State, Dept. of Family Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services v. DDM
1994 WY 70
877 P.2d 259
Case Number: C-93-6
Decided: 06/29/1994
Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES; and STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., BJC, a minor child,
Appellants (Petitioners),
v.
DDM,
Appellee (Respondent).
Appeal
from the District Court of Park County: The Honorable Hunter Patrick,
Judge
Representing Appellants: Frank D. Peasley and Kari Jo
Gray of Gray & Associates, Douglas, WY.
Representing
Appellee: P. Jaye Rippley of Brown & Drew, Casper, WY.
Before
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J.
Ret.
CARDINE,
Justice.
[1] The Department
of Family Services (DFS) appeals from a district court order awarding attorney
fees to DDM, who successfully defended an allegation of paternity. DFS claims
that attorney fees are not statutorily authorized against it and, in the
alternative, the award in this case was unreasonable.
[2] We affirm.
[3] DFS frames the issues for review as
follows:
I.
Did the trial court err in assessing a putative father's attorney fees and costs
against the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services under Wyoming
Statutes 14-2-114 (1977 as amended) in a child support establishment action
brought by that Department pursuant to congressional mandate as implemented
under the Wyoming Child Support Enforcement Act, Wyoming Statutes 20-6-101
through 109 (as amended)?
II. In a paternity action brought by the
State of Wyoming pursuant to the Child Support Enforcement Act, is it
unreasonable for the trial court to award fees and costs to a putative lather
and against the State under Wyoming Statutes 14-2-114 (1977 as amended) when
it has been established that the putative lather had sexual access to the mother
at the time of conception and the action is dismissed immediately following the
filing of genetic test results excluding the putative
father?
FACTS
[4] The facts are brief and uncontroverted.
On November 24, 1992, DFS filed a Petition to Establish Paternity and Support
for a minor child against DDM and JAD. The mother of the child did not know who
the father was but had narrowed the possibilities down to DDM and JAD. DDM and
JAD both admitted to having sexual access to the mother at the time of
conception.
[5] DDM and JAD
agreed to have genetic tests taken to determine if either was the father. The
genetic tests eliminated both JAD and DDM as possible fathers. The district
court then dismissed the action against them.
[6] DDM then filed a motion for reasonable
attorney fees and costs which the district court granted in the amount of $
601.97. The district court based its award on W.S. 1-14-126(b) (1993 Cum.Supp.)
and W.S. 14-2-114 (1993 Cum.Supp.). DFS now appeals that
award.
DISCUSSION
[7] We begin with the language of the
statutes at issue. Wyoming Statute 1-14-126(b) provides:
In civil actions for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party without requiring expert testimony. In exercising its discretion the court may consider the following factors:
(i)
The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(ii) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular
employment precluded other employment by the lawyer;
(iii) The fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(iv) The amount involved and the results
obtained;
(v) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(vi) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(vii) The experience, reputation and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and
(viii) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
(emphasis
added). Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 states that
the court may order reasonable fees of counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad litem, and other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings including genetic tests, to be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the court.
Wyoming
Statute 1-14-126(b) permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees
to a prevailing party in civil actions when such an award is authorized. The
question we confront is whether W.S. 14-2-114 authorizes an award of attorney
fees against DFS. Our answer depends on whether or not DFS is a "party" as that
word is used in the statute.
[8]
Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 allows a court to impose costs, including
reasonable fees of counsel, on the pares "in proportions and at times determined
by the court." DFS correctly points out that "parties" is not defined in the
statute or anywhere else in the Wyoming Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 to -120.
DFS claims that it is not a party but rather a "functionary" in the sense that
it has no choice or interest in the action but it must, by law, attempt to
establish the paternity of children whose mothers receive state financial
assistance. See W.S. 20-6-101 et seq. (Wyoming Child Support
Enforcement Act). DFS also points to W.S. 14-2-107 to support its position,
claiming that the statute limits "parties" to the natural mother, the presumed
lathers and the alleged fathers.
[9] DDM counters that the Wyoming Parentage
Act, read in its entirety, provides for the State to be a party. DDM also notes
that DFS has an interest in the matter because a determination of paternity in a
father reduces the amount of support the State is required to pay. Finally, DDM
argues that the State is a party because it had standing to bring this action
and DFS identified itself in its petition as a "party."
[10] Since the disputed word "parties" in
14-2-114 is subject to varying interpretations in this context, we turn to
extrinsic aids of interpretation. See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game
& Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993).
In connection with judicial proceedings the term "parties" is a technical word which has a precise meaning in legal parlance. It designates the opposing litigants in a judicial proceeding -- the persons seeking to establish a right and those upon whom it is sought to impose a corresponding duty or liability; it includes all the persons by whom or against whom a suit, either at law or in equity, is brought.
59
Am.Jur.2d Parties 7 (1987). A "party" has also been defined as one who
"is directly interested in the subject matter of the suit or some part thereof,
who has a right to make defenses, control proceedings and examine and
cross-examine the witnesses." Helge v. Druke, 136 Ariz. 434, 666 P.2d
534, 537 (Ariz.App. 1983) citing Chalpin v. Mobile Gardens, Inc., 18
Ariz. App. 231, 501 P.2d 407 (Ariz.App. 1972).
