at his
trial. The county court judge ruled, consistently with this finding, that Simms
should be held without bond pending adjudication of his case, in accordance with
the provisions of Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e).
[6.] Following that ruling,
Simms petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was filed with this court on
April 29, 1992. Simms' contention in his petition was that he was illegally
detained because he was denied his right to bail by the ruling of the county
court.
[7.] This issue is one of
first impression in Wyoming, and we have not found a precedent for
the circumstances presented in any other jurisdiction. The issue posed is
whether Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e), which permits detention without bail for an
accused who is found to be a flight risk, is compatible with the provisions of
Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution.
[8.] In resisting the
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the State argues that it was appropriate to
hold Simms without bail because Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e) allows detention if "[t]he
judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of
any other person and the community." This rule provision was modeled after 18
U.S.C. 3142 (1984), a provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The federal
courts have upheld the federal statute against a variety of constitutional
attacks. U.S. v. Parker, 848 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1988) (Fifth Amendment); U.S. v.
Walker, 808 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986) (due process); U.S. v. Portes, 786 F.2d
758 (7th Cir. 1985) (Fifth and Eighth Amendments); U.S. v. Savides, 658 F. Supp.
1399 (N.D.Ill. 1987), aff'd 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied ___ U.S.
___, 110 S.Ct. 3286, 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111
S.Ct. 210, 112 L.Ed.2d 170 (1990), on remand 758 F. Supp. 466 (N.D.Ill. 1991)
(due process). We can see no reason why the federal courts could not also find
it compatible with the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United
States which provides only that "excessive bail
shall not be required." In our view, Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e) would not be
invalidated by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
That Constitution, however, does not encompass language articulating a right to
bail as does Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming
Constitution.
[9.] This court previously
has interpreted the language in our state constitution in this
way:
The
right to furnish bail with sufficient sureties, then, arises in favor of any
person accused of crime, and before conviction, absolutely and without exception
in cases of all crimes not punishable with death * * *.
State v. Crocker, 5
Wyo. 385, 40
P. 681, 685 (1895).
Decisions
in other states bearing on the same or similar constitutional language are
afforded persuasive effect. Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1977). We have
considered similar constitutional provisions from other states and have sought
guidance from their courts with respect to the interpretation of this provision.
See Petition of Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (listing
comparatively the constitutional provisions of the several states). We have
found no other state that has held that an accused can be held without bail
solely because he is perceived to be a flight risk, however serious.3 Some courts have recognized the
possibility of such a rule. State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972). New Jersey, however, has
cited Crocker in support of two propositions:
The
purpose [of denying bail in capital cases] is, of course, to deny bail where the
prisoner's assumed apprehension of being put to death if found guilty creates
the hazard that he will forfeit the bail rather than forfeit his life. Where
there is no such hazard bail attends even capital cases.
Application of Corbo,
54 N.J. Super. 575, 149 A.2d 828, 834 (1959).
[I]t
was said that an attempt by the lawmakers to forbid bail after indictment
whether or not proof to the required degree appeared, could not
survive.
State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740, 744
(1960).
[10.] We also have held that the constitutional
standards promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States are minimal, and
those rights may be enlarged pursuant to state constitutional provisions if that
approach is justifiable. Richmond v. State, 554
P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976). See also Washakie County School
District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom., Hot Springs County School District Number 1 v. Washakie County School
District Number 1, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980). Our holding
is consistent with general law to this effect:
Nevertheless,
* * * the state courts may exceed the federal courts in the granting of rights
under the state's own laws or the state's own constitution, as long as they do
not violate a restriction of federal law.
JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.6, at 21 (4th ed.
1991).
[11.] Our primary judicial obligation is to
uphold the constitution.
By the
constitution which [the people] establish, they not only tie up the hands of
their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers
of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take
action in opposition to this fundamental law.
1 THOMAS M. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 81 (8th ed. 1927).
In the
first decade after statehood, this court quoted from an earlier work of Cooley
saying:
In
American constitutional law the word "constitution" is used in a restricted
sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon by the people of the
Union, or any one of the states, as the absolute rule of action and decision for
all departments and officers of the government, in respect to all the points
covered by it, which must control until it shall be changed by the authority
which established it.
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7
Wyo. 117, 50
P. 819, 823 (1897) (citation omitted).
[12.] The language of Article 1, Section 14 of
the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides without equivocation that
"all persons shall be bailable," and it must control the right to bail over Wyo.
R.Crim.P. 46.1(e). Similarly, it affords a greater right than is specified in
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Our constitution does not permit denial of bail on the ground that the accused
is considered to be a serious flight risk.
[13.] Another argument advanced by the State is
that the language of the constitution is sufficiently expansive to provide for
pretrial detention when the accused is a flight risk. The State looks to the
language that focuses upon "sufficient sureties." The argument is that the
sufficiency of potential sureties is to be considered in connection with a bail
hearing and, if no surety is perceived to be adequate to compel the accused to
reappear for trial, then he may be detained to provide the "sufficient
sureties." According to the State's argument, "petitioner was a significant
flight risk, since he had no ties to the community, no job, no family in the
area, and had given the police three different social security numbers and may
be using different names." There is no reason to disagree with the position of
the State that Simms, indeed, is a serious flight risk.