[11] In this case, DFS initiated the action
by filing the petition alleging DDM's paternity. DFS's attorney signed the
stipulation for genetic testing and the order approving the tests. The attorney
also filed the motion to dismiss the action against DDM after the tests were
negative. DFS is listed as a petitioner in the captions of documents filed in
the district court, including those filed by its counsel. Clearly, DFS
participated in and exercised control over the proceedings below. There can be
no doubt that DFS was a party.
[12] Furthermore, DFS was a "real party in
interest" since it stood to benefit if the father could have been
identified. Weber v. City of Cheyenne, 55 Wyo. 202, 209, 97 P.2d 667, 669
(1940) ("[a] 'real party in interest' is one who has an actual and substantial
interest in the subject * * * *."). A mother, as prerequisite to receiving state
aid, is required to assign to DFS any support obligations to which she is
entitled. W.S. 20-6-106(a).
[13]
DFS's assertion that it is not a party because it was required by statute
to bring this action is irrelevant to whether DFS is a party. While the degree
of discretion accorded an agency may affect the decision to file an action, it
does not relate in any way to the status of the agency once the action has been
filed in court. An agency cannot bring an action and then claim it is not a
party. See Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental
Quality Council, 869 P.2d 435, 438-39 (Wyo. 1994).
[14] DFS also asserts that attorney fees
cannot be imposed against it because there is no statute which specifically
authorizes such an award. While a statute that waives sovereign immunity is
strictly construed to favor the government, we conclude that the statute in
question, W.S. 14-2-114, authorizes an award of attorney fees against DFS. See
Powder River, at 439.
[15]
Wyoming Statute 14-2-114 allows an award of attorney fees against "the
parties in proportions and at times determined by the court." The Wyoming
Parentage Act contemplates that DFS will be a party to some actions under the
title. W.S. 14-2-104(c) (1993 Cum.Supp.). We have already found that DFS was a
party to this action. Therefore, we conclude that 14-2-114 authorizes an award
against DFS.
[16] This cane
is analogous to Powder River. The statute at issue in that case referred
only to a "party" and did not make specific reference to the State or the
agency. Id., at 437-38. We concluded that, in part, the plain meaning of
that statute authorized the Department of Environmental Quality to make an award
of attorney fees against itself in the appropriate circumstances. Id., at
439. Similarly, W.S. 14-2-114 authorizes an award of attorney fees against
DFS.
[17] Finally, DFS
argues that even if an award is authorized, the district court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to DDM in this case. Essentially DFS
argues that any award against it is unreasonable because it does not have any
discretion in bringing the action, it must rely on what the mother told them and
DDM should not be allowed to "benefit" from extra-marital sex -- he should
accept the consequences of his act including the possibility of a paternity
action. DFS also suggests that DDM was not a "prevailing party" under W.S.
1-14-126(b).
[18] We review
an award of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard. LC v.
TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo. 1994).
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.
Martinez
v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). See also LC, 870 P.2d at
381, and Rodgers v. Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo.
1981).
[19] The district
court did not give any reasons for its award. However, we find that the award
was reasonable in amount and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. There can be no doubt that DDM was a "prevailing party" -- he
avoided being adduced the father and becoming responsible for all the
obligations that determination would entail. We are not persuaded by the policy
arguments of DFS and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting them.
CONCLUSION
[20] DFS was a party to the action, and W.S.
14-2-114 authorized an award of attorney fees against it. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorney fees to DDM. Therefore, the
district court's decision is affirmed.
Citationizer Summary of Documents Citing This Document
Cite | Name | Level | |
---|---|---|---|
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases | |||
Cite | Name | Level | |
1994 WY 141, 886 P.2d 595, | McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co. | Cited | |
1996 WY 127, 925 P.2d 231, | Rocha v. Rocha | Cited | |
1997 WY 17, 931 P.2d 953, | Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div | Cited | |
1997 WY 70, 938 P.2d 861, | Johnston v. Stephenson | Cited | |
2008 WY 127, 193 P.3d 1167, | TRACY L. RINGOLSBY, JR., and JANE E. SWANHORST V. DALLAS C. JOHNSON, ARLA JOHNSON, DALMAC CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, DALMAC HOMES, INCORPORATED, AAA LAZY D LAND COMPANY, LLC, and AAA LAZY D ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED | Cited |
Cite | Name | Level | |
---|---|---|---|
Wyoming Supreme Court Cases | |||
Cite | Name | Level | |
1940 WY 3, 97 P.2d 667, 55 Wyo. 202, | Weber v. City of Cheyenne | Cited | |
1980 WY 51, 611 P.2d 831, | Martinez v. State | Cited | |
1981 WY 67, 627 P.2d 1381, | Rodgers v. Rodgers | Cited | |
1993 WY 10, 845 P.2d 1040, | Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n | Cited | |
1994 WY 29, 870 P.2d 374, | LC v. TL | Cited | |
1994 WY 21, 869 P.2d 435, | Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council | Cited |