[14.] In presenting this contention, the State
appears to invert the applicable concepts relative to constitutional
application. The State, in effect, is seeking to invoke an exception to what is
a clear extension of a right to bail. The general rule is that constitutional
provisions should be broadly and liberally construed in order to provide the
flexibility to meet changing conditions without departing from the basic
principles that are articulated. See cases cited in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law
18, nn. 67-70 (1984). Conversely, if an exception is articulated or perceived
with respect to a constitutional provision, it is to be narrowly and strictly
construed. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 313 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1975); Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 281 N.E.2d 248
(1972). The language of Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State
of Wyoming is
not vague or ambiguous. There is a clear exception for capital offenses only
when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and there is no indication
that there is an exception to be found with respect to the right to bail if the
only sufficient surety is detention. The application of the concept of narrow
construction of such a perceived exception leads us to the conclusion that it is
not available to avoid the setting of bail for Simms.
[15.] In structuring yet a third reason to
justify pretrial detention in the case of someone found to be a significant
flight risk, the State of Wyoming points to the language in the rules to
the effect that "the judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that
results in the pretrial detention of the person." Wyo.R.Crim.R. 46.1(c)(2). The
State's argument is that the judge was foreclosed from imposing a financial
condition for release that results in pretrial detention. Therefore, the State
contends, the judge must turn to other means of assuring appearance for trial
and, under the federal standard, that may encompass continued detention. The
State, in effect, argues that the judge must choose between imposing a financial
condition that results in pretrial detention or pretrial detention because of
the risk of flight. This argument fails to acknowledge that either course would
violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming
Constitution.
[16.] We are unable to accept this argument by
the State of Wyoming. Wyo. R.Crim.P. 46.1(c)(2) is not pertinent to
whether the individual who is charged will be admitted to bail. Rather, that
provision inhibits setting the amount of bail at an amount so high that it would
substantively and actually deny bail to the accused. Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S.Ct. 1179, 97 L.Ed. 1642 (1953)
(Opinion of Justice Douglas Sitting in Chambers). In this case, the question of
excessive bail is not before us since no bail was set. In this regard, however,
the purpose of the required surety is to assure the appearance of the accused at
his trial. "The word `appearance' means a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction in whatever form manifested." Ex parte Forbell, 82 N YS.2d 109, 110
(N.Y.S.Ct., Special Term, Richmond County 1948) (quoting Citizens' Trust Co. of
Utica v. R. Prescott & Son, Inc., 221 A.D. 426, 223 N.Y.S. 191, 197 (4th
Dept.
1927)). See generally the cases cited in 6 C.J.S. Appearances 18
(1975). We are in accord that bail may not be set so as to inhibit the release
of the accused, but it may be set higher than the amount perceived to be
necessary to forcibly return the accused to trial.
[17.] The amount of bail, like any other
condition of probation, is designed to assure the appearance of the accused when
he is ordered to appear. In setting bail, the court may consider the sum
reasonably necessary to cause one to appear, rather than flee the court's
jurisdiction. In this regard, we note our holding that violations of other
conditions of bail, including a requirement of good behavior, can cause
forfeiture of the bond, reaffirming our decision in Application of Allied
Fidelity Insurance Co., 664 P.2d 1322 (Wyo. 1983). We recognize that determining
the amount of surety which is sufficient to cause the accused to appear,
together with other appropriate conditions for the admission of an accused to
bail, is a demanding judicial task, but it is a decision the law
requires.
[18.] The Order on Writ of Habeas Court of this
court entered June 12, 1992 is confirmed in every respect.
FOOTNOTES
1 Wyo. Stat. 6-3-402(a),
(c)(i) (1988) provides:
(a) A person who
steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent
to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of
larceny.
* *
*.
(c) Except as provided
by subsection (e) of this section, larceny is:
(i) A felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more * * *.
2 Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(f) provides, in
pertinent part:
The
hearing shall be held immediately upon the defendant's first appearance before
the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the state, seeks a
continuance.
3 Both Illinois and Pennsylvania have suggested that bail may be
denied if the accused is a serious flight risk, but their cases are
distinguishable because the accused in each was charged with murder. People ex
rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill.2d 74, 322 N.E.2d 837 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Segers, 460 Pa. 149, 331 A.2d 462
(1975).
Citationizer Summary of Documents Citing This Document
Cite | Name | Level | |
---|---|---|---|
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases | |||
Cite | Name | Level | |
1993 WY 13, 846 P.2d 604, | Saldana v. State | Cited | |
1997 WY 42, 934 P.2d 740, | V-1 Oil Co. v. State | Cited | |
2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, | OLSEN v. STATE | Cited | |
2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, | CATHCART v. MEYER | Cited |
Cite | Name | Level | |
---|---|---|---|
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases | |||
Cite | Name | Level | |
1979 OK CR 97, 601 P.2d 103, | PETITION OF HUMPHREY | Cited | |
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases | |||
Cite | Name | Level | |
1977 WY 71, 568 P.2d 855, | Matter of Johnson | Cited | |
1980 WY 5, 606 P.2d 310, | Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler | Cited | |
1983 WY 69, 664 P.2d 1322, | Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. | Cited |